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Abstract
The vast majority of Africans living in rural areas do not have access to health insurance 
and policy related questions to assist health planners design and implement financially 
viable rural health insurance schemes have yet to be fully addressed. This thesis seeks to 
fill some existing gaps in the knowledge about the performance of existing schemes and 
methods of assessing “willingness to pay” (WTP) and financial feasibility. It begins with 
a review of the literature on the theory of insurance and its practice in rural areas in Sub- 
Saharan Africa, that contributed to the research conceptual framework and 
implementation.
Two health insurance schemes (La Carte d'Assurance Maladie and the Abota in Burundi 
and Guinea Bissau), were evaluated regarding their social and financial performance in 
rural areas. The research instruments were household surveys, focus group discussions 
and health facility costing. In both schemes access to health care appeared to have 
improved and the findings suggested that were quality of care improved, the schemes 
would considerably reduce financial concerns faced by people at the time of illness. They 
would also raise significant revenue.
In the third study country, Ghana, a study of preferred benefit options, WTP, and 
community rated premiums for a proposed health insurance scheme was undertaken in a 
rural area. In undertaking this feasibility study, the research developed a WTP instrument 
and used a contingent valuation approach. Eight hundred households participated in the 
study. Eighty percent of households said they would be willing to pay the premium 
required to recover 100% of the non-salary recurrent costs of providing OPD care in a 
local clinic and inpatient care in a hospital. The stated WTP was conditional on: a) the 
insurance scheme giving access to health care in which drugs and basic laboratory 
investigations would be available, b) health staff being professionally qualified and 
respectful, and c) a local solidarity association having a role in administering the 
participating health facilities.
Econometric analysis of households’ WTP for outpatient insurance cover supported the 
hypothesis that WTP is influenced by a) the experience of frequent difficulties in paying
WTP for RHI-Abstract & Acknowledgement i
for health care in the past; b) the perception that adults in the household are healthier than 
those in other households; and c) the household head’s sex, education and religion.
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Chapter 1: Introduction, aims and objectives and structure of thesis
INTRODUCTION
The scarcity of resources for health care activities is global, and sometimes the situation 
is compounded by inefficient and inequitable financing of the public health services. In 
sub-Saharan Africa, the context has been declining economic growth. (During the period 
1980 to 1991 low-income Sub-Saharan African countries had an average GNP growth 
rate o f-1.2% (World Bank 1993).) The situation has been caused by severe droughts, 
deteriorating terms of trade for agricultural and mining products and failings in 
government policies. Consequently, rationalization of the financing mechanisms in the 
health sector has been, and continues to be, seen as crucial if improvements in quality and 
accessibility are to be realized. This has led policy makers to consider a spectrum of 
financing options for Africa, ranging from user charges to achieve 100% cost recovery 
on the one hand to comprehensive national health insurance schemes on the other. In 
recent years several African governments, sometimes in collaboration with donor 
agencies, have proposed introducing or expanding insurance-based health care financing 
(Vogel 1990).
The rationale for encouraging insurance financing rather than user fees, which tend to 
reduce utilization, is that it will achieve the following. It will, 1) raise additional revenue 
to fund the cost of health care provision that may be used to improve quality, 2) diminish 
financial barriers to obtaining health care at the time of illness by providing risk averse 
individuals the opportunity to maintain income in despite of the uncertainty associated 
with health care consumption, 3) depending on the design, encourage providers and 
consumers to use health services cost-effectivelv. Diminishing financial barriers would be 
particularly beneficial for those who are vulnerable, such as the poor, the chronically ill, 
the elderly and children, and would be achieved by sharing the financial risks associated 
with ill health and health care consumption among an insured population. As a 
consequence the cost of caring for those with high risks of ill health, ie the very young, 
the elderly and the chronically ill, would be subsidized by those with lower risks, ie those
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in the middle years of life and the healthy.
The majority of people in Sub-Saharan Africa live in rural communities and therefore the 
research focus was health insurance (risk sharing for health care) that is accessible to 
people living outside the urban centres. Individuals in this group are not employed in the 
formal sector, such as commerce and industry, they are engaged in small scale farming, 
sometimes combined with petty trading and/or the production of local handcrafts. Their 
cash incomes are, as a result, relatively low and seasonal. ‘Access’ in this context 
therefore implies that the premium level and the payment schedule are compatible with 
this pattern and level of cash income. Community participation in the design of the scheme 
is the main mechanism for achieving financial compatibility and, in addition, helps to 
ensure that the benefit packages offered by the schemes are socially and culturally 
acceptable to the community.
In evaluating the policy relevance of health insurance to rural populations in Africa, it is 
essential to consider health insurance as a risk sharing mechanism employed to harness 
private funds for health care, and reduce the financial barrier faced by vulnerable groups 
to obtaining care. This is in contrast to defining health insurance as those administrative 
and financial arrangements that exist in many developed countries for pooling health care 
risks. The latter definition would imply that schemes in richer countries represent 
universally relevant models, whereas the former suggests that the more pertinent 
experiences are those of countries such as Burundi, Guinea Bissau, Thailand and Zaire, 
who have implemented insurance schemes that provide cover for rural populations. Their 
rural schemes provide policy relevant information and illustrate the potential for 
innovative and “appropriate technology” approaches to health insurance in African 
countries. To complement such information, health planners require tools specifically 
designed to evaluate the social benefits and costs, and the financial viability, of rural 
health insurance schemes in their specific national settings.
When the organization of a health insurance scheme involves action by social institutions, 
communities and the State, either in isolation or in collaboration, the scheme becomes a
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social security programme. In effect it represents public action taken to reduce human 
deprivation and to eliminate vulnerability (Burgess & Stern 1991). Thus, in this thesis ‘a 
rural health insurance scheme’ refers to a formal social-security orientated programme 
in which the community, through its representatives, fully or partially controls a pool of 
resources. This pool consists of payments by insurees used to fund all or part of the health 
care costs of community members. This definition implies that the communities explicitly 
or implicitly participate in the design and the implementation of a scheme.
HYPOTHESES AND OBJECTIVES
Hypotheses
Currently, little analytical information is available about rural health insurance schemes, 
particularly on the affordability of premiums, the appropriateness of payment schedules, 
the relationships between premiums and benefits, and the resulting level of access to 
health care among the population. The thesis reports on the objectives, desk studies and 
empirical investigations of a health economics research project, "Community Health 
Insurance in Developing Countries and Its Feasibility in Ghana”. This project aimed to 
redress this gap in knowledge. Prior to its implementation only a few studies in the 
subregion had addressed some of these questions in relation to risk sharing schemes for 
rural populations. They included the evaluations of the Abota village insurance scheme 
in Guinea-Bissau (Chabot et al 1991; Eklund & Stavem 1990) and hospital prepayment 
in Zaire (Moens 1990). In order that other rural areas can initiate schemes that are 
appropriate for their populations, guidelines/protocols are required to assist local/district 
health planners and managers to assess the preference for, and willingness to pay for, 
insurance schemes in their localities. By testing the following hypotheses, the research 
thesis on health insurance in developing countries and its feasibility in Ghana aimed to 
increase the information available and develop an assessment protocol.
Hypothesis 1
* A health insurance scheme in a developing Sub-Saharan African country can be 
effective in reducing the financial barriers faced by those who are most vulnerable,
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such as the poor, the chronically ill, the elderly and children, and be financially 
viable.
Hypothesis 2
* The health care utilization pattern of rural households in a subdistrict in Ghana, 
their stated preferences for insurance coverage and basic health facility cost data, 
can be used to forecast the relationship between premiums that households are 
willing and able to pay, and those premiums that will cover a given percentage of 
the costs of providing care for those households.
The broad aim of the research was to evaluate schemes for sharing the risks associated 
with ill health and health care consumption in several rural areas in sub-Saharan Africa, 
and to use the results as inputs in the design and implementation of a study of the 
feasibility of a community-based scheme in a subdistrict in Ghana. It was envisaged that 
later the study protocol would be revised in the light of the research findings and 
implementation experiences into a pilot protocol to be tested by other districts.
Objectives
The specific objectives with regards to both the evaluations and feasibility study were as 
follows:
1. To examine the literature on the economic demand for health insurance by rural
households in Sub-Saharan African countries.
2. To assess empirically the degree of risk pooling1 (Friedman 1986) achieved by,
and the financial performances of, three African health insurance schemes that 
cater for rural populations.
3 To investigate the factors determining participation of rural households in health
insurance schemes, in particular the affordability of the premiums and the 
appropriateness of payment schedules.
1 Risk pooling here refers to aggregating the uncertain financial consequences of ill-health faced by
many individuals to give a population that experiences an actual total health expenditure close to the 
expected.
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4. To determine if high risk groups such as women and children have improved 
access to health care under existing rural health insurance schemes.
5. To ascertain the types of schemes that are preferred by communities in a sub­
district in Ghana and the premiums that households in this area would be willing 
to pay for different benefit options.
6. To make recommendations to the Ministry of Health Ghana based on the findings 
of the study, on the feasibility, accessibility and efficiency of different health 
insurance schemes for the rural and informal labour sector.
STRUCTURE OF THESIS
The thesis is organised into three parts corresponding to i) a review of the literature on 
the theory of insurance and its practice, particular in rural areas in Sub-Saharan Africa, ii) 
the methods and findings of empirical studies on health insurance carried out in 3 field 
sites in Sub-Saharan Africa, and iii) discussions about financial and social consequences 
of implementing health insurance schemes for rural populations in Sub-Saharan Africa.
Part One consists of this introduction followed by a review of the relevant literature in 
chapters 2 and 3; the former describes the economic concepts of risk aversion and 
expected utility maximization that are postulated as underlying individual decisions to 
purchase health insurance and the problems of adverse selection and moral hazard 
commonly found in functioning insurance markets. It also considers the argument for 
publicly organised health insurance found in economic literature, including 
interdependence of individual preference functions for health care consumption, positive 
externalities associated with health care and separation of Pareto efficiency and social 
efficiency in the market for health care.
The second half of chapter 2 performs two tasks; a) it discusses the conceptual 
development of Willingness to Pay (WTP) methodology and its application in Contingent
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Valuation studies in the health care sector of developing countries, and b) reviews 
models of health care expenditure as a function of user prices in the absence of insurance 
as a starting point for identifying the exogenous variables for insurance demand studies. 
Where past preferences cannot be observed, WTP provides a means of obtaining 
consumer valuations of health care and insurance policies. In many developing countries, 
past preference data on quantities purchased at different prices are not available because 
health care has traditionally been free at the point of use or insurance has not been offered 
for purchase to the majority of the population.
Chapter 3 presents a review of the limited available literature on formal health insurance 
activities in Sub-Saharan Africa. It provides a general overview of scales of activity and 
the policy trends and makes references to specific schemes in the literature as illustrations 
in focusing on schemes that provide cover for rural populations.
Part two begins by presenting the research questions that emerge from the main findings 
of the literature reviews. This is followed by descriptions of the objectives and study 
methods used in the different studies undertaken as part of the research (chapter 4) and 
by the socio-economic backgrounds of the three countries where field work was carried 
out, Burundi, Guinea Bissau and Ghana (chapter 5). Although the chapter focuses mainly 
on the health financing situation in these countries, it also describes rural economic 
activities to provide insight into the levels and characteristics of cash flows in households, 
in particular seasonal fluctuations. This information is required to interpret the findings 
relating to the premiums household heads reported they were able and willing to pay and 
their preferred payment schedules.
Evaluation findings about health insurance schemes in two study areas, Muyinga Province 
in Burundi and Gabu in Guinea Bissau, are presented in chapter 6. The first half of the 
chapter presents the results relating to the financial and social performance of the CAM 
in the former study area and is preceded by a description of the scheme. The Abota 
system in the latter study area is the focus of the remainder of chapter 6 and relies on 
data from the empirical research carried out in the Gabu Region in October 1992.
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Chapters 7, 8 and 9 contain the results of the feasibility study carried out in Ghana, the 
“Osudoku health expenditure and health insurance study”. They describe and interpret 
those findings that relate to (a) the incidence of morbidity, the pattern of health care 
utilization and health care expenditure of the study population (chapter 7); and (b) local 
perceptions about health insurance, "willingness to pay "for health insurance and 
predictions about affordability and revenue (chapter 8). The final results chapter initially 
reviews two categories of demand studies that are used to model the demand in the 
health insurance market; direct models using the conceptual framework of utility 
maximization under uncertainty, and indirect models arising from insurance- conditioned 
demand for health care. This chapter concludes by presenting a regression analysis of the 
factors influencing willingness to pay for health insurance and discusses the predictions 
arising from the regression model.
Finally, Part Three of the thesis consists of discussions and conclusions (chapters 10 and 
11). Critical findings that are relevant to policy decisions about financial and social 
consequences of implementing health insurance in rural settings are identified in this 
chapter. This chapter also considers the lessons learnt with regard to contingent valuation 
of the demand for health related goods in general, and health insurance in particular, in 
an African context.
Chapter 11 presents the major research conclusions relating to the demand for health 
insurance in the study countries and comments on how they provide support for the 
research hypotheses. It also describes the policy implications of the research findings for 
health care financing in Ghana and in other Sub-Saharan African countries. In 
conclusion, future studies needed to (a) assess and manage adverse selection that may 
arise from increasing numbers of AIDS patients in Ghana and (b) evaluate the impact of 
a district health insurance scheme on health sector efficiency and equity, are discussed.
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Chapter 2: A Review of health insurance theory and willingness to pay (WTP) 
studies
INTRODUCTION
This chapter reviews the literature on the theory of health insurance and the factors that 
affect the efficiency of the market for health insurance policies. The first part of the 
chapter focuses on the economic concepts that have been used to explain a) individual 
preference for health insurance cover and the willingness to pay for policies; b) strategies 
for regulating the quality of insurance contracts; and c) mechanisms by which 
inefficiencies arise in the market for health insurance. In the second part, a review of 
willingness to pay (WTP) studies in the health sectors of developing countries is 
presented. The WTP technique provides a means of obtaining consumer valuations of 
health care and insurance policies in situations where past data on the quantities purchased 
at different prices are not available. Understanding of the strengths and weaknesses of 
WTP methodology was central to the thesis since one of its objectives was to ascertain 
the premiums that households in a sub-district in Ghana would be willing to pay for 
different benefit options even though in the past insurance was unavailable to the study 
population.
INSURANCE AND PRINCIPLES OF DEMAND FOR POLICIES
Individuals are uncertain about the timing and form of their future health care 
consumption and consequently the cost of that consumption. These uncertainties in many 
situations have led to the demand for health insurance. Health insurance increases welfare 
by spreading the risk of financial loss due to illness and therefore maintains income. It 
also relieves the consumer from concerns about health care prices and income constraints 
at the time of illness. When health services are free, or virtually free, at the point of use 
some of the financial uncertainty (specifically the risk of income reduction due to health 
care expenditure) is removed and this may limit the demand for health insurance. This 
was the situation in many developing countries before the onset of the present decline in
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their economic growth rates. More recently patients have increasingly shared in the 
financing of government health services through the payment of consultation charges and 
the purchase of drugs and other renewable items because the health institutions have 
inadequate government provision. It is therefore conceivable that in Sub-Saharan Africa 
there is now increasing and significant demand for insurance policies to cover illness 
eventualities.
An insurance policy is "a state-contingent income claim" which is obtained before the state 
of the world is known. In other words, the policy entitles the buyer to wealth or income 
if and when the event against which he or she has insured occurs, and the policy is 
purchased before he or she knows whether the event will occur. The decision is therefore 
made under uncertainty. Faced with an uncertain situation in which one of the possible 
states of the world will result in financial loss, ie illness occurs and health care fees must 
be paid, a person may decide to protect himself by purchasing insurance cover. However 
the fact that insurance firms normally make profits is an indication that such a person pays 
more in premiums than his expected loss and therefore the decision to insure does not 
arise from a desire to maximize his expected income. Rather the decision to insure and 
the value he places on that insurance emerges from his attitude to risk and the manner in 
which his utility or true worth of wealth changes as wealth changes.
Expected Utility under uncertainty
Daniel Bernoulli in the early eighteenth century proposed that the true worth or utility of 
an individual’s wealth is the logarithm of the amount of money possessed. In 1947 John 
Von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstem offered a treatment of utility in which they 
proposed that a utility curve can be tailored for any individual provided that the 
assumption of the Expected Utility Theory holds. This theory states that individuals 
choose among alternatives in order to maximize expected utility.
The assumptions underlying this theory make it possible to determine utility values 
pertaining to a single individual who behaves consistently in accordance with his own 
tastes. Those originally postulated by Von Neumann and Morgenstem start by asserting
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that a person is able to determine, for any pair of outcomes, which she or he prefers or 
that both are regarded equally. Transitivity of preference is also assumed and reflects an 
individual’s consistency such that if A is preferred to B and B is preferred to C, then, A 
must be preferred to C. The third and fourth assumptions are those of Continuity and 
Substitutability indicating that an individual regards a gamble having the best and worst 
outcomes as rewards to be equally preferable to some middle outcome and that it can be 
substituted by a gamble that is equally regarded. The final assumption of the theory 
asserts that the preference for gamble between the same two outcomes increases as the 
probability of attaining the better outcome increases.
In applying state preference theory and the theory of expected utility maximization to 
explain insurance decisions, the orthodox literature on health insurance postulates that 
individuals purchase health insurance because they are risk averse consumers attempting 
to maximize expected utility (utility being the satisfaction derived from the consumption 
of a good or service) (Bernoulli 1738; Lapin 1987). Rees (1989) in his analysis of 
asymmetric information in the market for insurance, examined individuals' insurance 
decisions using the above theoretical framework of insurance. He employs state preference 
indifference curves to illustrate the relationship between expected wealth and utility in 
uncertainty. The first theory in this framework, the State Preference Theory, implies that 
a person's wealth is dependent on the state of the world and that given two different states 
of the world the marginal rate of substitution (the rate at which reductions in wealth in one 
state can be compensated by an increase in the other), is given by the slope of the line U° 
u° in figure 2.1. The second, the Theory of Expected Utility Maximization, implies that 
the expected utility is the probability weighted sum of utility in the possible states where 
the sum of the probabilities is one.
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Expected Wealth and Utility in Uncertainty
Figure 2.1
W‘, Wb = states of the world
Y1 Y and X'X = expected wealth lines = constants
The individual is indifferent between H and G 
H is a situation of certainty
G is risky leading to different levels of wealth according to the state of the world 
KL = difference in expected wealth between situations of certainty and risk
= Risk Premium
On any expected wealth line, there will be one certain position, H in figure 2.1, where 
wealth is the same irrespective of the state of the world and there will also be many risky 
positions. The difference in the expected wealth between a certain and risky position of 
the same utility (difference between L and K in figure 2.1) is known as the risk premium 
and is a measure of the individual's risk aversion. Risk aversion describes an attitude 
towards risk in which as wealth increases, the increase in satisfaction increases at a 
diminishing rate. It is one of the three basic attitudes to risk obtained by applying the 
Expected Theory of Utility and its assumptions, the other two being risk seeking and risk 
neutrality. Persons are accordingly described as being a risk averter, risk seeker and
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neutral risk taker. A risk averter will accept only a favourable gamble and will not pay a 
fair price to gamble; a risk seeker will pay a premium for the privilege of gambling; and 
a risk neutral individual considers the face value of money to be the true value and is 
therefore indifferent to a gamble and receiving the expected payoff.
Risk aversion and expected utility maximization
Insurance provides a risk averter the means of transferring the consequences of the worst 
outcome of an uncertain situation to an insurance firm by paying a positive price. A risk 
averter will therefore purchase insurance when the price does not exceed the sum of his 
individual monetary evaluation of the risk (pure risk cost) and the expected loss. This can 
be shown as follows. A risk averter has a utility function with respect to wealth which is 
characterised by a diminishing marginal utility o f wealth (figure 2.2). The utility function 
of a risk averter shows a concavity. If such an individual is at a point on the utility 
function so that he or she has an asset valued at V and faces the probability P that it will 
be stolen. In accordance with the Expected Utility Theoiy a risk averter will always prefer 
to buy insurance offered at a 'fair premium' n1, where a fair premium is defined as
n1 = expected loss = P.V 1
The expected utility from the risk E(U) is less than that utility offered by the certain
Utility of wealth 
U(W)
U(w-nJ) - - -
E(U)
U(w-v)
Wealth
0 W-V W -n W
W-p.v
Figure 2.2 (Adapted from Mayston (1989)) 
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wealth that remains after purchasing a fair premium insurance.
E(U) = P.U(w - v) + (1 - p).U(W) 2
E(U) < U(W - n1) 3
The conclusion is that he prefers a certain event to a risky event since even though both
yield the same expected monetary value of wealth yet he is not indifferent. He is 
willing to pay a positive price to avert the risky situation denoted by and defined as 
the difference between the expected value and the certain-value equivalent of the risky 
situation.
a, = ( W - P.V) - (W - n )  4
where
* . in = a, + n .i i
The risk averse person when faced with the above probabilities and payoffs will 
therefore be willing to buy insurance up to the value a! + n1 (the maxium premium the 
individual will be willing to pay). Hence, at becomes the maximum loading costs that 
he will accept from the suppliers,confirming that the decision to buy insurance is 
subject to the premium not exceeding the sum of the pure risk cost and the fair 
premium.
In the event that the degree of aversion increases the new utility function will have a 
greater degree of concavity. The same risk will then have a higher pure-risk cost of
a2 >
The individual, having acquired a greater degree of aversion, will now pay a higher 
positive price for certainty, corresponding to being willing to pay a higher price for the
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same insurance cover.
n 2 > n ! 6
In summary, risk aversion is an attitude towards risk which is consistent with a 
diminishing marginal utility o f wealth. This utility function is a concave curve, the 
concavity of which increases as the degree of aversion to risk increases. Greater 
concavity results in a higher pure-risk cost such that the individual will pay a higher 
price rather than face the uncertain situation. Increasing degrees of aversion affect a 
risk-averse person by making him or her willing to buy insurance at a higher price.
It can be inferred from the orthodox economic theory of utility maximization and decisions 
under uncertainty, that the degree of risk aversion in absolute terms is greater for a poor 
individual than for a rich individual. Classically this is depicted by constructing 
indifference curves which cling nearer to the certainty line and are more curved as one 
moves lower down on the indifference map. This inference is compatible with the intuitive 
notion that people in poor countries have greater absolute risk aversion than people in 
wealthier countries. Thus it could be inferred that people in developing countries would 
have a high demand for insurance, including health insurance. This line of reasoning 
would also imply that, all things being equal, individuals in developing countries, by virtue 
of their greater risk aversion, would be willing to pay insurance premiums that include 
a higher percentage of pure risk cost than people in developed countries. Since the pure 
risk premium represents the maximum "loading"2 that an insurance policy purchaser 
would accept above the fair premium3, all things being equal, greater risk aversion implies 
that more revenue will be available for administrative costs and/or profits for insurance 
suppliers.
The "loading" represents the administrative charge and the normal profit obtained by the supplier 
per policy and is equal to that part of the premium above the fair premium.
3 A fair premium is equal to the expected loss, that is the probability of loss multiplied by the value
of loss.
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The Arrow-Pratt measure of local, absolute risk aversion is the formal measure of risk 
aversion found in standard economics texts (Pratt 1964; Arrow 1971). Unfortunately it 
fails to capture the decision-maker's attitude towards health risks because it is applicable 
only where the utility function depends exclusively upon the level of wealth, irrespective 
of the state of the world. In situations involving health risks, where wealth changes are 
caused by changes in health, the marginal utility of wealth depends also on the state of 
health. Kami theoretically considers the relationship between risk aversion and optimal 
health insurance where preferences depend on the decision-maker's health and the 
insurance policy specifies cash payments (Kami 1981). It is doubtful that his conclusions 
are applicable where the insurance supplier provides the health care. Therefore an 
analytical approach for examining and modelling the decision to purchase health insurance 
that relies on the direct measurement of absolute risk aversion would not provide a 
conceptual framework that could be translated into empirical research.
However, the above conceptual framework implies that individuals who are risk averse 
will purchase more comprehensive coverage against illnesses of “low probability and high 
loss” than for those of “high probability and low loss” in order to maximize their expected 
utilities. This suggests that the demand for insurance against illness may be influenced 
by the likelihood of the illness events, and consequently the probability of requiring 
specific treatments and the costs involved. Following this line of argument, all things 
being equal, the pattern of demand for health insurance will be characterized by a greater 
demand for insurance against rare but major illness associated with expensive treatments, 
eg cardiovascular accidents (stroke), than for insurance to cover frequently occurring 
illness treated at lower costs, eg adult malaria in hyperendemic areas. An American study 
in 1984 was consistent with the conclusion that, given coverage of equal actuarial value, 
people choose to insure against low probability high expense health problems before high 
probability low-loss conditions (Pauly 1986). In the absence of data to estimate 
accurately the probabilities and the monetary loss associated with different illnesses in a 
developing country, empirical studies could incorporate this theoretical prediction by 
approximating "low probability high expense health problems" to inpatient episodes of 
illness, and "high probability low-loss illness" to OPD and assess the demand for OPD
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and inpatient policies separately.
THE HEALTH INSURANCE MARKET: ITS OPERATION AND REGULATION
The literature cited above attempts to explain why an individual purchases insurance and, 
more importantly, health insurance so as to understand the demand pattern. However the 
overall structure of the market for health insurance is also important because it dictates 
how the market may be regulated to ensure it provides the greatest benefit to society. In 
order to explore the pattern of both demand and supply, and therefore the likely structure 
of the market for a community health insurance scheme, it is helpful to analyse the 
components of health insurance.
The insurance contract
The basic concept of an insurance contract is defined by two elements
p = the premium received under the contract 
x = stochastic variable representing the amount paid to settle claims.
" the premium must be sufficient to compensate the common losses, to pay 
the expense of management, and to afford such a profit as might have been 
drawn from an equal capital employed in any common trade" (Adam Smith 
(1776) as quoted by Borch (1990)).
Borch observes that in the developed countries, the profit - the charge that the insurer 
makes for his risk-bearing services - is determined not only by the supply and demand 
conditions in the insurance market but also by government regulations. He illustrates this 
by the following: let P = total premium received, X = a stochastic variable representing 
the amount used to settle claims and where F(X) = the distribution of X, then the 
probability of a company paying claims exceeding premiums is:
Pr {X > P } = 1 -F(P)
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Usually an insurance company will, by law, be required to hold reserve funds, or equity 
capital, S, which can be used to settle claims in the event of such losses. The probability 
that the claims cannot be met, ie "the probability of ruin”, now becomes 
Pr{X > S + P} = 1 -F{S +P}
Government regulation may then stipulate the largest permissible value of "the probability 
of ruin" as 'a'
Pr{X > S + P} = 1 -F{S +P} < a
1-a is therefore a measure of the minimum "quality" of the insurance, in the sense that it 
is an indication of the insurance company's ability to pay claims that exceed the expected 
loss upon which the premium has been calculated. As the "a" decreases this ability 
increases. As 1-a approaches unity the ability becomes a statistical certainty and the 
quality of the insurance may be described as excellent. S can be invested without risk at 
a rate of interest of r. In a free market economy this simple model implies that the 
minimum premium is determined by (1) the risk-free interest rate, r, and (2) the 
permissible probability that insurance claims cannot be met (as set by the government), a. 
It emphasises the essential relationships between premium levels and conditions in the 
capital market. The need for substantial reserve capital is only removed if the government 
supplies a guarantee. On the other hand an insurance company may make reinsurance 
arrangements to compensate for insufficient equity capital. If premiums are adequate, 
losses requiring the use of reserve funds will not occur often and the equity capital may 
be invested in assets which are only fairly liquid.
Efficiency of insurance schemes
The organisational arrangement for supplying a commodity is evaluated as efficient when 
it achieves set objectives employing minimum resources. The selection of the objective 
requires a value judgment and is therefore a normative problem. In the context of health 
insurance one possible objective is to supply the type and mix of insurance demanded by 
the consumer. Such an objective is consistent with defining efficiency as a Pareto 
optimum insurance will be consumed such that 'no input can be transferred to alternative
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use without making at least one person worse off. Embedded in this definition is the value 
judgment that the current income distribution is optimal (Pearce and Nash 1989). An 
alternative objective, corresponding to a different definition of efficiency, is to ensure 
equity in the consumption of health insurance arising from the desire to attain equity of 
access to health care. The two definitions represent value judgments and political views 
at poles of the debate on what is the appropriate criterion for economic evaluation of 
social projects.
Pareto efficiency or optimality, which is the maximization of the economic welfare of the 
community, requires the existence of specific conditions, referred to as 'standard 
assumptions' by Barr (1990). These assumptions may be summarised as: the possession 
of perfect information by the consumers and the suppliers; the existence of perfect 
competition, ensuring suppliers make no long run excess profits; and the absence of 
market failure. In economic theory the presence of market failure in the health insurance 
market provides efficiency reasons for government intervention or even government 
provision. An example of such intervention is when the quality of insurance is regulated 
by government stipulated "probability of ruin", as discussed above. In the context of 
health insurance, perfect information on the part of the suppliers requires: that the 
probabilities of needing treatment are known or estimable; that it is independent across 
individuals and smaller than unity; and the absence of significant adverse selection or 
moral hazard.
In developing countries some interdependence between individual probabilities of 
requiring treatment will exist because of the prevalence of infectious diseases and 
epidemics. While the probability of requiring health care for conditions such as fractures 
and acute inflammations over a given period is less than unity, this is not so for chronic 
and/or hereditary conditions (ie diabetes, sickle cell disease and AIDS).
Adverse selection and moral hazard are both major causes of market failure and have 
received considerable attention in empirical and theoretical studies (Arrow 1963; Pauly 
1986; Lohr et al 1986; Manning 1987). Adverse selection arises as follows: in a
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community there are people with low risk of illness PL and others with significantly 
higher risks PH. In the absence of perfect information concerning the values of the risk 
pertaining to each individual’s insurance, suppliers are initially unable to tailor 
premiums. Instead they offer uniform premiums based on an average expected 
probability of loss, known as Community Rating n*c
n c =  Ph(Nh/(Nh +  N J +  P,(Nl /(Nh +  Nl )+  L
Where L is the loading amount and NL and NH are the numbers of low and high risks 
respectively in the insured population. The community rated premiums discourage those 
of low risk from purchasing while making insurance attractive to high risk individuals. 
The resulting "selection" of high risk individuals increases the average expected loss for 
the insured population in subsequent periods. In subsequent periods the average expected 
loss for the insured population rises above n*c.
At the extreme, insurance becomes impossible as P approaches unity for the selected 
group. The outcome is an unstable market in which the individual schemes are not 
financially viable. Adverse selection thus prevents an insurance scheme based on a 
community rated premium attaining an optimum in the Pareto sense.
If individuals and households are able to predict accurately their risks then the conditions 
exist for adverse selection in a community-rated rural health insurance scheme. If the 
household head's perceptions of the household's risk are correct, then the expenditure he 
or she anticipates for a subsequent period will be close to the actual expenditures incurred 
by the household. Therefore if rural households do accurately predict their health 
expenditures, then all things being equal, adverse selection will be a problem in voluntary 
community-rated schemes.
Provided insurers are able to correctly predict the risk of those insured, experience rated 
premiums, as an alternative to community rated premiums, reduce or eliminate adverse 
selection. Thus for insurance policies to be based on experience rated premiums,
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individuals or groups of individuals, are offered individual premiums related to their 
assessed risks. High risk individuals are charged higher premiums or not offered insurance 
policies at all.
Although the efficiency of the insurance market is improved by experience rated 
premiums, in Pareto terms, considerable inefficiencies may still exist from moral hazard. 
Moral hazard occurs when individuals, once possessing full and fair insurance policies, 
lack the incentive to take actions that reduce the probability of the insured event occurring 
or the loss associated with it (a frill insurance policy is one in which the loss resulting from 
the insured event, in this case illness, is exactly compensated for; a fair policy is one in 
which the premium is equal to the expected loss: the probability of loss multiplied by the 
value of loss). In the context of health insurance, moral hazard leads an insured person 
to invest less in preventive health measures and to use more resources to treat illness. In 
the presence of third party payment the individual has no incentive to contain the cost of 
medical treatment, he or she faces zero marginal costs at the point of consumption and 
consumes to the point of satiation. Computation of an accurate expected loss is then 
extremely difficult and the insurance market becomes unstable. The outcome is rising 
rates of utilization together with increasing health care costs and premiums.
Rees (1989) considered adverse selection and moral hazard to be the consequences of 
information asymmetry and focuses his analysis by assuming away social risk and any 
imperfect competition in the insurance market. He is able to show that in response to 
moral hazard, such a market will offer only partial coverage, in the form of coinsurance, 
to all individuals irrespective of their level of risk. Also his analysis indicates that adverse 
selection results in partial coverage for individuals of low risk.
In reality the administrative or transaction expenses of insurance tend to be substantial. 
High transaction costs are inefficient if an alternative system of provision can reduce them. 
Arrow (1963) suggests that in theory, “a deductible” (the initial minimal fee that is not 
covered by the policy and is payed out-of-pocket by the insured) attempts to reduce these 
costs. Were deductibles proportional to premiums, then the theoretical interpretation
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would be that individuals bear a small risk in order to save on the administrative cost. 
However this is not the case and deductibles are determined more by the number of claims 
than the premium. In the presence of deductibles, the user price is the same as the market 
price, beyond which it falls to zero. Arrow (1971) shows that the optimal insurance 
policy (for a risk averse individual who maximises his or her expected utility) is one which 
provides for full coverage of the loss above a deductible minimum.
Coinsurance4 makes the use price of health care non-zero. Therefore, the effect of linear 
coinsurance on use in theory can be predicted from the user price elasticity. The price 
elasticity or coinsurance elasticity of demand reported in the literature at the mean range 
from -0.1 to -2.1 (Newhouse & Phelps 1974; Colie & Grossman 1987; Newhouse & 
Phelps 1976).
Manning et al (1987) found that the utilization of outpatient physician services was 
responsive to the coinsurance rate (elasticity of approximately -0.2) among an 
experimental group of 2,005 families assigned to 14 experimental insurance plans in the 
Rand Health Insurance Experiment. Six centres of population across the USA were 
involved in this experiment from 1974 to 1982. Some of the plans provided free (at the 
point of use) health care while the remaining fell into three categories requiring 
coinsurance payment. The relationship between insurance type and health status was also 
investigated and no significant difference in health status was found between the free plans 
and the cost-sharing arrangements. In contrast, Lohr et al (1986) found that poor sick 
children showed the greatest response to coinsurance in the likelihood of any use of health 
services. However the total health care expenditure was 45% higher for the free plan 
leading the researchers to conclude that the arguments for the provision of health care free 
at the point of consumption are not justified by recourse to the health benefits involved. 
Reduction in the number of episodes of medical treatment was found to be responsible for 
all of the reduction in health care expenditure with coinsurance (Keeler et al 1988).
In contrast to a full insurance contract, a contract involving coinsurance means that the insurer and 
insured pay fixed proportions of the total loss.
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Finally, the presence of positive externalities in health care is a major cause of market 
failure. In general, an externality exists when a variable controlled by one economic agent 
enters the utility function of another economic agent, and specific externalities exist when 
the consumption of a good by individual b enters into the utility function of individual a. 
The explanations for this interdependence may be either selfish or altruistic needs of 
individual a, and for both the following economic analysis is applicable. The true social 
evaluation of each unit of health consumed by b, as reflected by the willingness to pay, is 
therefore given by the vertical summation of the demand function of a and b. The society 
as a whole benefits by ensuring that members consume health care as close to the social 
optimum as possible. An equilibrium which fails to take into account this externality is 
unlikely to be one which will make at least one person worse off by reallocation.
Public versus private health insurance
In answering the question, "can there be an efficient private health insurance scheme?", 
the objectives of a health insurance scheme define the precise meaning of efficiency in 
this context. Pareto efficiency in the provision of health insurance is not possible because, 
as already discussed, the market lacks the properties of a competitive market. In 
particular, imperfect information leads to adverse selection and the problem of moral 
hazard prevents the attainment of Pareto efficiency. In a welfare economics context 
where the benefits of consumption of health by an individual include the positive 
externalities to others in the society, there is a clear distinction between Pareto efficiency 
and social efficiency.
Government intervention in the private health insurance market in the USA through the 
provision of tax subsidies is considered by Pauly (1986) to be Pareto inefficient. He 
argues that in the USA there is no evidence that there is under-consumption by those 
income groups (the upper and middle-income groups) that purchase insurance and 
secondly that "Virtually all the tax subsidy goes to the non-poor" (Lohr et al 1986).
The theoretical literature contains examples where efficiency is implicitly defined in terms 
of equity of consumption of health insurance. Much literature on health departs from the
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assumption that individual preference functions are independent of each others'. General 
interdependence is one of the characteristics which distinguishes the health field from 
sectors exhibiting the norms of competition (Lees & Rice 1985). It also forms the 
foundation of Lindsay's explanation of the observed widespread support for public 
provision of health care (Lindsay 1969). He postulates a society in which individual 
utilities depend not only on the quantity of goods consumed, but also on a measure of 
equality of health care consumed. A member of this egalitarian society, J, has a utility 
function
U, = U j {Xj, Xj2,........X , \ \  e)
where; X} (i=l,....n) are the quantities of goods consumed by the jth individual, hj is his 
consumption of health care and e is a measure of the distribution of health consumption 
about its mean.
Lindsay constructed a model of a two-person society and represented it graphically such 
that the vertical axis shows the marginal value (mv) and the marginal cost of the health 
care and the horizontal axis the the quantity of health care (figure 2.3). The graph 
illustrated that if it is simply equality per se that is desired, inequality in health care 
consumption may be reduced either by inducing the poor individual (b) to consume more 
or by inducing the wealthy individual (a) to consume less. This permits the wealthy 
individual four options, each with its associated cost, whereby he or she may increase 
equality. In selecting an option to use alternatively or jointly he aims to "promote equality 
to the point where his marginal evaluation of a unit of equality is equal to the marginal 
subjective cost of that unit".
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Equality in Consumption of Health Care
mv/mc
me (fair premium)
mv
mv
HEALTH CARE
Figure 2.3 Adapted from Lindsay 1969.
Promoting equality to this point requires him to select the least-cost method of producing
that quantity and would therefore be the most efficient. These options are as follows:
a) The Sacrifice/Burnt offering method - where individual a after purchasing his 
optimum quantity of health only consumes hb and destroys hb -ha . The cost of 
this action is high and consists of the total cost of the quantity, hb echa, plus the 
consumer surplus eac.
b) Abstention Method - by purchasing only hb, the cost of which is given by the loss 
of consumer surplus eac.
c) Price Subsidy Methods - to drive b to voluntarily choose to consume up to h° - 
at cost edf. This must be combined with one of the two previous methods to 
lower a's consumption also to h°. Combining with abstention will be the 
least-costly of the two, costing bed + efd.
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d) The Gift Method where a buys his optimum ha but makes a gift of l/2(hb - ha).
The cost is given by h° b cha and exceeds (bed + efd).
The efficient solution which attains equity in the model is therefore a scheme which 
combines subsidies and abstention. When the above model is expanded to more than two 
persons, and more than one individual has the stated egalitarian preference, private action 
will not provide positive externalities to all others who value equality. This is because 
private action would lead to a free-rider problem. Only collective action to secure 
equality would allow extension of the activity to the optimum level. Therefore the 
solution implies collective action in which individuals of high income in the society 
subsidise the health care of those of low income. Lindsay argues that welfare oriented 
health care systems, such as the British National Health Service, are based on this type of 
rationale.
The solution also provides universal coverage more efficiently than a free market system. 
The low per capita health expenditure in Britain as compared with America supports this 
conclusion. In the context of the NHS, the abstention may be viewed as rationing of 
excess demand arising from moral hazard, the level of abstention being largely determined 
by the suppliers (doctors) through the referral and waiting system. The observed 
relationship between patients and physicians permits this rationing mechanism to operate.
“By certifying the necessity of a given treatment or the absence of need, therefore
the physician acts as a controlling agent on behalf of the insurance companies”
(Rushing 1986)
Rushing, in his comprehensive work on the social functions of health, put forward a 
different reason for public provision. He uses a conceptual framework, found in social 
anthropology and sociology, "structure-function", to analyse health insurance. He presents 
the thesis that the purchase of health insurance is a social ritual alleviating anxiety and 
promoting social integration and cohesion in the society. These attributes underpin the 
view held by many people in Western societies that reliable insurance is important enough
WTP for RHI Literature A Chapter 2 25
to be seen as a public utility. Consequently it is subject to public regulation, even to the 
extent of public provision.
From the above it may be concluded that the extent to which individuals in a community 
view mutual-aid groups as desirable and their willingness to assist those who are ill will 
determine, to a large degree, the stability of a community health insurance scheme. 
Information that may be useful in assessing this is the level of participation in existing 
community mutual-help groups, especially those that provide health care-related benefits 
to members of the community. The level may be considered as an indication of the value 
placed on equal consumption of health care by individuals in the community.
FUNCTIONS OF A SOCIAL HEALTH INSURANCE SCHEME
The theoretical consideration of health insurance presented above suggests that one that 
is social welfare oriented will have two prime functions that merit separate consideration, 
although they are intrinsically linked. The first is a financial function: to provide a pool 
of funds to cover all, or (in government subsidized schemes) part, of the cost of health 
care for those who contribute to the pool; and to encourage providers and consumers to 
use health services in a cost-effective manner. Schemes that perform well financially by 
raising adequate revenues from insurer contributions to cover a high percentage of the 
costs of care provision, plus all administrative costs, will provide meaningful additional 
funds for the health sector. On the other hand schemes may have poor financial viability 
because of an excess of high risk members in the scheme (adverse selection), or as a 
consequence of levying an inadequate premium relative to the health care needs of the 
insured population. Finally, a scheme may be unable to fund the health care claimed by 
its insured because they make excess demands as a response to being insured (moral 
hazard).
The second prime function of a social welfare oriented health insurance scheme is social, 
including social equity. It is to remove financial barriers to obtaining health care at the 
time of illness for the vulnerable groups in society, i.e. the very young and elderly, and the
WTP for RHI Literature A Chapter 2 26
chronically ill. Many of these persons are also in the low income groups and/or require 
expensive health care. This social function is achieved through the subsidization of the 
cost of caring for some individuals in the society by those who have lower risks, i.e. the 
wealthy and more healthy. This may be regarded as redistribution of effective income. 
Thus a health insurance scheme promotes social equity because individuals who have 
equal health care needs ("need" being defined as the capacity to benefit from care) are 
assisted to obtain comparable care, irrespective of their economic status. All members 
participating in the insurance scheme benefit from removal of the uncertainty about wealth 
or income arising from health care expenditure. In addition to providing private benefits 
to participating individuals, health insurance also increases overall social welfare by 
promoting the optimal consumption of health care and thus maximizing the resulting 
positive externalities. A scheme may fail to perform its financial function adequately as 
a consequence of low participation of individuals of low risk (adverse selection) and high 
income. This will then minimize its impact on the distribution of effective incomes and 
make it impossible for it to perform the equity function of reducing the financial barrier 
to the disadvantaged when seeking health care. Financially non-viable schemes may, 
however, be assisted by government subsidies to have an impact on the levels of financial 
concerns faced by the poor at the time of illness, and thus still provide a valuable social 
function.
WILLINGNESS TO PAY METHODOLOGY AND MODELLING THE DEMAND 
FOR HEALTH CARE
Close association exists between the demand for health insurance and health care because 
the former by altering the price of health care at the point of use, influences the behaviour 
of the consumer. In theory, the effect of insurance can be predicted from the user price 
elasticity. Furthermore, for private insurance in particular, the price of a policy which 
influences an individual's decision to be insured is set by the insurer taking into account 
the individual's past utilization of health care. The linkage between the two demands 
therefore involves interdependent decisions made by those insured and suppliers of 
insurance policies and a feedback mechanism.
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The interdependent decisions of the insurer and the insured may be modelled using 
simultaneous equations of the individual's health care expenditure, the insurer pricing and 
the demand/choice of insurance policy by the individual. Stability and financial solvency 
of an insurance scheme would require that these equations attain an equilibrium state in 
which insurance price is a stochastic independent variable in the equation for health care 
utilization/demand, insurance prices being set by the insurer based on the cost of 
transactions between policy holders and the insurer, the unit costs of health care 
production, and utilization/demand for care by the insured population. The demand for 
care, the primary endogenous variable, therefore, would feed back into the equation of 
the insurance price. The relevant price in the health care demand equation is determined 
by the choice of insurance policy which is an expression of demand for health insurance. 
The demand for insurance would also be influenced by expected future health care needs.
This section briefly reviews two categories of health demand studies that are relevant to 
the above outline of a stable insurance market and its empirical investigation. The first 
group of studies considered is willingness to pay (WTP) studies in the health sectors of 
developing countries because where past preferences cannot be observed, WTP research 
techniques provide a means to obtain consumer valuations of health care and insurance 
policies. In many developing countries, past preference data (that give quantities 
purchased at different prices) are not available because health care has traditionally been 
free at the point of use or insurance has not been offered for purchase by the majority of 
the population.
Another approach to the study of demand for insurance is indirect, and models insurance 
conditioned demand for health care. In developing the equations found in this group of 
studies, the framework for the demand for care in the presence of user charges is one of 
the starting points for identifying the exogenous variables. Consequently, the second 
group of studies reviewed in this chapter is studies in which health care expenditure is 
modelled as a function of user prices in the absence of insurance policies. In reviewing 
this second group of studies and their models, the aim is to emphasise the postulated 
mechanism through which charges faced at the point of use of health care enters the
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behavioural frameworks, rather than to give descriptive details of the models.
In chapter 9 a brief review of studies that attempt to model the demand for insurance 
using the conceptual framework in which demand is the outcome of utility maximization 
under uncertainty is presented. They illustrate the application of those concepts used in 
developing the thesis model of the factors that influence WTP for health insurance 
policies. In these models, demand is determined by expectation rather than past 
experience.
Willingness to pav studies in the health sector
Consumers' monetary valuations of a good or service may be assessed indirectly by 
observing quantities purchased in the past as a function of price (the implicit evaluation 
method), or by direct inquiries about quantities they would be willing and able to purchase 
as a function of price (the questionnaire method). Studies designed as part of the latter 
approach have been termed Contingent Valuation studies because the respondent is asked 
to state his or her preference in a hypothetical situation.
Willingness-to-Pay studies are undertaken from two main perspectives; to measure the 
benefits to a society arising from the provision of a good or service as part of a Cost 
Benefit Analysis (CBA) or to predict demand patterns as inputs to pricing and marketing 
decisions (Lavy & Quigley 1993; Mills et al 1994; Donaldson et al 1995). A few studies 
however, do not fall into these two categories, for example they may measure ordinal 
preferences as a function of attributes to guide planners in evaluating the effect on demand 
of different specifications of a good.
Much of the early conceptual and empirical development of willingness to pay 
methodology was undertaken in connection with CBA in the field of environmental and 
transport economics. In early examples of such studies, health economists used the WTP 
methodology in CBA of projects that had the saving of human life as the sole or a major 
benefit and contingent valuations were used to value the lives saved. On the premise that 
a person would be willing to pay an infinite amount to avoid certain death, then the
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relevant compensation in decisions about projects that alter risk of death is that required 
to accept that change of risk. An approach based on valuation of risk of death was first 
considered by Dreze in 1962 (Dreze 1962) and has been established through the work of 
Mishan (1971), and Jones-Lee (1976). The emphasis is on evaluating the individual’s 
marginal rate of substitution of wealth for risk of death as opposed to valuing the 
consequences of the person’s death to society. Jones-Lee suggested that information 
acquired at the individual level could be aggregated to give the relationship between 
magnitude of a decrease in risk and the maximum amount that would be paid to effect that 
change (ie willingness to pay for reduction in risk of mortality). The problem becomes one 
of decision under uncertainty and can be considered using the expected utility theory as 
treated by Von Neumann and Morgenstem.
As pointed out by Mishan, the formulation of the choice only becomes meaningful in 
terms of compensation for accepting a risk of death where the risk is very much smaller 
than unity. In practice the compensating variation required can only be obtained through 
interviews using hypothetical questions. Whether people are able to comprehend small 
probabilities then becomes an important issue. Although people do make choices 
regularly between alternatives that affect the probability of their own death, as in whether 
or not to cross a road using a pedestrian overhead bridge, they may not be accustomed 
to doing so in terms of explicit probabilities of survival. Other arguments against the use 
of WTP questionnaires have been put forward and most infer that responses to 
hypothetical questions may lack reliability and validity (Diamond & Hausman 1994; 
NOAA 1993).
Much less theoretical and empirical evidence has accumulated with respect to WTP 
studies in the context of pricing of goods and services, particularly those provided publicly 
rather than privately. Nevertheless, recently researchers in developing countries have been 
attempting to use WTP studies to measure the potential for cost recovery in some sectors 
that are traditionally largely public, in particular health and water and sanitation. The 
results of these studies are intended for policy makers to assist them to make price 
decisions with respect to goods supplied in these sectors. The rationale for using WTP
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rather than the implicit evaluation methods in these cases are usually one or more of the 
following:
* Lack of a previous market for the good or service because it has been provided 
free or because it is new to the study area.
* Difficulty of assessing the maximum that consumers are willing to pay because 
they have faced price structures significantly lower than that proposed, for 
example where prices have been token and not adjusted for inflation for many 
years.
* Lack of comparability in the quality of the service previously consumed and that 
proposed.
As mentioned above, in the literature on contingent valuation there is discussion of the 
possible causes of unreliable and/or invalid answers to WTP questions. Reliability is the 
level of agreement between replicate measurements/assessments made on/of the same 
subject. Respondents may give random and therefore unreliable answers if the description 
of the good and the market within which it is being sold fails to produce a meaningful and 
realistic scenario. When inappropriate words are used in the description or insufficient 
details are provided, this problem is likely to arise. Insufficient information about the 
existence of a substitute good, for example health care provided by other suppliers, is a 
particular important example of the latter. Where a good or service is complex, as in 
health care, or previously unknown, as may be the case for health insurance in rural areas 
in developing countries, this type of problem will be intensified.
A common test of reliability of contingent valuation measures is whether or not the 
explanatory variables explain a significant amount of the variation in the independent 
variable. A widely accepted general rule in the case of continuous responses is that the 
adjusted R2of an ordinary least squares fit should be at least 0.15. The model chi-square 
test may be more relevant where the responses are dichotomous. A significance level
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of less than 5% implies that the likelihood of the observed responses, given the estimated 
equation, is significantly greater than their likelihood given an equation without 
independent variables (Norusis 1990).
Validity of the technique is the extent to which a method provides a true assessment of 
that which it purports to measure. Both reliability and validity are required if 
measurements produced by a study are to be accurate and legitimate for analysis. 
Reliability is not however a guarantee of validity since a method may consistently measure 
an alternative variable.
Strategic bias occurs when the respondent attempts to influence a decision or plan that 
may depend on the outcome of the research findings by providing inaccurate answers. For 
example the respondent may understate his or her WTP where the health care has a 
'public good' nature, as in the case of immunization, in the hope of becoming a 'free-rider'. 
Questions that offer a price may be interpreted as the critical price ("value cues") and the 
respondent may state WTP below or above in the hope of securing a specific outcome.
Hypothetical bias occurs when the respondent does not consider that his or her answers 
will directly influence the outcome of decisions or plans. Consequently the answers may 
be given without proper thought or they may be used to convey an attitude rather than a 
magnitude of preference.
A perfect assessment of validity requires an independent standard of reference which can 
be considered indisputably true. In the case of WTP for health care, such an assessment 
would require that the hypothetical market becomes a reality and respondents’ answers 
are compared with their actions, however this is rarely possible. Consequently, there are 
only a few empirical studies in which validity has been assessed in this way. One such 
study showed that residential properties differing only in levels of surrounding air 
pollution were sold in the market at prices that reflected values for clean air consistent 
with those obtained by a WTP questionnaire (Brookshire & Crooker 1981).
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In the absence of the conditions needed to demonstrate consistency between answers to 
hypothetical questions and real market behaviour, validity may be assessed by examining 
two types of construct validity, a) theoretical validity and b) convergent validity. 
Theoretical validity implies that the relationship between WTP answers, and price and 
total consumption, is consistent with economic theory; in particular that respondent would 
be less willing to pay high prices than low prices, producing a downwards sloping demand 
curve. A negative and significant coefficient for the natural log of the price provided some 
proof that the responses to contingent valuations questions had theoretical validity in the 
study by Weaver et al (1993).
Composition of WTP questionnaires
Several authors have provided guidelines on composition of questionnaires and what areas 
should be covered (WASH 1988). The consensus is that the following components are 
essential although the debate about the best form of the questions is ongoing.
a) Past health care practices, expenditure and attitudes
These questions stimulate the respondent to consider his current and past 
valuations and choices, the rationale being that the WTP values for the new health 
related good or service will be made in the context of existing information about 
prices, qualities and suppliers. Overall these questions establish the credibility of 
the subject matter.
b) Creation o f a plausible hypothetical market
The type of information required to create a realistic market in the case of health 
related services and goods includes; a detailed description, the institutional and 
organizational circumstances, the method of payment, actual and perceived risk 
of illness, and perceived effectiveness of care (Morrison & Gyldmark 1992).
c) Questions which elicit the respondent's willingness and ability to pay 
Empirical studies have reported substantial differences in people's responses to 
willingness to pay versus compensation questions in the context of measuring
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potential economic losses. Thus the individual facing certain death will pay only 
a finite amount to save his life (WTP), but when alive due to a medical treatment 
will demand infinite compensation for curtailing the treatment 
(willingness-to-accept {WTA}). This is contrary to economic theory which 
implies that the two methods of measuring changes in an individual’s welfare 
should yield similar estimates providing income and wealth effects are small. 
Gafni (1990) claims that the difference between WTP and WTA stems from 
comparing answers to bounded versus non-bounded questions. ’What sum are you 
willing to part with for reduction in the probability o f death?' is a question 
bounded by income, whereas, 'what sum do you require fo r compensation for  
increased risk o f death?' is a non-bounded question.
To take account of the stochastic rather than deterministic effect of health care 
Gafni argues that WTP questions should be asked in the context of insurance 
purchasing. Phrasing the question in this way is also thought to be consistent with 
the fact that; "If services were provided based only on individuals' willingness-to- 
pay at the point of consumption, many would not exist at their current level since 
many individuals would not be able to pay for many services they currently 
consume". This argument is less relevant where the WTP is input into the pricing 
decision rather than input into the decision whether or not to provide a public 
funded or subsided service. In the case of WTP for insurance policies an 
insurance phrasing is an obvious option.
d) Questions about the respondent’s and his or her household characteristics
Socio-economic and demographic variables are required to aid interpretation of 
the WTP findings and to allow some exploration of reliability.
In 1995, a review of contingent valuation studies in developing countries was able to 
identify eight health sector CV studies and five water and sanitation sector CV studies 
(Russell 1995) that had the objectives of providing information for pricing. Almost all the 
water and sanitation studies used questionnaires that provided precise descriptions and
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reminded the respondents of substitutes and expenditure on these. They also checked that 
subjects had understood the nature of the good or service for which they were /would be 
asked to provide WTP values. Only half of the health studies incorporated these 
important measures.
Willingness to pay for health insurance was not the focus of any of the above studies. A 
contingent valuation survey was, however, used in Israel to assess the potential demand 
and welfare improvements generated by a proposed supplementary health insurance in 
which a special insurance scheme was considered to be a possible financing mechanism 
(Elise et al 1993). In spite of the likelihood of insurance financing, the WTP questions 
in this survey seem not to have been asked in the context of insurance purchasing. (The 
sample question reported was “Suppose that for some time you {or one of your family} 
have been suffering from a medical problem, and you are seeking additional medical 
advice. Would you be willing to pay a specialist for a private consultation?”). The 
questions focused on demand for care in a certain situation of ill health rather than demand 
for a good that reduces the probability of being denied access to care.
Modelling the demand for health care 
Past models o f demand for health care
Underpinning most empirical economic research that investigates the use of health care 
services is the micro-economic paradigm of constrained utility maximisation, ie models 
based on a sovereign and fully informed rational consumer. This is in sharp contrast with 
models which imply that the decision about the need and consequently the demand for 
medical care is entirely determined by the medical expert. However, if "need" is defined 
as the capacity to benefit, and the benefits also include the utility gained from the 
acquisition of information and the assurance that symptoms are insignificant, then demand 
cannot be solely determined by third parties. Models in which demand for care is 
determined by professionals are therefore omitted from this discussion.
The models in which the effect of price on the demand for health care are investigated may 
be classified into those in which health care enters directly into the individual’s utility
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function, permitting an estimation of a reduced-form demand for health care, eg outpatient 
visits, well baby clinic attendance, and those in which the demand for health care is 
derived from the demand for health requiring an estimation of the underlying health 
production function.
Some are static, one period models while others are intrinsically dynamic because changes 
over time are explicitly considered by employing multi-period objective functions and 
constraints. Models in which uncertainties are incorporated may be classified as stochastic 
as opposed to deterministic models, in which the variables are non random.
Early models that were used by Feldstein (1974) and Newhouse (1981), primarily to 
explore price and income elasticities, ignored the fact that the basic trade-off is between 
health and other commodities. Rather, these models were derived from a traditional utility 
maximisation process in which purchases of health care are traded against those of a 
composite good under a budget constraint. The market price of medical care, Pm, is 
found in the function limiting utility as follows; 
max U(m, c) subject to PmM + PcC = Y
Where M is medical care, C is a composite good, Pc is the market price of this and Y 
income. The endogenous nature of health in decision making is not expressed and health 
care is seen as another consumption good. Many of the social variables such as health 
status indicators and education, elicited by anthropological studies referred to in the 
preceding section, were assumed to be "taste shifters".
Acton (1975) extended the utility-maximizing model to embrace the argument that time 
costs are involved in the consumption of health care. The total cost per unit of health 
care is therefore defined as the sum of the monetary cost and the opportunity cost of time. 
Consequently, his model predicts increasing sensitivity of demand to time costs as cash 
price approaches zero. It also implies that the effect of earned income is ambiguous since 
increased wages raise both income and the opportunity cost of time. Assuming health 
care to be a normal good the increased earnings have a positive income effect but a
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negative own price effect since consumption becomes relatively more expensive.
Acton's model has the general form shown below;
Max. U = U(m, X)
Subject to (p + wt)m + (q + ws)X <_ Y = y +wT
Where 
U = utility
m = constant quality units of health services 
X = composite of all other goods 
p = money price per unit of medical services 
t = time price per unit of medical services 
q = money price per unit of other goods 
s = time price per unit of other goods 
w = hourly earnings
Y = full income including earned income, unearned income, and the opportunity cost of 
home production 
y = unearned income
T = total time available for market work and own production
Relevant demographic variables play no defined role and thus many of the proven 
predictors of health and health care consumption discussed above are excluded. The 
inclusion of time cost, though intuitively appealing, cannot be upheld conceptually. In the 
model utility is derived directly from the consumption of health care, making this a leisure 
activity which therefore should have a zero time cost.
Akin et al's (1986) empirical study of the determinants of households' decisions to use 
medical services and their choice of practitioners in the Philippines employs this type of 
demand model. To permit the use of the Lagrangian multiplier technique, Akin assumes 
the utility function to be "strictly quasi- concave", continuous and weakly separable 
between health services and a vector of all other goods. This implies that the consumer's
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preference ordering is "strictly convex" or the indifference curves representing preferences 
are convex to the origin and do not intersect the horizontal or vertical axes.
In view of the general consensus that consumption of health care in the presence of severe 
illness is imperative (an example of evidence supporting this is the finding from group 
discussions by Waddington and Enimayew (1989)), and that in such instances the demand 
may be considered as 'needed' or 'necessary', it is reasonable to postulate that preference 
between health and a vector of all other goods is not strictly convex. Rather, it intersects 
the "health related goods" axis such that health related goods as a substituted completely 
for all other goods.
The literature includes several different models that explain the pattern of health care 
expenditure, including a two-part, expandable to four-part model by Manning et al 
(1987), and a four-part estimation model used by Duan et al (1982). The latter separately 
estimates inpatient and outpatient expenditure, using two equations for each type of 
expenditure. The first estimates the probability of any use and the second estimates the 
level of expenditure among users. Other models are sample selection estimates and may 
be superior to two-part or four part model where there is sample selection bias (Duan et 
al 1983; Hay & Olsen 1984; Duan eta l 1984).
A facility-specific model of outpatient and inpatient expenditure as a function of level of 
health insurance was developed and used in two rural counties in Sichuan Province, China 
(Cretin 1990). In The Central African Republic Weaver and collaborators used a two-part 
model to estimate the willingness to pay for quality improvements in care (Weaver et al 
1993).
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Chapter 3: A review of health insurance activities in Sub-Saharan Africa
HISTORICAL POLICY CONTEXT
In this chapter a review of the literature on health insurance activities in Sub-Saharan 
Africa is presented. Published and unpublished data about this subject are very limited. 
Consequently, the review is not an account of all health insurance systems in Sub- 
Saharan Africa, but provides a general overview of scales of activity and the policy 
trends and makes reference to specific schemes in the literature as illustrations. Initially 
it considers the range of insurance schemes reported and then it focuses on schemes that 
provide cover for rural populations. To provide some insight into the policy context in 
which these schemes have evolved, relevant information from major health financing 
policy documents of international agencies has also been included. Although the primary 
sources of the information are published papers and reports, the review also includes 
information obtained by personal contact with health planners and workers in several 
African countries.
Health financing and insurance in sub-Saharan Africa
A health insurance scheme is any mechanism whereby the risks of incurring health care 
costs are spread over a group of individuals. Formal schemes refer to instances where 
officials formally hold a pool of resources consisting of prepayments by insurees and use 
it to fund all or part of the health care costs of members contributing to the pool. The 
officials are either third parties or the providers of health care as in the case of a Health 
Maintenance Organization. Prior to the second World War in developing countries, 
formal health insurance, whether private or social security linked, was mainly confined 
to some Latin American countries. By the 1980s, out of 90 developing countries studied, 
40 were using one or more forms of insurance to provide medical services (Zschock 
1982). Surveying the health financing activities in 23 African countries during the period 
1987-90, Vogel (1990) revealed that only 7 countries (30%) had formal health insurance 
schemes. An ILO survey of 37 African countries in 1993 found that 14 countries
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(approximately 40%) had formal schemes as defined here, and four others had employer 
provided health care programmes.
Following a survey of 28 African countries in 1990, ILO classified five countries (Cape 
Verde, Gabon, Kenya, Tunisia and Egypt) as having "public service health services" 
combined with classical social insurance:
“Social Security/social partnership intervention in the health care sector in Africa 
ranges, in terms of population coverage, from virtually zero in countries like 
Ghana or relatively small-scale intervention of employer-based systems like in 
Nigeria to a population coverage of almost 50 per cent in Tunisia. Gabon and 
Kenya have reached an intermediate level of population coverage of 25 per cent” 
(Arhin 1995)
Based on the findings of the above surveys and in official documents, formal African 
health insurance schemes can be grouped into two categories; those operated by the 
government and those operated by other organizations. Schemes may also be grouped 
with regard to the populations for whom they offer insurance cover - the eligible 
population - and the nature of the benefits included in the cover- the benefit type. Tables 
3.1 and 3.2 illustrate the range of eligible populations and benefit types for non­
government and government schemes respectively. In the second column of these tables 
are illustrative examples of countries operating schemes that provide the benefits for the 
populations stated in the first column. Where the information is available, an estimate of 
the total population covered by the example schemes is provided in the last column.
Non-government schemes. This category consists primarily of private-for-profit schemes 
and in reality these are significant in five Sub-Saharan African Countries - Zimbabwe, 
Cote d'Ivoire, Ethiopia, Kenya, and Nigeria. In Zimbabwe, where the private insurance 
market is relatively well established, private insurance covered only 4.6 % of the total 
population in 1990. Another category of schemes consists of those operated by private 
companies for their employers, typical examples being the mine companies in Ghana,
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Zambia, Nigeria. In these countries employees of mine companies constitute a very small 
percentage of the total population and therefore their contribution to providing free care 
at the point of use for the whole population is minimal. In parts of Francophone Africa, 
however, significant medical insurance is provided by private and parastatal firms who 
reimburse workers’ medical expenses, or provide free care at facilities that they operate 
or partly fund. In Zaire for example, 30% of revenue in Kasongo Health District is 
derived from employer organized insurance schemes.
Table 3.1 Non-government managed schemes
Eligible population/benefit types example 
country /scheme
coverage of 
total pop
Private individuals Zimbabwe: 4.6%
Households in a hospital catchment area 
care in designated hospitals 
free inpatient care
Ghana: "Nkoranza 
Hospital Scheme"
-
Households in participating villages
care at village and public facilities 
free total care
Guinea Bissau: 
"Abota"
-
Employees of private companies
care at “employer owned facilities” 
free total care
care at contracted facilities 
free total care
Ghana: Ashanti Gold 
Company health 
benefits 
Nigeria
Source: Vogel (1990), ILO (1993) and Arhin (1995)
The final group of schemes in this category includes those operated by NGOs and 
communities. Their designs are “non-conventional” in that they provide health insurance 
covers that are accessible to households and individuals living in rural areas. The 
Nkoranza Hospital Scheme in Ghana and the Abota in Guinea Bissau, examples of this
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group given in Table 3.1, are described later in this chapter. These two schemes illustrate 
the diversity of forms that rural insurance may take. The Abota Scheme was also 
evaluated as a case study in this research and therefore additional information about it is 
included in Chapter 6.
Government schemes. A study in 1990 by Vogel was able to identify six forms of explicit 
and implicit government insurance in Sub-Saharan Africa, ranging from free care for 
citizens (as in Tanzania) and government employee health insurance funds, to mandated 
employer coverage of employees (Zaire) (Vogel 1990). The majority of schemes operated 
by the government provide health insurance coverage for government employees and their 
families. Examples of such schemes are those for government workers in Kenya, 
Botswana and Burundi.
In Kenya, in the National Hospital Insurance Fund, employees’ contributions are 
graduated with their earnings and are deducted at source. (Between 1967 and 1988 those 
earning monthly incomes of Ksh 1,000 contributed Ksh 20 and in 1990-91 contributions 
ranged from Ksh 30 to Ksh 320 per month.)
All employees of the Botswana government are eligible to be members of the Botswana 
Public Offices Medical Aid Scheme, established in 1990 as a society. Members have the 
option of two levels of benefits, High Benefit and Standard Benefit, which differ in the 
copayment rate and the maximum amount of benefits available to members and his or her 
dependants during a financial year. The total contribution payable by a member (half of 
which is payable by the government) is based on the income of the member, the number 
of dependents and the benefit option and ranges from P25 to P75 for Standard and P55 
to P205 for High Benefit. In 1992, an employee in the middle basic monthly category of 
Pl,501-P2,000 with three dependants was required to contribute P147 for High Benefit 
and P75 for Standard Benefit.
The Kenyan and Botswana schemes are unique examples because civil service members 
may obtain care from both the private and the public sectors under the schemes, whereas
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it is more common for government employee schemes to limit coverage to care in public 
facilities.
Government schemes that provide cover for the general public are much fewer in number. 
In the study by Vogel, only Senegal out of 23 Sub-Saharan countries studied had a 
comprehensive social security health insurance scheme providing care for government 
employees and the general public.
The final example in this category, the CAM in Burundi, differs from the other examples 
in that although not part of a formal social security system, the general public are eligible 
for cover. The features of the scheme are such that it is accessible to rural households and 
therefore it is described later in this chapter in the section on “Community health 
financing and health insurance for rural populations”. Also, since the CAM was the 
subject of one case study carried out as part of this research, further information about 
the scheme is provided in chapter 6 where the case study findings are presented.
HEALTH INSURANCE TYPES IN AFRICA
With the exception of a few schemes, existing government, private employer and private 
for profit schemes are modelled on health insurance schemes that have developed to 
function within the socio-economic realities of Western societies, many of which are 
integral to complex and expensive social security systems. For example, premiums are 
collected monthly in all these schemes and in some schemes there is reimbursement of 
expenses by the third parties, all of which require considerable administrative resources 
and those insured to have regular incomes. Although the prevalence of formal insurance 
schemes in sub-Saharan Africa is low, in countries where they do exist, Vogel and others 
conclude that the data indicated that they covered primarily those employed in the formal 
sector, effectively those who constitute the relatively small upper and middle classes 
(Vogel 1990; Abel-Smith & Rawal 1994). For example, Zambia’s public health insurance 
schemes covered 6.1% of the total population, mainly professional and skilled workers 
and their dependents.
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Table 3.2 Government Managed Insurance Schemes*
Eligible population/benefit types country/scheme coverage 
% of pop
Government employees only
care in public facilities 
free total care
Burundi: "Mutuelle de 
Function Publique"
1.4%
Discount schemes Ethiopia <.001%
care in private facilities
free inpatient care with coinsurance Kenya
Botswana
0.2%
Government employees plus general public
care in public facilities 
free total care
Burundi:" La Carte 
d'Assurance Maladie" 
(CAM)
30%
free total care and social security Senegal: "les Institutions de 
Prevoyance Maladie" (IMP)
15%
*This excludes “insurance” consisting of free health care for all funded entirely by general 
tax revenue and systems that exempt poor from paying fees
In addition to the problem of low coverage, the various attempts by African countries to 
set up insurance programmes modelled on schemes in Western countries have been 
fraught with major managerial and financial difficulties. For example, in Kenya, the 
National Hospital Insurance Fund (NHIF) reports a high administrative cost ratio of 14 
per cent of contribution income, and in Zambia a shortage of trained staff to manage the 
group insurance schemes exists (ILO 1993). As a consequence of these and other 
problems encountered by developing countries who have attempted insurance schemes, 
a frequent assumption in development literature (explicitly or by implication ) is that
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developing countries are too poor to "afford" social-security-based health care systems. 
Furthermore, rural health insurance has often been regarded as not feasible, based on the 
assumption that there is no demand for health insurance among the relevant populations 
("demand " used in the economic sense of willingness and ability to pay for a good or 
service). Not surprisingly, the majority of implemented reforms in sub-Saharan Africa 
introduce and/or consolidate health financing based on the payment of fees by patients at 
the point of use (referred to as 'user-fees').
In spite of the low level of coverage and financial difficulties that have arisen with 
conventional schemes since the mid 1980s, many African countries have put forward 
plans to increase the role of risk sharing mechanisms in the financing of health care. In 
most cases the emphasis is on the introduction of various forms of "national health 
insurance". These countries include Ghana (Amenyah 1985), Nigeria (Nigerian Federal 
MOH 1986) and Zimbabwe (Vogel 1990). (Although called "National Health Insurance", 
unlike national social insurance schemes in Europe, the proposed schemes are designed 
to cover only some sections of the population, such as formal sector employees and 
members of agriculture cooperatives.) A strong argument against such national insurance 
at this point in time and one in favour of "alternative" or "appropriate 
technology"schemes, is the inadequacy of the administrative network for collecting 
premiums on a national basis and the limited coverage attainable using payroll-based 
contributions.
COMMUNITY HEALTH FINANCING AND HEALTH INSURANCE SCHEMES FOR 
RURAL POPULATIONS
Donor organizations, specialized UN agencies, international monetary institutions and 
African health ministers have all in recent times advocated policies that endorse 
community financing of the public health sector in Africa. Thus the Alma-Ata declaration 
(WHO/UNICEF 1978) in 1978 required that Primary Health Care (PHC) be affordable 
to the community and should involve community participation; the World Bank strategy 
outlined in the "Agenda for Reform" (World Bank 1987) called for increased private
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sector provision of health care, user charges and health insurance; and the Bamako 
Initiative (WHO 1988; UNICEF 1988; UNICEF 1988) announced by the African health 
ministers in 1988 depends on community financing of recurrent costs to improve 
accessibility and quality of primary health services.
In 1982, a review of 100 community financing schemes throughout the developing world 
found that 31 involved some form of prepayment (Stinson 1982). The organization of 
some of these schemes depended on the production and sale of primary products such as 
coffee and rice (Vaca et al 1978). In Africa many existing and planned community 
financing schemes are based on fee-for-service. Few schemes provide risk sharing 
through the payment of premium contributions. Carrin in 1987 reviewed 20 community 
financing schemes in Africa and found only one involving prepayment, although two 
others combined prepayment with a fee at the time of receiving the service.
The 1993 World Development Report "Investing in Health" makes detailed policy 
recommendations about insurance financing in middle income countries but this option 
is discussed only briefly with respect to poorer countries (World Bank 1993). The report 
gives the impression that insurance-based financing for low-income countries would be 
a desirable but impractical option.
It is only within the last 10 years that a number of African countries have experimented 
with rural health insurance schemes that cater for rural communities; these countries 
include Burundi, Guinea Bissau, Ghana and Zaire. The schemes they have adopted have 
taken a variety of forms - in some cases, benefits are provided at a central facility, such 
as a district hospital, or at scattered lower level facilities, such as health centres and health 
posts. In other cases the benefits consist of comprehensive care at all levels of the health 
system. The administration of these schemes is also varied; some are managed by a 
central government organization together with local officials, while some have been 
implemented solely by autonomous community solidarity groups. Some of the 
specifications that the dimensions of an insurance scheme may take are shown below.
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Specification of Health Insurance Schemes
Specification variable possible values
Co-payments No/yes (if yes : %)
Deductibles No/yes (amount)
Nature of premiums Cash/in kind
Time & frequency of premium Monthly/ annually
Units of Membership Individual/household
Degree of external subsidy No/yes (if yes : %)
Coverage of benefits All health services/
outpatient/inpatient
Management structure Community elected/traditional leaders/
health facility staff/external persons
Adapted from Russell & Reynolds 1985
The literature about existing schemes, in particular the Abota village insurance scheme in 
Guinea-Bissau and the hospital health insurance schemes in Nkoranza District Ghana, 
Bwamanda, and Masisi Health Zones in Zaire, illustrates the diversity of the benefits, 
administration arrangements and evolutions (see Table 3.3).
a) The Abota Village Insurance Scheme:
The Abota system entails prepayment for essential drugs and the provision of primary 
health care at the village level by the community. The system comprises many hundreds 
of autonomous Abota schemes at village level. Health care is provided voluntarily by 
members of the village, village health workers known as Agentes de Saude de Base, and 
by birth attendants at the village health post (Unidad de Saude de Base, USB). The USBs 
were constructed from local building materials by the villagers and furnished with basic 
equipment (such as metal storage cupboard, obstetric stethoscope, lantern and a kit of 
teaching aids) by the Ministry of Health. Administration of the Abota system in each 
village is the responsibility of the village committee, the lowest level of the country's 
decentralised political system.
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Table 3.3 Specifications o f three rural health insurance schemes
Management
structure
Premiums & 
membership unit
Coverage of benefits Payment schedule
a) the Abota 
village insurance 
scheme in Guinea- 
Bissau
village
management
supplies from 
central MOH
Cash or in kind
per HOUSEHOLD or 
INDIVIDUAL
outpatient by village 
health worker
free referral care
determined by 
village
usually annually or 
biannually
b) Hospital health 
insurance in 
Nkoranza District 
Ghana
3-tier
Advisory Board
Management
Team
Voluntary
registers
c450 in 1991 
(1.0 US$)
per INDIVIDUAL 
enrolled by family
inpatient care
refund of referral 
expenses
Annual registration 
Oct-Dec
c) Bwamanda 
Health Insurance 
Plan in Zaire
enrollment and 
accounting by 
health staff 
assisted by NGO
cash = price of 2 kg 
soya beans + 
copayment per 
INDIVIDUAL
all hospitalization and 
chronic care in health 
centres
annually (normally 
in March)
The earliest Abota schemes began in 1980 in a few villages as part o f a general village 
health care programme (Chabot & Savage 1984). Villages in the programme adopted and 
modified an indigenous payment mechanism, originally used to collectively finance 
ceremonies, in order to fund inputs for primary health care. Chabot et al (1991) describe 
the process o f trial and error, used by these villages over a three to four year period, to 
determine the frequency and level of prepayments that would ensure the availability of 
drugs throughout the year.
The Abota system is now widespread, totalling 462 villages in 1991, and is an integral part 
of the country's health system. Since 1983, patients referred by village health workers to 
the public health facilities have been exempt from payment o f consultation fees on 
showing evidence, usually a receipt, of having contributed to Abota. Furthermore the 
Government of Guinea Bissau's ten year health plan (1984-1993) emphasised the role of
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village-based primary health care, thus making the efficient functioning of the Abota 
system critical to the country's health strategy (World Bank 1987).
The Abota revenue is used to purchase essential drugs and bandages from nearby 
government health centres or sectoral hospitals. The ultimate supplier is the Central 
Medical Store situated in the capital. In each village, the village committee decides the 
procedures for collecting contributions, purchasing drugs and overall monitoring of the 
system. As a consequence of this autonomy, prepayment terms vary substantially from one 
village to the other. In 1988 the annual contributions per adult male varied from P.G. 20- 
500s; in 2 of 18 villages surveyed by Eklund and Stavem, only men paid and in another 
two villages contributions were on a household basis (Eklund & Stavem 1990). Other 
villages accepted in kind contributions of agricultural produce.
In recent years the country's economic crisis has threatened the survival of the Abota. The 
economy of Guinea Bissau has deteriorated substantially since 1983 and its current per 
capita income, of less than US$200, makes it one of the poorest countries in Sub-Saharan 
Africa. A decade of implementation of a Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) has, 
as yet, failed to improve the economy sufficiently to have a positive effect on the financing 
of the public health sector: the per capita Ministry of Health budget in 1990 was estimated 
to be US$3.00 (MOPH/UNICEF 1991). As a consequence, problems such as inadequate 
recurrent budget allocations, shortage of drugs and low salaries for health workers plague 
the public health system (Tanner 1990). Ramifications include a decreasing capacity of 
government health workers to train and supervise village health workers and difficulties 
in resupplying village health posts, even when their Abota revenues are sufficient to fund 
their requisitions. In a few cases Abota funds have been misappropriated (Knippenberg 
et al 1991) either by village health workers or staff of the Ministry of Health.
b) Nkoranza Health Insurance Scheme:
Started in 1992, the scheme is administrated by a three-tier structure:
In 1988 350 P.G. (the Guinea Bissau Peso) was equivalent to US$0.31. 
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a) Insurance Management Team (IMT) in the hospital, consisting of the 
Medical Officer in charge of Public Health and the Hospital Management 
Team. This is the decision making body of the scheme;
b) Insurance Advisory Board made up of traditional, political, religious and 
administrative leaders in the community and district health leaders (MOH 
and NGO); and
c) Zonal Coordinators and field workers. There are 11 health zones each 
managed by a team of three zonal coordinators. They supervise voluntary 
field workers who register families into the scheme.
The premiums are calculated per person so that they vary with the size of the family The 
scheme ensures access to care at St. Theresa hospital, Nkoranza District in Ghana by 
providing free admission in the medical, surgical and maternity wards. However, 
admissions for normal deliveries are excluded. In addition, insured persons who are 
referred to other health institutions may claim refunds equal to the cost of an average 
admission at Nkoranza. The scheme is available only to families living in the Nkoranza 
district and all the members of a family must register. Registration is renewable annually, 
during the last two months of the year only.
c) Bwamanda and Masisi Health Zone Insurance schemes in Zaire:
Bwamanda Health Zone is linked to a development project, Centre for Integrated 
Development (CDI) started in 1969 and supported by Belgian volunteer workers. 
Impetus for the insurance scheme came from the Zone’s medical staff who were 
concerned about the barrier to access caused by existing user fees and the low recovery 
of hospital costs from fees. Although the Zonal Hospital (a 156-bedded reference hospital) 
had recovered 48% of its operating costs in 1985, this was a lower rate than that of eight 
comparable hospitals in the country (Bitran et al 1987). The parameters of the insurance 
plan, having been set by hospital staff, were explained to the community and preferences 
between two options of premium and co-payment levels were obtained. Enrollment of 
members was carried out by health centre staff, mainly nurses, who receive 3% of the 
premiums they collect as commission. Zone administrative staff make frequent supervisory
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visits to health centres during the enrollment period to monitor payment records, distribute 
membership stamps and transfer premiums to the hospital. They also manage the plan at 
the hospital by verifying the membership status of admitted patients and keeping 
administrative and accounting records.
Members of the Bwamanda insurance plan are covered for hospitalizations including 
deliveries, dental extractions and outpatient surgery. The cost of illness treatment at 
health centres is also covered. Twenty percent copayment is charged but some groups are 
exempted.
THE SOCIAL AND FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE OF RURAL SCHEMES
From the conceptualization of the functions of a social welfare oriented health insurance 
scheme presented in chapter 2, it follows that performance may be assessed from two 
dimensions, the social and the financial. The conceptual framework implied that a 
number of criteria were appropriate. In the case of Social dimensions the criteria include:
a) the resulting levels of access to health care among the population; b) affordability of 
premiums; and c) the appropriateness of payment schedules. With regard to the Financial 
dimension the main criteria are the relationships between: a) premium revenue and b) 
benefits expenditure and the extent of adverse selection. In addition, where possible, 
some information on the extent of moral hazard would also be helpful.
The published and unpublished literature on rural insurance schemes including those 
described above, provide some information that are relevant to the above mentioned 
criteria. Therefore, in this section the three schemes, Nkoranza Health Insurance scheme, 
Bwamanda Health Insurance Plan, and Abota, are evaluated using these criteria. A 
summary of the evaluation is Table 3.4.
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Table 3.4 Performance of three rural health insurance schemes
Social dimensions Financial
dimensions
Affordability Appropriateness o f  
payment schedules
Level o f access revenue/  
expenditure
a) the Abota Village 
Insurance Scheme 
in Guinea-Bissau
affordable - 
determined by 
villagers
appropriate - 
determined by 
villagers
increased -
PHC available in villages
not assessable
b) the Hospital 
Health Insurance in 
Nkoranza District 
Ghana
premiums assessed 
as unaffordable by 
two thirds o f 
households and 
health workers
inappropriate - low 
cash availability Oct - 
Dec.
increased - insured /non 
insured admissions = 
2.4
responsible for 9% 
increase in admissions
revenue/expenditure 
= 0.45
deficit c l 1,000,000
c) Bwamanda 
Health Insurance 
Plan in Zaire
affordable premiums, 
copayment 
unaffordable to some 
households living far 
from hospital
appropriate - 
time chosen by 
community
increased —  
insured/non insured 
admissions 
= 6.7
revenue/expenditure 
= 1.45 (1987) and 
= 1.01 (1989) 
(interest included)
Nkoranza Health Insurance scheme. At the time of the research the scheme had been 
in existence for almost two years and performance data for the first year of operation 
provided information for the assessment presented here (Dept of Insurance, St Theresa’s 
Hospital 1993).
Affordability of premiums. Sixty three percent of the scheme’s field workers and 66% of 
heads of households thought that poor people in the district could not afford the 
premiums. Analysis of the first half of 1992 showed total enrollment of 29% of the 
district's population. There was a clear relationship between the percentage of a zone’s 
population enrolled and the distance of the zone from St. Theresa Hospital. Distant zones 
had lower enrollments, ie Nkoranza Zone- 46%, Ayerede Zone (14km away from the St. 
Theresa Hospital) - 37%, and Kranka Zone (26 km away) - 8% (see Figure 3.1). 
Therefore it appeared that costs of transport to the hospital had the effect of making the 
scheme unaffordable to some households.
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Figure 3.1
Appropriateness of payment schedules. Seventy-two percent of field workers and 65% 
of household heads thought that "people find it difficult to register because they are short 
of money between October and December". Sixty-five percent of field workers and 75% 
of heads agreed that "more people will register if registration is between January and 
March".
Revenue from premiums and expenditure for benefits. During the first year of operation 
the premium was set at c450 per person (approximately $1 at 1992 exchange rates). Using 
the admissions’ data for the insured population, it was estimated that the income obtained 
from premiums would be approximately 55% of the expenditure for inpatients for the first 
year of operation. This implied a deficit of cl 1,000,000. A higher than expected average 
cost per admission was observed for the insured population and this suggested that 
adverse selection and/or moral hazard were significant problems.
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Resulting level of access to health care among the population. The findings suggested that 
the scheme had removed a barrier to admission for people in the district. Utilization, in 
terms of admissions per 100 person-years, was greater than the non-insured by a factor 
of 2.4. It was estimated that among the insured population 9% of admissions was due to 
factors such as earlier reporting of patients and more liberal admission policy of staff, and 
that without the insurance policy this would not have occurred.
Bwamanda Health Insurance Plan. Information in a World Bank report was used to 
assess the social and financial functioning of the Bwamanda Health Insurance Plan in 
Zaire (Shaw & Ainsworth 1994). The assessment results pertaining to the criteria of 
affordability, payment schedules revenue and expenditure, and associated access to health 
care are presented below.
Affordability of premiums. Absolute inaffordability did not appear to be a problem. It was 
reported that in setting the premiums, the health staff compared the premium to the price 
of two kilograms of soy beans as a measure of affordability. In addition, only 16 percent 
of 21 non-members stated that they had not joined the plan because of inadequate cash. 
However, the combined costs of the travel and premium may have been unaffordable to 
some households; when in 1988 the co-payment rate was lowered for those living more 
than 25km from the hospital, the enrollment declined less with distance than in other 
years.
Appropriateness of payment schedules. Communities elected to pay premiums during the 
months that followed the second harvest period (March to April). The explanation 
provided by the authors was that after the first harvest cash was required to pay school 
expenses and therefore appropriateness of time of collecting was ensured by consulting 
the community.
Revenue from premiums and expenditure for benefits. The financial data for the insurance 
plan showed that in 1987 and 1988 premiums and interest were equivalent to 145% of the
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expenditure on care for beneficiaries. As a consequence the share of the hospitals 
operating costs recovered rose from 48% in 1985 to 79 % in 1988.
Resulting level of access to health care among the population. It was reported by the 
World Bank study that insured persons were 6.7 times as likely than the uninsured to be 
hospitalized, implying that access to care was greater for the former group. Since over 
60% of the Zone population were insured this implies a significant increase in the access 
to care as a result of the insurance plan. Even so households living close to the hospital 
were also more likely to be insured, and therefore their high access and utilization may 
have been because of good physical access rather than the insurance plan. The combined 
effects of adverse selection and moral hazard was also felt to account for the high 
utilization, although the copayment and the requirement of all household members joining 
the plans probably reduced their prevalence. Other researchers working in Zaire, 
however, reported the rate of hospitalization among the insured to be only slightly 
higher than that of the non-insured (Moens 1990).
Abota, The published and unpublished literature drawn upon to provide the description 
of the Abota in earlier sections of this chapter also permit a limited evaluation of the 
scheme. Again the criteria of affordability, payment schedules, revenue and expenditure, 
and associated access to health care were used.
Affordability of premiums. Studies of the Abota do not provide direct information on 
affordability but since the contribution was set by the members of the village it is likely 
that the amount set could be afforded by the majority. The fact that many individuals 
were willing to increase their contribution also supports this general conclusion.
Appropriateness of payment schedules. The number of times prepayment contributions 
were collected in a year varied, some villages collected twice yearly, others once. The 
frequency of payments was determined by the villages themselves, therefore it is 
reasonable to assume it was the most appropriate for the community.
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Relationships between premiums and benefits. In the first year of operation the villages 
supply of drugs was depleted within 3 months because the revenue from contributions was 
exhausted. The scheme appears not to have held reserve capital to ensure the quality of 
the insurance policy.
Resulting level of access to health care among the population. That participating villages 
had basic health care made available within the village implies significant increases in 
access. Near universal membership in participating villages excluded adverse selection, 
and the watchfulness of health workers and local communities appeared to prevent moral 
hazard (Eklund & Stavem 1990).
CONCLUSIONS OF LITERATURE REVIEW
The limited literature on health insurance in Africa permits several conclusions to be made 
about the availability of schemes to meet the needs of rural communities, the role of 
insurance in health financing policy and the demand for policies where schemes exist. 
First, although community health financing had been endorsed by many African countries 
with the support of international agencies, particularly UNICEF, fewer community-based 
health insurance schemes than formal social security systems have been attempted.
Secondly, by the beginning of the 1990s, despite considerable involvement in health 
financing policy formulation in Africa, many of the international agencies had failed to 
encourage appropriate insurance-based alternatives to fee payment at the point of use. 
During the financially lean periods, such fees deter many rural patients, the majority of 
them children and women, from seeking health care. This is to be expected since incomes 
in rural Africa are very low and seasonal and access to credit facilities is also minimal. 
Consequently, there are periods, particularly those far removed from the time of harvest 
and the selling of agricultural crops, in which households have virtually no cash. In this 
context, fees, coupled with the universal uncertainties associated with the timing and costs 
of health care needs, increase the chance that individuals requiring health services will find 
them inaccessible. In particular, the 1993 World Development Report (World Bank 1993)
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did not make recommendations for low income countries that would change the situation 
in the short to medium term.
Thirdly, the available evidence strongly suggests that in the foreseeable future, it is 
unlikely that either centralised government or large commercial schemes, as found in rich 
countries, can provide near-universal health insurance cover for people in Africa, most 
of whom live in rural areas. The main constraints that have hindered attempts are 
inadequate administrative infrastructures and shortage of trained staff to manage schemes. 
This underscores the need for information of feasibility of schemes that are designed for 
rural populations. Data on willingness to pay will be a critical part of such information 
since WTP will determine demand and the relationship between revenue and expenditure, 
hence social and financial performance. Affordability of premiums and appropriateness 
of payment schedules of existing rural health schemes suggest that willingness to pay is 
substantial for such schemes.
Fourth, the operation of three rural schemes summarised above from a review of the 
literature (Nkoranza Health Insurance scheme, Bwamanda Health Insurance Plan and the 
Abota) suggest that insurance systems, in some situations, have a high membership rate 
among the population and therefore are capable of increasing access to health care and 
mobilizing resources. However, low participation among the target population of the 
Nkoranza Hospital scheme in Ghana suggests that hospital based schemes may have the 
problem of being mainly attractive to those living close to the hospital and as a result 
achieve low enrollment. Schemes that were less successful than the Nkoranza Health 
Insurance in obtaining enrollments among their target populations have also been reported 
in Zaire. For example, the scheme in Masisi health Zone achieved enrollment rates of only 
26.8% and the subscription to the scheme appeared not to depend on income disparity but 
on the differences in the direct and indirect costs of travelling to the one district hospital 
operating the scheme (Noterman 1993). As predicted by theory, achievement of financial 
and social goals in these reported schemes appeared to mirror enrollment rates. 
Enrollment rates in turn reflect the target populations’ willingness to pay for insurance 
plans offered by the schemes. Hence it is concluded that critical analysis of willingness to
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pay and the factors influencing it will provide health managers and policy makers with 
information that will assist them to design schemes that have high enrollment rates.
The review of the current literature on health insurance theory provides some important 
insights about how a rural health insurance may function. The review supports the thesis 
that the financial and social performance of a rural health insurance scheme would be 
determined by factors that are relevant to community financing in general (ie affordability, 
equity, efficiency, sustainability and quality assurance), all of which will determine its 
acceptance by individuals and households. In addition, the risk attitudes found in the 
population and the willingness of individuals to invest in locally managed schemes will be 
important. This implies that the financial viability of an insurance scheme will be increased 
if its target clientele are risk averse with regards to health care and they are willing and 
able to pay the fair premiums plus loading costs.
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Chapter 4: Objectives, Design and Implementation of Studies
INTRODUCTION
This chapter begins by presenting some research questions that emerge from the reviews 
of the literature on the theory of insurance and the methods for studying its impact 
(Chapter 2) and on health insurance activities in Sub-Saharan Africa (Chapter 3). This is 
followed by descriptions of the objectives and study methods used in the different studies 
undertaken as part of the research.
Priority areas of research
The literature on rural health insurance in Africa fails to, or only partially, address(es) 
a number of policy related questions that would assist health planners to design and 
implement effective and financially viable schemes. One central question for African 
Health Ministries is “are households in rural Africa risk adverse with regard to health 
care and therefore willing to pay for health insurance?” and is only partially answered 
by the limited literature on existing schemes, notably in Guinea Bissau, Ghana and Zaire. 
There is therefore the need for additional information from other countries and about 
different approaches to risk sharing in Africa. Furthermore, to facilitate improvements in 
current schemes and to assist planers to design and implement effective schemes, answers 
to several secondary questions are also required. The secondary questions include the 
following:
* What are the attributes o f a rural health insurance scheme that encourages 
enrollment/participation? Premium level, and the quality of care provided by a 
scheme, are two of the variables that are likely to determine its acceptance by 
individuals and households. Management and financial structures are other 
scheme variables that will influence consumers’ confidence and therefore their 
decision to join the scheme. The personnel structure and their line of reporting will 
influence the perceived credibility of schemes and consequently their acceptability 
and patronage by the population.
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For a given rural population how may the combinations of premiums and cover 
options that will result in a high enrollment and sustainability be determined?
A premium P must cover the following three cost components;
P = E + A + N 
E = Expected claim payment 
A = Administrative costs 
N = Profits
To predict financial sustainability a reliable estimate of the expected expenditure 
of a scheme would be required based on an estimate of the total claims 
(expenditure for the insured). Whereas A, the administrative expenses, are a cost 
accounting problem and the risk premium is a function of an individual's risk 
attitude, E, the expected claim payment is a statistical problem requiring data on 
illness experience of the insurance policy holder and the rate of utilization of health 
care. To provide estimates of revenue from the premiums charged necessitates 
that the number of individuals/households subscribing be known. This number, in 
turn will be equal to the number of households whose WTP valuations for the 
insurance cover is equal or above the premium. Individuals’/households’ WTP 
valuations would therefore be critical information needed to answer the question - 
what premium and cover option combinations will result in a financially 
sustainable scheme?
How does the design o f health insurance schemes encourage or limit the problem 
o f adverse selection and moral hazard? Adverse selection and moral hazard are 
major causes of inefficiencies in the functioning of health insurance schemes. 
Important research questions therefore concern the degree of adverse selection 
and moral hazard existing in schemes of different design and the factors 
encouraging and/or preventing both. The percentage of the population 
participating could serve as a measure of the degree of adverse selection existing 
in a scheme. Establishing the participation rate among high risk groups (children,
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women, and the chronically ill) would provide information about adverse selection 
and would also allow the equity outcome of the schemes to be considered. Data 
on health care utilization rate and type among the insured and the uninsured would 
be critical in assessing the extent of moral hazard.
* Is it possible to identify individuals/households that would be willing to pay for
a health insurance scheme prior to its implementation? This would make it 
possible to predict the expected revenue and revenue ratio and the need for 
exemption for vulnerable persons. A model that explains individual/household 
WTP valuation for insurance cover in terms of observable independent variables 
could be used to predict whether an individual or a household would purchase the 
insurance at a given premium. Currently few attempts have been made, particularly 
in developing countries, to develop such a model. The data obtained (ie WTP 
evaluations, household socio economic variables, illness rate and health care 
utilization) to answer the above questions could also be used to explore the 
possibility of obtaining such a model of WTP.
OBJECTIVES
Objectives of the case studies
The aim of the case studies was to provide answers to some of the questions identified 
above and in so doing, assess the social and financial performance of the two schemes 
selected. (Assessing these two broad dimensions of the schemes is consistent with the 
conceptualization of the function of health insurance developed by the research in which 
performance is seen as having two dimensions, the social and the financial.) 
Consequently, the broad objectives of the evaluations were as follows:
a) to determine changes in the population’s access to health resulting from the 
schemes;
b) to evaluate the affordability of premiums charged by the schemes;
c) to assess the appropriateness of payment schedules to their target population, 
particularly those living in the rural areas;
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d) to estimate the relationships between premium revenue and benefits expenditure;
e) to assess the extent of adverse selection and moral hazard.
The first three relate to the social dimensions of performance and the last two objectives
relate to the financial dimensions.
Objectives of Fieldwork in Ghana
The fieldwork in Ghana was designed to provide the empirical data required to achieve
the following objectives and, in so doing, to use the assessment tool developed.
a) to determine the preferred specifications of community-based risk sharing for 
health care and the “Willingness to Pay” (the maximum premiums/contributions 
that households would be willing and able to pay).
b) to estimate the community risks6, calculated as the proportions of the population 
in the study area who would seek western type health care during the dry season 
and the wet season, for serious and mild illness, if such care were physically 
accessible and affordable.
c) to estimate average costs for outpatient and inpatient episodes in health facilities 
preferred by households in the study area.
d) to estimate two sets of fair community rated premia7 using different approaches; 
a) with the aim of obtaining a contribution revenue equal to the total revenue 
currently raised from user fees and drug fees from the population; and b) with the 
aim of obtaining a contribution revenue equal to a stipulated percentage of the 
cost of providing care at specified facilities to members enrolled in the insurance
The population’s average expected probability of an event is referred to as “the community risk”. 
The alternative is the personal risk which is the measure of the individual’s probability of 
experiencing an event, ie requiring health care.
A fair premium is equal to the expected loss, that is the probability of loss multiplied by the value of 
loss.
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schemes.
e) to estimate the external subsidy from government and/or donor agencies that may
be required to make the preferred schemes financially viable.
The fair premium mentioned above was is in fact a “modified fair community rated 
premium”. A fair premium would have been calculated as the probability of loss, 
multiplied by the value of loss ie the full cost of care. Since one objective in this research 
was to obtain policy relevant WTP valuations, in approach b, it was rather calculated by 
considering only losses due to non salary recurrent cost of providing the care packages. 
This captures the aims of many cost recovery initiatives in African countries, that is, to 
recover a proportion of the recurrent costs rather than the full costs.
STUDY METHOD: EVALUATIONS
Empirical data were collected for the two case studies by administering structured 
questionnaires to the beneficiaries of the schemes (see Appendix 2). Thus household 
surveys were carried out in the study areas in Burundi and Guinea Bissau. In addition 
village health workers involved in the Abota were also surveyed for the Guinea Bissau 
case study. The drug treatments for a sample of patients were obtained by direct 
observation at the health centres in the Burundi case studies.
i) Evaluation of CAM, Burundi
A household survey was used to obtain information on illness occurrence in the month 
preceding the study, perceptions about the value of the health card insurance scheme and 
willingness to pay for membership from 300 households in Muyinga Province. Fifty 
"collines" were randomly selected with probability proportional to population (1990 data) 
from 259 collines in the province. (A colline is a rural community commonly located on 
hill tops. Several collines form a sector administered by a Sector Chief, and several sectors 
form a commune governed by a committee, responsible for local development activities.) 
In each colline 6 households were randomly selected and the head of household
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interviewed by local college students trained to administer the questionnaire by the 
research team.
Four focus group discussions were conducted (the number was determined by time and 
resource availability). Three were held among farming women in rural collines and the 
fourth was held in Muyinga town. The collines were randomly chosen among 
approximately 50 of the collines that had local women's credit associations. On arrival at 
the collines the study team either randomly selected a group of 7-12 women working in 
a field or women living in a cluster of houses randomly selected, and the women were 
invited to participate in discussions held in the local language, Kirundi. All those invited 
agreed to be members of the groups. The main question debated was "Has the card 
insurance scheme increased the access of women and children to health care?". The 
women's general perception of the health insurance card scheme was the starting point 
of each of the discussions. Although women of widely differing ages participated in the 
discussions, the majority were in the child bearing age range, 15-45 years. The 
discussions were permitted to last 40 to 55 minutes.
A retrospective outpatient survey was used to obtain data about 566 outpatient visits to 
5 government health centres in the preceding 12 months. For each month in a health 
centre, 9 or 10 patients were selected by taking every tenth outpatient registered in that 
month. The age, sex, diagnosis and drug treatments of the patients in the sample were 
extracted from the registers. The completeness of a patient's treatment was jointly 
assessed by the principal investigator (the author) and the co-researcher, both trained 
public health physicians with clinical experience in tropical Africa, by comparing the 
quantity of drugs prescribed to the quantity required for a person of the patient's weight 
under the MOH's dosing schedule. The patient's weight was inferred from age and sex. 
In some of the health centres the register also provided information on the form of 
payment used by the patient, ie whether fee for service or a health insurance card.
Initial analysis of the data collected was carried out in the field. Epi Info, version 5, was 
used to analyse the household survey data. Costing of the drugs received by outpatients
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at the health centres was done using the Quattro Pro spreadsheet package.
ii) Evaluation of Abota in Gabu Region of Guinea Bissua 
Household survey
Six tabancas (villages or hamlets) were studied in each of the five sectors in Gabu region. 
A non-random selection of half of these tabancas ensured that they had Abota systems 
at different stages of development. This provided a sample of 10% of the village Abota 
schemes in the region. The tabancas were also selected so as to include USB of varying 
distances from the health centres and major roads. In each tabanca surveyed, 7 households 
were randomly selected (a total of 210 households) and a spokesperson, usually the male 
head of household, was interviewed using a standard questionnaire.
The questionnaire, originally developed to study prepayment in Burundi, was translated 
from French into Portuguese, Guinea Bissau's official language. Translation was done by 
the local staff of the UNICEF office in Bissau prior to the mission. A team of health 
workers from Gabu region and representatives from some of the study communities 
subsequently assisted the research team and the interviewers to adapt the Portuguese 
version of the questionnaire to suit the conditions in the region. Seven local school 
teachers were trained as interviewers by the principal investigator (the author), and staff 
of UNICEF and GVC (an Italian NGO). All the interviewers were fluent in the two main 
local languages. During this fieldwork they were supervised by the Chief Regional Nurse.
Survey of Unidad de Saude de Base (USBVVillage Health Posts 
The research team visited all USBs (15) in the study villages. The Agente de Saude de 
Base in each USB was interviewed using a standard interview form (see Appendix 2), 
either by the principal researcher through an interpreter or by the field supervisor. The 
premises, equipment and stock levels of drugs of each USB were inspected and recorded. 
Records in the regional drug store in Gabu were used to obtain information on quantities 
and prices of the most recent purchases of essential drugs by the USBs.
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STUDY METHODS: GHANA FIELDWORK
Selection of the study area
The study area was Osudoku, one of the four sub-districts in Dangme-West District, in 
southern Ghana. This sub-district was selected for the following reasons:
* communities in this administrative area have physical access to a range of health 
care providers. These include the government - Akuse hospital and MOH level 
B health posts at Volu; Mission - Battor Catholic Hospital; and community 
clinics, at Volivo, Asutuare, Atropiya and Dufo (figure 7.1 in chapter 7). 
Therefore households in the study area had knowledge of the differences in the 
care provided by these providers in different facilities, either from personal 
experiences or that of their family and friends. This information would provide the 
basis for their decisions to participate in ("willingness to pay" for) schemes 
offering care in facilities operated by different providers with different 
characteristics.
* Dangme West District is a Bamako Initiative district and is therefore one of 
UNICEF's priority districts in Ghana.
The fieldwork carried out in Ghana had two main components: 1) focus group
discussions, "exploratory" and "expandatory"; and 2) a two-stage household survey. The 
exploratory focus group discussions were conducted at the start of the fieldwork to 
provide information on the perceptions and discourse relating to solidarity and risk sharing 
in the study community. Findings were used to refine and tailor the household 
questionnaire. The expandatory focus group discussions were conducted after the first 
round of household survey data collection and household heads who had taken part in the 
household survey were randomly selected to take part. To take account of seasonality of 
both income and illness occurrence, the household survey collected data for the dry and 
wet seasons in 1993/4.
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Focus group discussion
Twelve focus group discussions were conducted. The local languages, Ga-Adangbe and 
Ewe were used and adults of widely differing ages participated in the discussions. They 
were organized in groups of 7-12 discussants who sat in a circle. The length of the 
discussions ranged from 40 to 55 minutes and they were conducted in the open air. They 
were facilitated jointly by the principal investigator (the author) and the co-researcher. 
Information obtained in each session was recorded in written notes and by audio tape8. 
All the discussions were then transcribed verbatim9. A 'questioning route' was developed 
and used to guide the group discussions. The main questions debated were: 1) What role 
do solidarity associations play in the community?; 2) how would households in their area 
view the opportunity to join a health insurance association? The participants' general 
perceptions about the health care in the community and problems when seeking health 
care were the starting point of each of the discussions.
Household Survey
* A draft questionnaire was developed for the first round of the household survey 
(see Appendix 2). It included questions on three main areas of concern: 1) social 
and economic status of the household; 2) recent health care practice and 
expenditure; 3) willingness and ability to pay annual amounts to obtain free care 
at different health facilities in the sub-district. In addition the questionnaire 
provided basic information about the proposed health insurance associations. The 
findings of the first round of focus group discussions (Exploratory discussions  ^
suggested it would be more appropriate and valid to ask people in these 
communities about “their willingness/ability to join associations that require the 
payment of membership dues and which entitle members to have free health care 
at specified facilities in the event of illness”, rather than ask for “their willingness
Audio records of focus groups are invaluable. Krueger R. A. Focus groups: A Practical Guide fo r  
Applied Research Sage Publications, London, 1981, chapters 5 & 7.
Verbatim transcripts represent accessible and objective raw data that may, at a later date, be re- 
analysed, either by moderators/researchers or by other persons who were not physically present at 
the interviews or discussions. Notes written during the interviews and discussions incorporate the 
initial interpretations of participants' comments by the facilitators(s).
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to pay for health insurance covers”
Enumeration of all housing compounds (total of 1,650) in Osudoku and a census 
of the households living in each compound was undertaken.
The sub-district is divided into 29 units. These divisions are based on population, 
and are used by the Committees for the Defence of the Revolution (CDR) and 
district council for administrative purposes. These units were used as the basis for 
enumeration; and the unit chairmen as the enumerators. Each unit is made up of 
several small villages with anything from 1 to 40 or 50 houses. Before the census 
each unit CDR chairman was asked to list the villages making up his unit. This 
provided a means of checking that no village was overlooked in the enumeration. 
This list is provided in Appendix 3 and was also used to bring the map of the sub­
district up to date.
All compounds were assigned numbers. (The numbers were painted on the 
exterior walls of the compounds in order to facilitate their location by interviewers 
during the household survey.) The census information was entered into a 
computer data base using an Epi Info programme and formed the sampling frame 
for the household survey. A study sample of nine hundred households was 
randomly selected10.
Twelve interviewers were selected and trained during a three week period. The 
majority were ex-clerical staff of a local defunct sugar factory, recently graduated 
college students and retired teachers. The training consisted of introductory talks 
on the rationale for the study, discussions of suitability of terminology and units 
of measurement used in the draft questionnaire, role play and peer group 
assessment of interviewing techniques.
Using the illness rates found in the Burundi case study and those found by other researchers working 
in Tanzania, Zambia and Cameroon, it was estimated that the study required a sample size in the 
range 700-900 households.
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The draft questionnaire was revised in the light of the comments during the 
interviewers’ training sessions and the findings of the focus group discussions.
Two data entry clerks were trained.
The household questionnaire was piloted in an area adjacent to the study area.
Each round of data collection of the household survey was conducted over a 30 
day period. The interviewers were supervised in the field by the author, one field 
supervisor and one deputy field supervisor. Data entry began after the first week 
and was double entered.
The willingness to pay questions asked in the two rounds of the survey differed 
substantially. Those in round one were greater in number and provided the 
information needed to focus the questions in round two on fewer options, ie those 
benefit options that were most preferred. Thus, in round one respondents were 
asked to state their WTP to be members of an association that provided care at 
each of the categories of provider identified as catering for the sub-district, Battor 
Mission Hospital, Akuse Government Hospital, Volu health clinic/centre, and 
community clinics. Although a new method of payment, ie periodic household 
contributions, was described to the respondents, they were not provided with 
information about the types of care that would be provided. This meant that the 
hypothetical market was only partially specified and more options could be 
inquired about in the time available for the interview.
In the second round respondents were given a description of a new and 
hypothetical good, membership of an association that entitled them to free health 
care that had characteristics indicated as acceptable during the focus group 
discussions. They were also told that the management structure of the association 
corresponded to the model that emerged as being ideal during the focus 
discussions. The WTP questions were open ended and required respondents to
WTP for RHI Study design Chapter 4 69
state the amounts for children and adults separately for each of the following: 1) 
OPD at nearby government clinics; 2) inpatient at Battor; and 3) combined OPD 
and inpatient at Battor Hospital. Care at these facilities was selected because, 
during the first round, the willingness to pay was greatest for care at Battor 
hospital. Secondly, in the group discussion, access to a local clinic that provided 
acceptable care was considered of more value than access to a distant hospital.
Estimation of household consumption and saving incomes
The household questionnaires included a section (page 7) on household inputs and outputs 
in which the respondent was asked for quantities used or produced in the previous farming 
season (either the minor season, “Gbo” or the major, “Gbie” depending on whether it 
was the first or the second round of data collection). The inputs were labour, seeds and 
machinery. Outputs were divided to crops and non-crop.
The "total incomes before production cost" (Ib) was estimated for each household, by 
adding the estimated revenues from the sale of crops, live stock, wages/salaries and net 
transfers. The revenues from crop sales were calculated by multiplying the quantities that 
household heads said they had produced by unit prices obtained by doing a survey of 
local markets where farmers sold produce. The wages and salaries were estimated by 
finding out the nature of employment, for example whether a teacher, a cleaner or a 
driver, and assuming that the salary was identical to government pay scales. The total 
income after production cost (IJ for each household was derived by subtracting the costs 
of production, such as the cost of hiring agricultural machinery and/or labour, from the 
(Ib). This total income after production costs represents resources available for household 
consumption and savings during the 12 months investigated.
Costing of care at the presentative mission hospital
Battor Hospital provided a significant amount of the health care used by households in 
the sample. However, an initial review of their financial records and reports showed that 
donated goods which constituted a substantial proportion of the hospital’s supplies, were 
not reflected in the accounts. It was therefore necessary to use the financial information
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of another similar facility in the Ghana study. Consequently, a review of financial records 
and reports of Holy Family Hospital Berekrum was undertaken as part of the fieldwork 
in Ghana. The facility was selected because it was similar to Battor in its 
administration/management and in the type and quality of health care that it provided. The 
two hospitals also were of similar size with regards to beds and type and number of health 
staff. Unlike Battor hospital, however, Holy Family Hospital had financial reports based 
on comprehensive cost data that included the value of donated goods.
The relevant information to estimate unit non-salary costs per new outpatient, re-attending 
outpatient and inpatient was extracted from the records and reports. A computer 
spreadsheet was then developed and used to carry out the estimations (see Appendix 4).
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Chapter 5: Backgrounds of Study Countries
INTRODUCTION
This chapter describes the physical, demographic and socio economic environment of the 
three countries where the fieldwork for this research was carried out, Burundi, Guinea 
Bissau and Ghana. The first two were the only countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, at the 
time of the research, with the exception of Zaire, that had established health insurance 
schemes designed to be accessible to those living outside the urban area and/or not 
employed in the formal sector. For this reason evaluations of their schemes formed an 
important part of the research. The socio-economic indicators for both countries (Table 
5.1) were comparable to those of Ghana: for example, all three had GNP of less than $450 
in 1989-91 and gave further support to the rationale of seeking to use the results of the 
evaluations to inform the design of the feasibility study in Ghana.
Table 5.1 Basic Indicators of Selected African Economies
POPULATION
(MILLIONS)
MID-1991
AREA
(THOUSANDS 
OF SQUARE 
KILOMETRES)
GNP
PER
CAPITA
$
AVERAGE 
ANNUAL RATE 
OF INFLATION % 
1980-1991
LIFE
EXPECTANCY 
AT BIRTH 
(YEARS 1991)
ADULT
ILLITERACY
(%)
1990
Ethiopia 52.8 1,222 120 2.4 48
Tanzania 25.2 945 100 25.7 51
Zaire 0.04 2,345 60.9 52 28
Uganda 16.9 236 236 46 52
Nigeria 99.0 924 340 18.1 52 49
Kenya 25.0 580 340 9.2 59 31
Ghana 15.3 239 400 40.1 55 40
Burundi 5.7 28 210 4.3 48 50
Guinea
Bissau
1.0 36 180 56.2 39 64
Source: World Bank 1993
Ghana’s GNP was significantly higher than that of the other two study countries and 
therefore from the onset it was anticipated that the expectations, in terms of quality of
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care, by households in Ghana might be higher than those of Burundi and Guinea Bissau. 
However, since it was unlikely that high incomes would make households less willing to 
pay for health insurance, the existing schemes being in poorer countries than the feasibility 
study, this was not expected to lead to problems in interpreting the findings.
As background to the health financing situation in these countries, the circumstances that 
led to major economic changes are presented, in particular their structural adjustment 
efforts. The chapter also provides information on the structures and histories of the 
Ministries of Health, health care provision and recent financing policies in the health sector 
in these three countries. Information about variations in local languages was sought and 
used in making decisions about the wording of the questionnaires and the selection of 
interviewers; hence it is presented as part of the country backgrounds.
Information on the rural economic activities, which in all three study areas are dominated 
by agriculture, is also provided. The rationale is that the willingness to pay for health 
insurance among households will be heavily influenced by the levels and characteristics 
of household cash availability and flows. Hence, knowledge about the nature of economic 
returns to agricultural activities assisted in interpreting and evaluating the findings relating 
to the premiums household heads reported they were able and willing to pay and the 
schedules of payments they preferred. Some attention is also paid to physical and climatic 
conditions in these study countries because they affect economic activity, accessibility to 
health facilities and seasonality of infectious illness. In addition, such information about 
the whole country made it possible to form impressions about the generalizability of 
conditions and findings in the study areas.
In Ghana, the progress of democracy and government decentralization were seen as 
important since this would influence the insurance structures and the regulatory 
mechanisms that would be acceptable to communities, local administrations and central 
Ministries. For these reasons this aspect of the countries recent history also forms part 
of the background for this thesis.
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BURUNDI
This is a landlocked country in East Africa, bounded on the north by Rwanda, on the East 
and South by Tanzania, and on the West by Lake Tanganyika and Zaire. It has an area 
of 27,834 sq. km (10,747 sq. mi) and is one of the smallest countries on the African 
continent. Most of the county consists of a hilly plateau region, with an average elevation 
of about 1520 m (about 5000 ft). Elevations decrease gradually to the east and southeast. 
The narrow western margin of the country, bordering the Rusizi River and Lake 
Tanganyika, lies in the trough of the Rift Valley. The main rivers are the Rusizi, the 
Malagarasi, and the Ruvuvu. The climate is tropical, moderated in most places by 
altitude. The average annual temperature is 21.1° C (70° F) on the plateau and 24.4° C 
(76° F) in the Rift Valley. A dry season lasts from May to August, and the country is 
subject to droughts.
The population in 1993 was estimated as 5,985,308, giving the country an overall density 
of about 215 persons per sq. km (about 556 per sq. mi) one of the highest in Africa. The 
population is more than 90 percent rural. The chief ethnic groups are the Hutu, a 
Bantu-speaking people making up about 85 percent of the population, and the Tutsi 
people who form nearly 15 percent of the total. The Twa, a pygmy group, account for 
less than 1 percent. The official languages are Kirundi and French. Swahili is also widely 
spoken. About two-thirds of the population is Christian, chiefly Roman Catholic. The 
remainder adheres to Islam or traditional religions.
Burundi has a predominantly agricultural economy and is one of the poorest nations in the 
world. Export earnings are dominated by a single crop - coffee. National budget figures 
for the late 1980s showed about $189.4 million in revenue and $222.7 million in 
expenditures. Cotton and, increasingly, teas are also grown for export. Subsistence 
agriculture is the main means of livelihood and social and cultural importance is attached 
to the ownership of large cattle herds. Overgrazing has contributed to extensive soil 
erosion reducing returns from investments in animal rearing. Mining is based on the
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exploitation of small amounts of gold, bastnaesite, and cassiterite (a tin ore). Important 
reserves of uranium, nickel, and peat remain to be exploited.
Since the advent of the Third Republic, on Sept. 3, 1987, Burundi has been ruled by a 
30-member military junta, the Military Committee for National Salvation (Comite Militaire 
de Salut National; CMSN). Despite the appointment of a Cabinet consisting of an equal 
number of Hutu and Tutsi the CMSN is the key decision-making organ. Pending the 
adoption of a new constitution, the ruling party, the Unity for National Progress (Unite 
pour le Progres National; UPRONA), acts as the principal counterweight to the army. 
Burundi is divided into 15 provinces, each subdivided into arrondissements and 
communes. Power at the local level rests in the hands of centrally appointed authorities, 
most of whom are of Tutsi origins.
The country’s public health sector is managed by a decentralized Ministere de la Sante 
Publique. Decentralization became effective in 1987 and currently there are Provincial 
Medical Directors and Sector Medical Chiefs. The health infrastructure consists of 7 
referral hospitals, 26 six rural hospitals and 236 health centres. To provide care in these 
facilities the public health ministry collaborates with other ministries.
In 1990, Burundi had 168 physicians (1 per 31,777 persons) and 10,370 hospital beds 
(1 per 515 persons). More than 80% of the population lived within 6 km radius of a health 
centre. The vaccination coverage for infants under the age of 1 year was BCG 95%, above 
80% for 3rd DPT and 3rd Polio and 75% for measles.
The most common health problems stem from communicable diseases and nutritional 
deficiencies, a situation that accounts for 70 percent of infant and child mortality. Malaria, 
measles, influenza, and diarrhea account for 80 percent of reported cases of communicable 
diseases. While sleeping sickness is widespread in the lakeshore areas, pulmonary diseases 
are common in the central highlands. In 1990, the infant mortality rate per 1,000 live 
births was 111.0. Life expectancy at birth in 1991 for males and females was 50.0 years 
and 54.0 years respectively.
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GUINEA BISSAU
Guinea Bissau is a small country of western Africa, covering an area of 13,948 square 
miles (36,125 square km). Its two neighbours are Senegal to the north and Guinea to the 
east and south. Guinea-Bissau may be divided, from southwest to northeast, into three 
regions: the coastal lowlands, the interior plain, and the northeastern highland. The coastal 
lowlands are covered by extensive mangrove swamps, and a dense network of rias, or 
drowned valleys, covers roughly one-third of the country, extending inland to the 
northeast. Average rainfall is highest in this region, decreasing from more than 100 inches 
(2,500 mm) along the coast to between 70 and 80 inches (1,800 and 2,000 mm) inland.
The natural increase rate per 1,000 population in 1991 was 26.0. Native inhabitants of 
Guinea-Bissau speak languages derived from the Niger-Congo family, and the Balanta 
Brassa, Fulani, Malinke, and Mandyako are the four major ethnic groups. The animist 
Balanta Brassa are a people who belong to a stateless society revolving around the family. 
The Fulani are essentially Muslim pastoralists; their society is hierarchical. The Mandyako 
are horticulturists. The Malinke are agriculturalists and traders.
Portuguese is the official language, but each tribe speaks its own vernacular, which in turn 
is divided into dialects. The majority of the people follow traditional religious beliefs. 
Islam is the dominant minority religion. Christianity has made few inroads in 
Guinea-Bissau. The annual rate of growth of Guinea-Bissau's population is relatively low 
in comparison with the rest of sub-Saharan Africa. The people are predominantly rural, 
and more than two-fifths of the population are less than 15 years old.
Since gaining its independence from Portugal in 1974, the Government has faced the 
difficult task of rebuilding the economy which had been devastated by the long war of 
independence. A strategy to diversify production, with emphasis on developing the 
manufacturing sector, was adopted in the mid-70s but was largely unsuccessful. This 
strategy diverted substantial amounts of the state’s scarce resources away from 
agriculture, forestry and fishing, sectors in which the country had comparative advantages.
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In addition government controls and overvaluation of the country’s currency contributed 
to the development of a parallel market which also had adverse effects on these potentially 
successful sectors.
In 1983 the government initiated some reforms as part of the Financial Stabilization 
Programme (FSP) and Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAP) supported by the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. Specific measures in these 
reforms included price increases for the producers of agricultural goods, devaluation of 
the peso, liberalization of trade, reforms of public enterprises and reductions in number 
of civil servants. More comprehensive, medium term adjustment programmes were 
implemented in 1987. These additional programmes enabled the government to reduce 
the budget deficit from 14.7% of GDP in 1985, to 4% in 1988 (Evlo 1992). Although 
more restrictive monetary and credit policies were also put in practice inflation remained 
high because of devaluation and the liberalization of prices: inflation was 100% in 1987-88 
and 70% in 1989. The aim of the above reform measures was to redress the large 
macroeconomic imbalances. However, by the end of the 1980s foreign public debt was 
running at 275% of GDP, and debt servicing was an average of 40% of export income.
Between 1990-95 life expectancy at birth was 44.0 years and 45.0 years for males and 
females respectively. During these years the infant mortality rate per 1,000 live births was 
134. The major diseases include malaria, tuberculosis, and measles. Malaria, diarrhea and 
acute respiratory infections are reported to account for 95% of cases treated at health care 
facilities (UNICEF 1992).
The western health sector consists mainly of the public facilities although in the capital 
Bissau there are some private pharmacies. The government allocates 8% of its budget to 
health and in 1989 the total health expenditure (including that financed by foreign aid) was
13.1 million dollars or 13.1 dollars per capita. Foreign aid to this sector is channelled 
mainly through the funding of projects and covers both recurrent and investment costs. 
In the second half of the 1980s the percentage of the health sector expenditure funded by 
external cooperation ranged from 94% to 99.6%. Donations constitute approximately
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60% of external aid, and the main sources of loans are the World Bank and the African 
Development Bank. The main bilateral donors are Sweden, Italy, the Netherlands, 
Denmark and France.
Health care delivery is organized at four levels:
► the central level consisting of the two national referral hospitals in Bissau
► the regional level which in 1991 had five operational regional hospitals
► the level of sectors with 12 sectoral hospitals
► the local level consisting of health areas with an area containing a health centre
and several basic health units. In 1991 there were 120 health centres and 462 
village health units.
Most health facilities including the national referral hospital deteriorated during the 
economic crisis. Shortage of trained health staff was also a problem. Physicians working 
in the country in 1990 were 773 (1 per 7,445 persons). The unavailability of drugs and 
medical supplies were a major problem but improved when the government adopted an 
essential drug policy supported by WHO, UNICEF, France and Sweden. Under the policy 
the Central Drug Depot is managed by the national drug programme and it supplies drugs 
to health facilities.
In most health centres and hospitals, patients who are not referred by village health 
workers working in the village health insurance scheme, Abota, pay for treatments. The 
treatment charges are relatively low and do not aim to recover a percentage of costs. The 
Abota system in one region is described in chapter 6 and is the subject of one case study 
in the research. Another system of cost sharing practised in health centres in some parts 
of the country is the Bamako Initiative (BI) which requires patients to pay higher fees to 
recover 50% of drug costs. With the support of WHO, UNICEF and GVA, an Italian 
NGO, the Government started a pilot BI Essential Drugs programme in the Gabu region 
in 1989. It is estimated that cost-sharing in 1991 represented 15% of all health 
expenditure.
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GHANA
Physical Characteristics
Ghana covers an area of 91,843 square miles and lies within the tropics (4° 45' North of 
the equator extending 850km North to latitude 11° 11'). Although plateaux of varying 
elevations make up the greater part, the Volta River Basin covering the remainder, the 
county is divided into three major geographic areas - coastal, forest, and northern savanna. 
In the coastal part many rivers and streams cross its sandy plains but are generally 
navigable only by canoe. There are no natural harbours. Ghana's highest point 
(approximately 884 m above sea level) is found in the range of hills on its eastern 
border. In the West the terrain is broken by heavily forested hills. Beyond the coastal 
areas the forest forms the almost a third of the country. In the northern two thirds is the 
savanna, undulating and drained by the Black and White Volta rivers which join to form 
the Volta. In the mid 1960s, the Volta was dammed at Akosombo creating the largest 
manmade lake in the world (250 miles long and 3,275 sq. miles in extent). It is an 
important geographical feature and is one of Ghana's major economic assets. South of the 
lake, the river flows to the sea through a narrow gap in the hills.
The country's climate is tropical and is dominated by two air masses - the moisture laden 
Monsoon and the dry Harmattan. The former is associated with the rainy seasons, one 
in the north (May to September) and two in the south (April to June and September to 
November). The Monsoon provides annual rainfall varying from about 1015 mm (about 
40 in) in the north to about 2030 mm (about 80 in) in the southeast. The harmattan blows 
from the northeast from December to March, lowering the humidity and creating hot days 
and cool nights in the north. In the south the effects of the harmattan are felt in January. 
Temperatures vary with season and elevation with the annual mean temperature ranging 
between 26°C and 29°C and daily range of 10 to 16.7 degrees Celsius.
Administratively, Ghana is divided into 10 regions which are subdivided into 110 districts. 
Seventy percent of the total population lives in the southern half of the country. By the 
late 1980s about one-third of Ghana's population was estimated to be urban, and
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migration from the airal areas into the urban centres was steady and increasing. In 1992, 
the percentage of the population in urban areas was 34.9%. Despite their rapid expansion 
in size and population, most of the urban centres remain small by world standards. The 
Accra-Tema agglomeration, with an estimated population of 985,369 in 1988, is the 
largest in the country, followed by Kumasi and Tamale.
Pre-colonial and colonial history
It is thought by some historians that the people of Ghana originated from the ancient 
African empire after which it is named. The traditions of many of its 190 ethnic groups 
indicate they migrated from the north of the present boundaries over the period 1200 to 
1600. The Portuguese first visited the area in the second half of the 15 th century in search 
of gold, ivory and spices. The English, French, Danes, Swedes, Dutch, German and 
Portuguese all controlled parts of the territory at different periods until 1901 when Britain 
assumed full responsibility for the government of the Gold Coast (as it was then called). 
In 1922 a part of the adjoining German territory of Togoland was placed under British 
administration by a League of Nations Mandate and, after the Second World War, was 
placed by agreement under the Trusteeship System of the United Nations. The areas 
formerly known as Gold Coast (the Gold Coast Colony, Ashanti and Northern 
Territories), with that part of Togoland which had been administered by the British 
Government, became independent on March 6th 1957 and adopted the name Ghana. It 
was the first Sub-Saharan nation to be free of colonial rule.
Political Background
The Convention People's Party (CPP) under Dr. Kwame Nkrumah led the struggle for 
independence and ruled the country until the government was overthrown by the armed 
forces on February 24th 1966. Since then the country has had seven governments, five 
of which came to power through coups d'etat. The only two elected governments ruled 
for a total of four and half years.
On December 31st 1981 Rawlings returned to power for the second time as leader of the 
ruling Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC) by overthrowing the government
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of Dr Limann and the Third Republic. The PNDC repealed the Constitution and 
announced its intentions to foster "grassroots" and participatory democracy. These and 
subsequent measures had strong nationalist aims and were met with hostility from the 
Ghanaian middle classes and some western governments, the Reagan administration in 
particular. However the People’s Power rhetoric attracted strong support from the urban 
and rural poor.
From mid 1983 onwards, in the face of successive coup attempts, continuing alienation 
by the West and growing enmity among dissatisfied Ghanaians, the PNDC embarked on 
a policy of reconciliation encouraging representation by a broader range of social groups. 
From this period onwards the PNDC's relationship with the West improved dramatically 
with its implementation of IMF/World Bank supported economic policies. In 1988-89 
nationwide elections for non-party district assemblies were held as the first step in what 
the government described as an evolving democratic process. The district assemblies were
I
charged with local development tasks.
Under increasing international and domestic pressures the PNDC initiated the return to 
constitutional rule in the middle of 1990. In May 1991 the government announced its 
acceptance of multi-partyism and set in motion processes for the preparation of a draft 
constitution to be completed by the end of 1991. However some social and political 
organizations, including the churches, students, lawyers and the opposition Movement for 
Freedom and Justice (MFJ) have complained that some elements of the constitution 
making process are undemocratic. In spite of this the PNDC has indicated that a 
referendum on the constitution will be held (a date has yet to be confirmed), and that it 
will determine how soon the constitution will come into effect after the referendum.
Economic background
A major cause of the past political instability was the country's precarious economy in the 
1960s and the decline in all sectors of its economy that followed. In the 1970s food 
production fell by more than 3 per cent each year, cocoa exports fell from 407,00 tons in 
1971 (representing over 40% of the worlds output at the time) to 180,000 in 1982 and the
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output of the mining sector in 1980 was only half that of 1971. The PNDC took power 
in 1981 as Ghana staggered into its worst economic crisis while enduring the beginnings 
of the severest three year drought of the century. Rising poverty coupled with the 
collapse of the health services lowered the health status and the standard of living of 
Ghanaians. By 1981 yaws and yellow fever, which had been eradicated a quarter of a 
century ago, had returned.
The IMF and World Bank approved Economic Recovery Programme/Structural 
Adjustment Programme (ERP/SAP) was initiated in 1983. Since its inception it has 
benefited from substantial Western funding, about $3bn. The Thatcherite principles 
underlying the programme have arrested the economic decline: between 1985-89 Ghana's 
Gross National Product grew at an average of 5.5%.
Liberalization of trade and the devaluation of the Ghana's cedi under ERP/SAP (from 
c2.75 to the US dollar in 1983 to c370 by mid 1991) have increased the competitiveness 
of Ghanaian goods in the world market and have encouraged steady growth in the export 
of cocoa, gold and timber. Considerable revenue has gone into paying off the country's 
international debts while new credits have been used to rehabilitate the transport and 
communication infrastructure. Despite debt-servicing rising to 50 percent of its annual 
export earnings by 1985, Ghana has been able to service its mounting debts. This has 
contributed to restoring its creditworthiness internationally and currently Ghana is often 
commended as a shining example of IMF/World Bank structural adjustment policies in 
Africa.
The successes of these policies have been at considerable social cost to many ordinary 
Ghanaians (Herbst 1993). The distributional impact of the programme has therefore been 
a cause of concern and debate. Cocoa farmers in particularly benefited while food 
producers such as rice farmers suffered from cheap imports and inadequate food policies. 
Rising costs of imported intermediate products on the other hand forced local 
manufacturing industries to wane. Fiscal policies to reduce state expenditure including that 
on social services necessitated the removal of subsidies from all consumer goods and the
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above measures resulted in price increases of 122 per cent in 1983, eventually falling to 
23 per cent in 1986. Meanwhile general wage increases were suppressed, and real 
earnings declined sharply in 1984, partly because the monetary policy aimed to hold 
domestic credit formation to below 20 per cent. In urban areas, however, increases in real 
wages above that of the GDP growth have since occurred and salaries of higher income 
groups have risen faster than others.
Modern economy
Ghana's GDP, US$25000 million in 1994, is derived primarily from agricultural and 
mineral output. In 1991, agriculture accounted for 53% of GDP and provided 
employment for 56% of the labour force. Timber and gold have also been traditionally 
important parts of the economy accounting for 17.9% and 15.5% of exports respectively 
in 1986. Other mineral outputs include manganese ore and industrial diamonds. 
Manufacturing and services make a small contribution to the economy, industry 
accounting for 18% of GDP in 1991 (World Bank 1992).
Although in a few rural areas mining is an important occupation, the rural economy is 
almost entirely dependent on agriculture. Moving from the coast to the north, farming 
practices and outputs change appreciably. Except for the extreme northeast, agriculture 
is based on a rotational system in which land is cropped for two or three years and then 
abandoned for from four to seven years, in order to allow it to regenerate. Thus rural 
settlements form scattered nuclei surrounded by land that is either under crops or 
undergoing regeneration. When cocoa or other tree crops are grown, however, 
cultivation is usually continuous or permanent. In the extreme Northeast where 
settlements consist of isolated compound houses, each surrounded by its own farm 
continuous cropping is commonly practised.
The coastal zone is traditionally a region of fishermen and small-scale farmers. In this 
area, associated with the two rainy seasons of the south (April to June and September 
to November), there are two farming seasons, the major and the minor. The main crops 
grown during both farming seasons, mainly for household consumption and the local
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market, are corn, rice, tomatoes, cassava, pepper and okra. Poultry and other livestock 
are also produced on a small scale. In Osuduku (the subdistrict in this zone used as the 
study area in the research) sugar cane was grown on a commercial scale to supply a sugar 
factory in the independence years. Large scale sugar cane farming ceased in the late 1970s 
with the closure of the factory.
The forest region, which constitutes about a third of the country, is rich agricultural land. 
Almost all the timber, cocoa, and a number of minor cash crops grown for export come 
from this region. A large part of the foodstuffs consumed in Ghana, in particular plantain, 
yams and oil palm, are also grown in this part of the country. In addition, gold and other 
minerals are exploited in the forest area.
The northern savanna region, covering two-thirds of the country, has a harsh environment 
partly because rainfall is low. The southern part of the savanna that adjoins the forest 
zone, forms part of the disease-ridden "middle belt" of western Africa and is comparably 
poor agriculture land. In the most northerly part, which is relatively free from the tsetse 
fly of the middle belt is savanna vegetation that is well suited to livestock breeding. Its 
light soils and the rainfall regime support the cultivation of yams and cereals. Although 
agriculture is mostly of the traditional subsistence type, irrigation and mechanized 
cultivation have opened prospects. Lake Volta, which extends far into the heart of the 
region, serves as a reservoir of water for agricultural use.
Demography and ethnic characteristics
The population of Ghana (1984 preliminary) was 12,205,574; the estimated population 
in 1994 was 16,050,000, giving the country an overall population density of about 67 
persons per sq. km (about 174 per sq. mi). Since 1970, it maintained a high average 
annual growth rate of about 3 percent, with females slightly in excess of males. More than 
60 percent of Ghanaians are under 25 years of age, assuring that the country's high growth 
rate will continue for some time. Life expectancy at birth, which in 1960 was placed at 46 
years, improved considerably to nearly 55 years in the late 1980s, and in 1993 was 53.3 
years for males and 57.2 years for females. Population fluctuations due to emigration
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became pronounced during the severe economic depression of the late 1970s and early 
1980s.
The population of Ghana is divided into more than 50 ethnic groups. In the coastal areas, 
from East to West the principal ethnic groups are the Ewe, Adangme (Adangbe), Ga, 
Efiitu, Fanti, Ahanta, and Nzima. Most of the urban concentrations are along the coast 
in urban centres of Accra, Cape Coast, and Sekondi-Takoradi. West of the Volta, in the 
forest region, are the Akan people consisting mainly of the ethnic groups Akwapim and 
Kwahu in the east, the Akim in the south, the Ashanti and Brong in the centre and north, 
and the Wasaw and Sefwi in the west. The Ewes predominate to the east of the Volta. 
The largest ethnic groups in the northern savanna region are the Dagomba and the Guang 
(Gonja), related to the Mossi people of Burkina Faso. Based on language, at least 75 
different groups are recognizable. Many of these are very small, and only 10 of them are 
numerically significant. The largest groups are the Akan 52.4%, Mole-Dagbani 15.8%, 
Ewe 11.9% Ga-Adangme 7.8%, and Gurma 3.3%.
Nearly two-thirds of the population is Christian, about one-sixth is Muslim, and one-third 
adheres to the traditional tribal religions. The indigenous religions are based on belief in 
the existence of a supreme being and a number of lesser deities. They give considerable 
prominence to dead ancestors, who are believed to be ever-present, capable of influencing 
the course of events for the living, and can serve as intermediaries between the living and 
the gods. Stemming from these beliefs are distinct attitudes and practices relating to 
disease causation and cure. In particular, illness is often associated with the supernatural 
powers. It is often said that the Ghanaian dreads disease and believes that disease is 
almost never natural.
Causes of morbidity and mortality
Infective and parasitic diseases (particularly malaria, measles and pneumonia), 
malnutrition, sickle cell, accidents and problems of the newborn are the main health 
problems in Ghana. Approximately a third of all reported deaths in Ghana results from 
infective and parasitic diseases. In 1984, it was estimated that sickle cell disease,
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accidents and cerebrovascular disease were responsible for 5.5%, 4.7% and 3.3% 
respectively of the total days of healthy life lost (Ghana Health Assessment Project Team 
1981). The national pattern of ill-health conceals geographical and urban/ rural 
differences. For illustration, in 1991, circulatory disease was the major reported cause of 
urban mortality, accounting for 23% of male deaths and 26% of female deaths in Accra 
(Stephens et al 1994).
This pattern of ill health has persisted in spite of high priority that successive governments 
have placed on public health since independence. However geographically disproportional 
declines in the magnitude of most of these health problems did occur during the 1960s 
and early 1970s. For example, the infant mortality rate which was 360 per 1,000 live 
births in 1915, was 143 in 1960 and had declined to 95 during the period 1978-82. By 
1994 the national average infant mortality rate per 1,000 live births was 83, rural areas 
having 24% higher rates than urban areas. In the mid 1970s the national maternal 
mortality rate was reported to be 5-10 per 1000. It ranged from 5 in urban hospital 
conditions to 18 in rural areas. In 1994 it was reported to be 2-3 per 1000. However 
positive trends in nutritional status of the 1960's and the early 1970's have since dissipated. 
Thirty per cent of children less than three years were undernourished in 1988 and this was 
unchanged in 1993. The prevalence of acute under nutrition, manifested by wasting, was 
12% in 1993 and represented a substantial increase since 1988 when it was 8% (Macro 
International Inc 1993).
Health care providers
Ghana’s health care is provided by the government, mission, and private-for -profit 
western and traditional sectors. The government health system originated from that set 
up by the British Colonial Civil Service in the middle of the 19th Century, Cape Coast 
hospital in Central Region being the first to be established. About the same time Christian 
missions also began establishing independent not-for-profit health facilities, most famous 
of the early mission facilities being Agogo Hospital founded in 1931 by the Presbyterians. 
Access to health care was initially restricted to colonial administrators, officials of mining 
companies, and other Europeans. Following independence existing government hospitals
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were expanded, new health posts were constructed and training of health personnel was 
greatly increased. By 1981 the combined facilities of government mission and parastatals 
included 124 hospital and 230 health posts. Between 1970 and 1981 the number of 
physicians increased from 667 to 1665; with similar increases also occurring among other 
health workers. From 1981, however a steady decline occurred, and by 1994 the number 
of medical officers and dental surgeons employed by MOH was only 659.
The church related health facilities are estimated to provide 30% of inpatient admissions 
and approximately 35% of all medical care. Since 1975, following the recommendation 
of the Adibo committee, the mission facilities have been formally integrated into the 
government health network. They receive government subventions to support 
approximately 40% of recurrent expenditures channelled through their umbrella 
organization the Christian Health Association of Ghana (CHAG). CHAG has 81 member 
institutions and holds regular meetings with MOH on policy and implementation issues. 
Revenue from user fees is another major source of income for the majority of CHAG 
facilities. In 1987 the share of health care expenditure between the government, mission 
and private for profit was estimated to be 36%, 12% and 52% respectively (MOH Ghana 
1995).
Except for traditional practitioners, the majority of providers are allocated in the southern 
part of the country; Upper West, Upper East, Northern and Brong Ahafo regions in the 
north of the country have low percentage of their populations within 8 Km of a health 
facility, ranging from 13% to 45% compared to 100% in three of the southern regions 
(Table 5.2). Upper Eastern and Northern Regions also have the lowest per capita 
attendance of health facility rates and the lowest use of antenatal care.
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Table 5.2 Regional variations in health service provision and utilization
Percent of Pop 
covered*
Number of facilities 
/1 0,000 Pop
Annual attendance 
per capita**
Percent non 
antenatal ***
Greater Accra 100 0.27 0.73 6.0
Ashanti 59.0 0.33 0.68 4.7
Brongo Ahafo 33.9 0.54 0.68 10.6
Central 100 0.46 0.42 14.2
Eastern 65.0 0.51 0.75 3.0
Northern 13.1 0.38 0.14 42.1
Upper East 45.2 0.25 0.28 42.1
Upper West 22.7 0.46 - 42.1
Volta 100 0.60 0.32 13.6
Western 41.8 0.43 0.54 5.3
Notes
* within 6 km of a health facility
* * adjusted for under reporting
*** percent of birth with no prenatal care, last five years
Adapted from Smithson 1993.
Private for profit providers
Limited information is currently available on the characteristics and size of the private-for 
-profit health sector in Ghana. Providers in this sector include private hospitals, doctor 
or nurse practitioner clinics, maternity homes, pharmacies, chemical drug shops and a 
variety of traditional healers. Soon after independence, efforts were made to promote and 
develop indigenous medicine through the formation of the Ghana Psychic and Traditional 
Healers’ Association and the establishment of a National Institute and Research Centre 
at Nsawam to conduct research into herbal medicine. They had little impact in terms of 
integrating Western and Traditional medicine. However, the ministries continued to plan 
the delivery of health care services that include healers, particularly traditional birth 
attendants. In the late 1970s and earlier 1980s several experimental and isolated projects 
involved healers in the delivery of primary services, the best known example being the
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Danfa Comprehensive Rural Health and Family Project which trained traditional birth 
attendants. Recent evidence suggests that the general population consider that the 
“Western” care provided by such individual is not an acceptable substitute for that 
provided by full trained health workers (Agyepong et al 1992).
The government health services
To facilitate health service management, the country is divided into areas using the same 
boundaries as the administrative/political areas. Thus, there are regional health 
management units responsible for supporting health districts. In 1978, following the 
recommendations of a document published by the Planning Unit of the MOH, Ghana 
started to implement its Primary Health Care (PHC) strategy. Decentralization, 
community participation and intersectoral coordination were fundamental to the strategy. 
It involved reorganising the primary level of the MOH into a three-tier district health 
care system supported by secondary and tertiary referral at the regional and national 
levels. The community (level A) was to provide the most basic care depending on 
community health workers selected and remunerated by the local resident groups (the 
“community”). These workers included the Traditional Birth Attendant (TBA) and the 
Village Health Worker (VHW). The intermediate tier (level B) was to be staffed by 
Community Health Nurses, or midwives and Health Inspector Assistants, responsible for 
direct supervision of the first level workers. At the final tier was the District Health 
Management Team (DHMT), comprising the District Medical Officer (DMOH), the 
District Public Health Nurse, the District Administrator and the District Environmental 
Officer. Measures taken by the MOH with some assistance from donors have ensured that 
this overall strategy, with the exception of the VHW component, is now operational. The 
measures included training many young doctors in public health both local and overseas 
in the 1980s and the implementation of continuous programmes to strengthen managerial 
capacity of DHMTs with the assistance of WHO, beginning in the Volta Region. These 
measures were successful in attracting and retaining young doctors into the field of public 
health, even though between 1978 and 1984 30% of Ghanaian doctors migrated overseas 
soon after qualification (Arhin 1988).
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By 1980, 30 DHMTs had been formed and currently they exist in all districts. The teams 
submit annual plans and budgets to the regional MOHs to be integrated into regional 
budget estimates. Another of their official functions is to promote and support local 
people in their district to participate in the delivery of health care in their areas. Although 
level C has been successfully organized, in most districts the Level A health workers are 
relatively few or absent because many programmes to train and support village health 
workers were unsuccessful. In many cases this was because local residents’ groups were 
unable to provide funds for their payments, and government supplies were erratic and/or 
inadequate (Amuah et al 1989).
In 1988 the legal framework for decentralizing the government was enacted as local 
government law PNDC law 207 (Republic of Ghana 1988). The process of 
decentralization began with the creation of the current 110 districts from the original 68 
and was followed by the election of district assemblies (Republic of Ghana 1987). Under 
the law, the district executive committee will include a unit with the responsibility for 
preparing integrated multi sector plans to be approved by the elected assembly. The 
district health managing teams (DHMTs) will be integrated into the planning process of 
the executive committee and will submit annual plans for the health sector.
More recently, the central level of the MOH has been reorganized or restructured to 
enable it to function effectively in a decentralized national administration. As in the 
preceding structure, the technical head of the ministry, the Director General for Health, 
still is accountable to the politically appointed Minister for Health. However those that 
report directly to the Director are fewer and are the heads of newly organized divisions 
of: (1) Policy, Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation; (2) technical coordination and 
research; (3) human resources’ development; (4) drugs and supplies; and (5) financing and 
administration. At the regional level the ministry is headed by Regional Directors of 
Health Services (RDHS). Other regional staff include the Senior Medical Officer in 
Charge of Public Health (SMO-PH) and the members of the Regional health Management 
Team (RHMT).
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Health financing
Although Ghana adopted the concept of Primary Health Care in 1978, financial 
constraints have hampered progress (Bacon 1980; Pobee 1982; Nimo 1982). The 
constraints stemmed from inadequate government budget allocations to the public health 
sector, and inefficiency in financial management and allocation. The per capita 
expenditure dropped in real terms from c63.6 to c8.3 between 1978-1983. Investments 
in the health sector accounted for only 3.6 per cent of the Public Investment Programme 
in 1986-88. The decline in real health care expenditure was bom both by the patients and 
Ministry of Health employees (monthly salaries declined by 69.4 percent between 1978- 
1983 and in addition to official nominal hospital and clinic fees patients paid high informal 
charges). In 1989, following the initial success of the economic recovery programme, the 
Ministry of Health received 11 percent of the government recurrent budget, presenting 
29% increase in its budget in real terms. However this rate of growth in the budget did 
not continue and the annual rate of growth for subsequent years was lower.
During the times of fiscal crisis, especially during the late 1970s and early 1980s, the non­
wage expenditure bore most of the cuts mainly because reductions in wage expenditure 
require retrenchment of personnel. Personal emoluments as a percentage of total 
recurrent expenditure increased from just over 40% in 1975 to 62% in 1985, reducing 
non-wage expenditure from 60% to 38% during this period. With the recovery of 
recurrent expenditure on health during the mid to late 1980s, non-wage expenditure 
increased marginally as a percentage of total expenditure (excluding subventions) reaching 
48% and 41% in 1990 and 1991 respectively (Smithson 1993).
In 1992, 66% of the non personnel budget was designated to remain under the control 
of the central administration, mostly for the purchase of drugs and supplies. Eighty 
percent was allocated to the two teaching hospitals and 25% was earmarked for the 10 
regional health administrations. Districts receive their budgets from the regional 
allocations, typically amounting to about 40% of the region’s total. Thus the resources 
that reached the districts were puny, approximately 10% of the total non-personal MOH
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budget and it is only in recent years that they have had some control of these resources 
through the decentralization process.
Decentralization
Decentralization in the MOH has lead to gradual transfer of decision making power and 
the control of resources from the centre to the periphery. Since 1991 the DHMTs have 
had control of their designated portions of the recurrent budget allocated to the MOH, 
known as the financial encumbrances (FE). In 1992 further financial autonomies were 
given to districts through the introduction of imprests permitting small cash purchase to 
be made. Dangme West District’s FE for 1992 was equivalent to approximately 
US$11,094 and most districts received amounts of similar magnitude. The proportion of 
the allocated funds available to the district has varied from year to year because spending 
of these funds requires adherence to numerous regulations and there are sudden limits and 
freezes imposed by the central treasury. Although this system has the advantage that 
districts no longer apply to the region for the authority to spend, given the erratic nature 
of disbursements of funds to the district often the revenues from user fees are more 
reliable.
User fees
Public sector health service fees were introduced in 1971 through the Hospital Fee Act, 
but fees were nominal and did not reflect the true cost of the services rendered. The 
provision of highly subsidized government health services continued until 1983. In that 
year, following the passage of a hospital bill initiated two years earlier, the government 
raised the nominal hospital fees from c0.5 per day for ward admissions and first 
consultation with specialists to c7.5 per day for adults and c25 respectively (Anyinam 
1989) (1983 minimal daily wage = clO). The bill was based on a new fee proposal by the 
MOH that was to form the foundation of a future revolving drug fund. Following 
comprehensive unit costing of the Ministry's services by its planning unit in 1985, the fees 
were revised; thereafter, the fee for a first visit to a specialist rose to c200 (1985 minimal 
daily wage = c20). This fee schedule incorporated charges for drugs that reflected their 
real cost and the institutions were instructed to retain 50% of the revenue with
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authorization to use 25% and 15% on non-capital expenditure for hospitals and health 
centres respectively. These measures were taken to enable the health facilities to purchase 
medical supplies, particularly drugs, on the open market when government supplies fail 
within the decentralised system. Facilities were also expected to use the retained revenue 
to undertake the minor repairs and maintenance required to improve the quality of their 
services.
The above changes coincided with, and became part of, the government's Economic 
Recovery Programme (ERP). The ERP met many of the conditions laid down by the IMF 
and World Bank that were necessary for these institutions to provide credits (Loxley
1988). As part of the ERP, the MOH set a target of recovery of at least 15% of total 
recurrent expenditure in 1986, 1987, and 1989 (Vogel 1987). Monitoring of the 
programme indicated that by 1987, the target of recovery of 15% of recurrent budget had 
been achieved at the cost of substantial declines in the utilisation of health care services. 
The decline was greater and more sustained in the rural than urban areas. By January 
1989 MOH health institutions had been authorized by government to retain 100% of 
hospital fees collected to enable the establishment of revolving funds for the purchase of 
drugs and other medical supplies.
By mid 1989, the MOH had designed a "cash and carry" system to replace the old system 
whereby health institutions indented for drugs from the ministry’s medical stores. Under 
the new system institutions would use their fee revenues to replenish stocks of drugs and 
other medical supplies by purchasing from the Central Regional and District Medical 
Stores (Hagan 1989). The stated objectives of the system were: a) to generate sufficient 
funds to cover “most of the Ministry of Health’s drug and medical supply purchases”; and
b) to “ensure that health institutions order and receive the quantities of drugs and supplies 
that are needed by their patients”. Some commentators concluded that the link between 
user fees and drug purchases would guarantee continuous supply of drugs in the 
government health sector “even if drug prices and service utilization increase” (Cassels 
& Janovsky 1992). By 1992, implementation had begun in Greater Accra and in Volta 
Region. The World Bank considered the cash and carry system to be an important
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measure designed to facilitate the restructuring of health financing in the country, and 
therefore required the government commitment to its implementation as one of the 
conditions for supporting a second health and population project.
The BI had similar objectives to the MOH’s revolving drug funds and “cash and carry” 
system and consequently it was not met with enthusiasm for several reasons. The 
initiative appeared to be relatively rudimentary in design with respect to the health system 
above the district level where the majority of drugs were consumed. Secondly, Ghana had 
already begun to implement a long term plan to stimulate public participation in local 
politics and administration of all sectors through the district assembly elections and 
therefore donor-led support for community involvement in health alone seemed 
inappropriate. In addition BI emphasized “community involvement” whereas Ghana 
experience with community funding of level A health had not been entirely successful. 
Nevertheless, as a compromise with UNICEF, five districts were selected by the MOH 
to implement experimental BI schemes with drugs supplied free of cost by UNICEF. It 
remains unclear what the future of these schemes would be after the pilot stage.
Several health care utilization studies have shown that following the above changes and 
their impacts on fee levels in Ghana, there were significant reductions in the utilization of 
health services (Waddington & Enimayew 1989), as has been the case in other African 
countries such as Zaire (Bethune et al 1989; Haddad et al 1995), Swaziland (Yoder
1989), and Lesotho (Bennett 1989). The available evidence suggests that in the rural 
areas of Ghana, the decline in utilization rates have contributed to maintaining and/or 
accelerating the deteriorating health status indicators for women and children since 1983 
(UNICEF 1987). In Brong Ahafo, Northern, and Upper regions where the infant and 
maternal mortalities are the highest in the country, health unit attendance in 1984 were 
only 64%, 66% and 23% respectively of attendances in 1982.
Demand for health care and rural household economics
Household data collected as part of the second round of the Ghana Living Standard 
Survey (GLSS) indicated that the “private sector” accounted for 41% of patients for the
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country as a whole and 51% of patients in Accra (GLSS 1988). However it is unclear 
what the term private sector includes in this case.
The economics unit in the rural area is the household, typically an extended family unit 
which produces crops to meet food requirements and to raise cash for consumption and 
investment goods. Other major sources of income for some rural households are wages 
from working on the farms of other households, petty trading and transfers from members 
of the extended family living in urban areas and overseas. Salaries obtained by working 
within the formal sectors are generally insignificant. Although rural banks do exist in 
Ghana, most households in rural areas have little or no access to loans.
Expenditure on health must be balanced against primarily that for food, education, 
clothing and transport. Many rural households are nearly self sufficient with regard to 
food; and funds required for education are generally predictable as are those for transport 
that is not related to illness and death, permitting assistance from the wider extended 
family to be found. Ensuring the availability of fimds for paying for health care on the 
other hand is usually more difficult because of the uncertainty of the amount and the 
timing of health care needs. In 1978, when health care was virtually free because fees 
were nominal, the pattern of household expenditure for the average Ghanaian household 
was as follows; food and beverages 57.4%, clothing and footwear 14.3%, housing and 
energy 11.5%, transportation and communications 3.3%, health care 1.3%. Analysis of 
health data has shown that people in rural areas are less likely to consult health personnel 
in situations of ill health than people in urban areas suggesting that the patterns and/or 
total expenditure of expenditure differs for rural and urban households (Oti Boateng et 
al 1989). Although neither recent nor detailed information on rural household 
expenditure on health care are currently available, relevant data collected as part of the 
third round of GLSS will soon be published.
Increases in the charges for health care and education in both private and government 
sectors during the 1980s will have necessitated changes in the pattern of expenditure if 
their consumption are to be protected. However, recent health care utilization data
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discussed above suggested that the economies of rural households in particular are 
currently unable to fund the same level of health care consumptions as in the years before 
the economic crisis. Since health care needs are difficult to predict and rural incomes are 
irregular and seasonal, this change probably does not indicate changes in willingness to 
pay for health but rather changes in ability to pay at the time of need.
Health insurance in Ghana
The private health insurance market in Ghana is in its infancy and insignificant relative to 
the national expenditure on health care. In recent years several insurance companies based 
in the capital Accra have started to offer health insurance policies. The State Insurance 
Corporation utilizes social security contributions from all Ghanaians employed in the 
formal sector to finance care for its own employees. The Corporation currently owns 
and operates a modem hospital in Accra which provides free care to its employees and 
charges fees to all others.
However, the Government and the MOH are interested in establishing schemes, as are 
providers such as medical practitioners, and employer groups. The MOH, with the 
assistance of a German firm, attempted to identify groups to be covered by "National 
Health Insurance" in the late 1980s. In 1994 the Ministry commissioned its latest 
consultancy to undertake a feasibility study of options for national health insurance 
schemes. The report was made available in October 1994. Primary data were not 
collected and community insurance was not considered.
Acknowledging the administrative difficulties of implementing a national scheme, the 
MOH also wished to consider community based approaches. It recognized that 
community insurance/prepayment schemes have the potential to complement decentralised 
Primary Health Care (PHC), and to be compatible with the "cash and carry" system for 
purchasing medical supplies. The MOH surmised that the effectiveness of decentralised 
PHC, "cash and carry", and cost recovery through the new levels of user charges, may all 
be enhanced by the provision of risk coverage.
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Chapter 6: Evaluations of Two Rural Schemes
INTRODUCTION
The case studies in this chapter represent the research’s efforts to answer some of the 
questions identified in Chapter 4, and in so doing, assess the social and financial 
performance of the two rural health insurance schemes in Africa. Hence, the main findings 
and the analysis presented attempt to achieve the following specific objectives that were 
also stated in Chapter 4:
a) to determine changes in the population’s access to health resulting from the 
schemes;
b) to evaluate the affordability of premiums charged by the schemes;
c) to assess the appropriateness of payment schedules to their target population
particularly those living in the rural areas;
d) to estimate the relationships between premium revenue and benefits expenditure;
e) to assess the extent of adverse selection and moral hazard.
One general aim of the case studies connects it to the feasibility study subsequently carried 
out in Ghana. It was envisaged that in designing a study to assess the feasibility of health 
insurance schemes for rural populations in Sub-Saharan Africa, information on existing 
rural schemes was valuable. Therefore, the two studies, socio-economic evaluations of 
the national health card insurance scheme (La Carte d'Assurance Maladie, CAM) in 
Burundi, and the village Abota11 system in Guinea Bissau, acted as preparatory 
investigations and provided information to supplement that available from the literature 
(Arhin 1995; Arhin 1994).
The chapter is divided into two sections. Section one presents the results of the 
evaluation of the financial and social performance of the CAM. This is preceded by a 
description of the scheme, and a brief discussion of the assumptions about the functions
11 “Abota” is a local term and refers to a communal fund. The fund is derived from the voluntary 
contributions, usually fixed sums, from households or individuals. The amount contributed is decided 
collectively.
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of a health insurance scheme that underpinned the approach to the evaluation. In Section 
two an update of the existing information on the Abota system is presented using data 
from the empirical work carried out in the Gabu Region in October 1992.
THE HEALTH CARD INSURANCE SCHEME (CAM) IN BURUNDI
This is a national health card insurance scheme introduced by the Government of Burundi 
in 1984. Purchase of a CAM card by a household entitles its members (restricted to two 
adults and all children below 18 years) to free health care at all public health facilities. The 
card is sold at a fixed price irrespective of the household size (in June 1992, the price of 
the card was 500 Fbu (1.85 US$)). Persons without cards are required to pay user 
charges for government health care. The level of user charge per episode of illness treated 
is determined by the health worker at his or her discretion and generally varies with the 
age of the patient and the quantity and type of treatment received. All health services 
provided by the Government are covered by the CAM scheme and therefore, in theory, 
CAM card holders who seek health care at government facilities should not incur out of 
pocket expenses. However, due to the shortage of drugs and other inputs, CAM holders, 
like fee paying patients, are sometimes given prescriptions to purchase drugs on the open 
market. The names of household members entitled to use a card are written on the card 
at the time of purchase, making it difficult for it to be used by individuals from other 
households. The card is valid for one year and may be purchased from a community 
representative at any time of the year. This makes it possible for a non-CAM patient to 
pay a user charge at a health centre and on referral to a hospital, to purchase a CAM card 
in order to obtain free hospital care. The cards are not accepted by non-government 
health facilities, such as mission and for-profit clinics and hospitals.
The revenues from CAM card sales and user charges are retained by the "commune" 
committees (the "commune" is the lowest level of local administration in the country). 
These committees have some financial responsibilities for the health centres in their 
localities and are expected to fund recurrent expenditures, such as stationery, fuel for 
refrigerators and linen, and in some cases capital projects such as construction of new
WTP for RHI Evaluations Chapter 6 98
health centres. However, revenues from CAM and user charges are not designated to be 
used in the provision of health care and therefore in practice only a small fraction is 
allocated by communes to health. In 1990, 8% of the revenues of communes in Muyinga 
Province came from the sale of CAM cards, whereas on average only 1% of commune 
revenues were used to finance health care (McPake et al 1992). Health worker salaries 
and drug costs are funded by the government through the Ministry of Health's budget.
The approach used in the evaluation is underpinned by the assumptions derived from the 
literature review in Chapter 2, namely that a social welfare oriented health insurance 
scheme has two prime functions that merit separate consideration, although they are 
intrinsically linked. The first is a financial function: to provide a pool of funds to cover 
all, or (in government subsidized schemes) part, of the cost of health care for those who 
contribute to the pool; and to encourage providers and consumers to use health services 
in a cost-effective manner. The study sought to assess CAM's financial strengths and 
weakness, in particular to determine the existence of adverse selection and moral hazard. 
This involved establishing whether differences existed in the illness rates and utilization 
rates per episode of illness among individuals in households that participated in the scheme 
and households that did not. Another specific objective was to estimate the ratio of 
revenue to expenditure by determining the relationship between the average annual value 
of drugs obtained per participating household from public health facilities, and the annual 
cost of membership in the scheme. The study assumes that the percentage of the drug 
costs covered by CAM revenue is central to the scheme's financial performance. The 
rationale for this approach is that drug expenditure forms a major cost item in the 
provision of primary level care and therefore the ability of an insurance/prepayment 
scheme to fund drug supplies adequately will provide some indication of its level of 
financial viability. In addition community financing of drugs used at the local level is 
increasingly becoming a part of the health financing strategies of developing countries. 
Although at the time of CAM's inception it was not an objective to raise funds to cover 
drug purchases at the health centres, at the time of the study the Ministry of Health was 
exploring the potential of CAM to cover drug costs of government health centres in the 
future. The final specific object with regard to financial function was to evaluate the
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potential for improved financial performance by considering household health 
expenditures and the willingness of heads of households to pay higher prices for 
membership of the CAM, if services were improved.
The second prime function of a health insurance scheme is social, including social equity. 
It is to remove financial barriers to obtaining health care at the time of illness for the 
vulnerable groups in society, i.e. the very young and elderly, and the chronically ill. The 
study focuses on whether CAM improves the access of women and children to prompt 
health care. It was assumed that women and children had higher risks and less access to 
money, and therefore if the CAM affected their health care utilization favourably it was 
performing a positive social function. The specific objectives of the study relating to 
social benefits of the scheme were: to determine the perceptions of heads of households 
about the benefits of participating in the scheme; and to ascertain the effect of the scheme 
on the access of women and children to health care.
Muvinea Province
The topography of Muyinga Province, like most of Burundi, is that of numerous hills and 
valleys. Agricultural land is sparse and therefore the slopes and valleys surrounding the 
collines are intensively cultivated. The majority of household units in the district consist 
of a mother, father and dependent children, and frequently one or two grandparents. 
Women produce the food crops consumed by the household, selling any surplus in village 
markets, while the cash crop, coffee, is harvested and sold by men in the town markets.
Some women brew and sell local beer made from bananas, and therefore periodically earn 
small amounts of cash income. However, in general, because women in male-headed 
households are excluded from trading in the cash crops, women have little access to cash. 
Consequently, it is common for household decisions about the use of cash to be made by 
men. In order to obtain health care from fee-for-service health facilities, either for 
themselves or their children, women must frequently request cash from male heads of. 
households.
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The average household size was 5.34 persons. The majority of households (90%) said 
they were Christians. Moslems and other religions accounted for only 3% and 4% 
respectively. Almost all households in the study area were engaged in farming; 285 (95%) 
of heads of households were farmers. Only 9 (3%) had received more than 6 years of 
formal education, 129 (43%) had attended school for 1-6 years and 162 (54%) had 
received no formal education. The majority of homes were constructed either of bricks, 
tiles and mud (56%), or mud and thatch (41%). The households possessed few consumer 
goods: 128 (42.7%) of households owned a radio and/or a bicycle, and only one 
household possessed a car.
Participation
Fifty four percent of households were either participating in the CAM at the time of the 
survey or had done so in the past. Valid cards were held by 23% of households. Table
6.1 shows the distribution of households in the sample with respect to their participation 
in CAM. The "CAM households" (22.7%) presented valid CAM cards to the interviewer; 
the "Past CAM households" (31.3%) did not possess valid CAM cards at the time of 
survey but reported having purchased cards in the past; "Non CAM households" (46%) 
reported never purchasing a card. Female headed households constituted 13% of the 
sample. Among female headed households only 7% had cards whereas 24% of male 
headed households had valid cards.
A hypothesis that CAM membership status of households and the size of households were 
independent was rejected (Chi-square test p < .001). Larger households were statistically 
more likely to be current or past CAM card holders than households with few members 
(Table 6.2). The Chi-square test of independence rejected independence between 
economic proxies (type of house and household possessions) and size of family. 
However, a test of association failed to indicate a linear relationship and rather suggested 
that households with either very few or many people were poorer than those of sizes close 
to the sample average.
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T able 6.1 CAM Status of Male and Female Headed Households
household
status
male headed female headed total
(a) Non-CAM 111 42.5% 27 69.2% 138 46.0%
(b) past CAM 85 32.6% 9 23.1% 94 31.3%
(c) CAM 65 24.9% 3 7.7% 68 22.7%
261 100.0% 39 100.0% 300 100.0%
Table 6.2 CAM Status by Household Size 
CAM status household size (No. of persons)
<=2 3-6 >=7
count
(column pet)
row total
Non-CAM 27 88 22 137
84.4% 50.9% 23.4% 45.8%
Past CAM 3 54 37 94
9.4% 31.2% 39.4% 31.4%
CAM 2 31 35 68
6.3% 17.9% 37.2% 22.7%
column total 32 173 94 299
10.7% 57.9% 31.4% 100.0%
Chi-Square
Pearson
Likelihood Ratio
Value
42.7634
44.9698
DF
4
4
Significance
0.0000
0.0000
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The most frequently selected reasons for non purchase were affordability, poor quality of 
government services (lack of drugs) and insufficient knowledge about the scheme Figure 
6.1). Forty five percent o f the households who gave lack of funds as one o f the reasons 
also said they would be willing to pay at least twice the present price if drugs were always 
available, suggesting that some of the reported inaffordability may have been relative 
rather than absolute. Competition from other health insurance schemes did not appear to 
be a significant factor influencing non participation in the CAM scheme since only 4 
(1.3%) households reported that they were covered by other health insurance schemes. 
Of the 232 households who did not have valid cards, 15 did not select any o f the 6 reasons 
offered in the questionnaire as possible explanations for non-participation. (All reasons 
were first read to the respondent and during a second reading he or she was asked for an 
answer.)
Reasons for Non Purchase of CAM by Households
N=232 households who did not have valid CAM cards
(a) Unable to afford CAM
(b) Poor quality of government
health services
(c) Not well informed about CAM
(d) Not worried about health care 
prices because family healthy
(e) family covered by other 
health insurance
(f) Not willing to lose money in 
the event of non-use
0 20 40 60 80 100
counts
never . previously \ \ v j
purchased purchased
Figure 6.1
Reasons that might suggest "non risk averse" attitudes to illness were reported by only 23 
households. These reasons included "absence of worries about health care prices, because 
of good family health" and accounted for 8.4% o f the reported reasons for never having 
purchased a card and only 2.1% of the reasons for not having a valid card at the time of 
the survey. For households that reported "not willing to lose money in the event o f non­
use", one interpretation is that they have a low monetary evaluation o f the risk involved
-. .'.v',- • - .v. ■ x
v w w w w
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in illness. A low evaluation would lead to unwillingness to pay a positive price to avert 
the risk and therefore would be consistent with a low demand for insurance. Only 11 
(3.6%) of households fell into this category.
Illness rates and utilization
The main symptoms reported suggested that the principal illness conditions for all age 
groups were respiratory infections, malaria, digestive disorders, headaches, and injuries 
(figure 6.2). These health problems accounted for 76% or more of illness episodes in each 
age group in the 4 weeks prior to the survey.
The illness occurrence as measured by episodes of illness per person, was almost identical 
for households that purchased the CAM and those that did not (Table 6.3). This suggests 
that there was not a predominance of persons with high tendencies/risks of becoming ill 
in the households purchasing CAM, compared to households that had not purchased 
CAM. This in turn suggests that adverse selection of individuals was probably not a major 
problem. Formal health care (modern/western care obtained outside the home) was not 
sought for all illness and therefore, the number of formal treatment actions was less than 
1 per illness episode. The formal treatment rate per episode was higher for CAM 
households as opposed to non-CAM: 0.54 per episode for CAM households and only 0.35 
per episode for non-CAM. Public treatment (from government facilities) rates were also 
higher for CAM than non-CAM: 0.37 per episode and 0.91 per household for CAM 
households, and only 0.16 per episode and 0.3 per household for non-CAM.
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Table 6.3 Morbidity and Treatment Rates for Acute illness in a One Month 
Recall Period in CAM and Non CAM households
Rate CAM
households
non-CAM
households
Total
No. of people
(a) Illness episodes
981
400
615
259
1596
659
Illness /household 2.47 1.88 2.20
Illness /person 0.41 0.42 0.4
Treatment actions 305 164 469
T reatment/episode 0.76 0.63 0.7
(b) Formal treatment 
rates per episode
0.54 0.35 0.5
(c) Public treatment 
rates per episode
0.37 0.16 0.3
(d) Formal treatment 
rate per household
1.33 0.65 1
(e) Public treatment 
rate per household
0.91 0.30 0.63
(a) as perceived and defined by respondent
(b) and (d) treatment from formal health facilities such as government health centres and hospitals, mission 
clinics and private health facilities. Excludes traditional/herbal treatments and self medication
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R eported Illness by Age Group in a One Month Recall Period 
June 1992 Muyinga Province , Burundi
<2 2-7 8-13 >=14
Age (years)
§ § !  resp.inf m  malaria §§§5 digest, dis.
11 h ea d a ch es  M  injuries H  others
Figure 6.2
The average number of drugs (types) received by outpatients was similar for the five 
centres studied. The mean number of drug types was 1.58 (Table 6.4). The average value 
of the drugs received by patients in each facility, however, varied greatly, ranging from 
72 FBu for patients at Muyinga to 165.5 FBu for those at Gasorwe. Significant numbers 
o f patients received incomplete treatments in the centres that had low values 
(Kamaramagamba and Muyinga), whereas most patients received adequate quantities in 
Gasorwe and Muramba. Distribution of the average value o f the drugs received by 
patients in each facility is skewed towards the lower range of values. The mean value of 
drugs per patient (both CAM and non-CAM) for the three centres that did not give
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incomplete treatments is 134.1 FBu. (It was not possible to calculate the mean value of 
drug per CAM patient because the health centre records did not state the method of 
payment in all cases. However, since drug treatments were generally adequate in these 
three centres, it was assumed that the mean value of drugs per CAM patient would not 
differ significantly from this value.)
Health expenditure and willingness to pav
In the month prior to the study, 110 (36.6%) households had incurred out-of-pocket 
expenses for medical consultation(s) and/or drug purchases. Of the households who held 
valid CAM cards, 27.9% had incurred such costs, and of the households without valid 
cards the corresponding figure was 39.85%. The mean expenditure per household was 
254.00 FBu for the CAM group and 192.84 FBu non-CAM. The expenditure per 
treatment action ranged from 10 FBu to 9,000 FBu. For households possessing a valid 
CAM the mean expenditure per treatment action was lower than for households that did 
not (136.00 FBu and 249.94 FBu respectively).
Table 6.4 Number of Drug Treatments and Mean Cost of Drug Treatments 
by Health Centres in Study Area
mean
value
Centre patient(%) receiving X No. of drugs Mean No. of drugs
N X=0 X=1 X=2 X=3 of drugs FBu
Gasorwe 120 0.8 30 55.8 13.3 1.82 166
Giteranyi 120 3.3 60.8 34.2 1.7 1.34 111
Kamaramag 120 0.8 30.8 52.5 15.8 1.83 79
Muyinga 120 6.7 51.7 31.7 10 1.45 72
Muramba 86 0 62.8 33.7 3.5 1.41 126
TOTAL 566 2.5 46.3 42 9.2 1.58 114
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Household Willingness to Pay for CAM Card
(W illingness to pay w as conditional on drugs being available at the health cen tres)
willing to pay 1000FBu
not willing
'•  .2%)
willing to pay 2000FBu
Figure 6.3
Willingness to pay a higher price for the CAM if drugs were more available at government 
health centres was expressed by 49% of households. About half of these households were 
willing to pay 1000 FBu and the others were willing to pay 2000 FBu (Figure 6.3). O f 
those who said they were conditionally willing to pay more for the CAM card, 32% had 
never purchased a CAM card in the past.
Benefit o f CAM to women
Contributions in the focus group discussions were in general spontaneous and appeared 
to reflect a keen interest in the CAM. One rural group opened the discussions with a 
request that they be informed of the outcome of our study as they had received no 
feedback from a previous study in which they had participated.
In response to the opening question, "do you think the CAM has any benefits for 
women?", consensus in three of the groups implied that the CAM has important benefits 
for poor families, for households with seasonal cash availability and to women whose
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husbands spent significant amounts of household cash on alcohol. In these situations the 
CAM ensured that in times of illness health care was available. This was thought 
particularly important in cases of child illness since they require prompt treatment.
"Before the CAM if you were unable to pay for expensive drugs then your child 
would die".
One member stated,
"CAM was started out of love for the people".
Some members of the fourth group expressed the opinion that the CAM provides no 
benefits because the government health centres provided poor quality service and 
insufficient drugs.
Some of the comments, in the early part of the discussions, reflected an appreciation that 
the CAM removed the uncertainty about the affordability of health care at the time of a 
child's illness;
"It is better to buy the card than to take the chance of illness";
"To guard against falling sick in times of no cash it is well to buy the CAM";
"The card is important because for one year of use it is cheap, especially when one 
is referred to the hospital".
Overall the groups agreed that households' decisions to purchase the CAM were initiated 
by the women but that the cards were purchased by male partners. However, several 
women reported that they had purchased separate cards for older girls living away from 
home to ensure them antenatal care. The cards were either kept at home and women 
required no permission from husbands to make use of them or, as reported in one group, 
"the card is kept in the pocket of the woman just like an identity card".
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In three of the groups the issue of quality of health care received by CAM holders became 
dominant after the initial debate about the merits of the CAM. There was agreement that 
CAM holders had poor care because the drugs at government health centres were 
frequently out of stock. They also identified that, in some cases, health workers 
discriminated against CAM holders and gave preferential treatment to patients that paid 
cash. It was noted, in one group, that antenatal treatment was poor because there were 
few female medical technicians at the health centres.
Most of the women in the group that were dissatisfied with the quality of care expressed 
a willingness to pay a CAM price of up to 2,000 FBu, if this would ensure adequate drug 
supplies at the health centres. (The groups believed that the revenue from the sale of the 
cards was used to purchase drugs and other supplies for the Government health centres 
and hospitals.) These women were also willing to purchase the cards at a specified time 
in the year to facilitate the purchase of drugs in larger quantities and therefore cheaper unit 
prices by the government. They suggested July-August, the months corresponding to the 
end of the harvest. One unwilling woman explained that she was a poor widow. Another 
said she was elderly and had no children in her care.
In the latter stages of the discussions the groups were asked to make some suggestions 
to improve the CAM. The following summarises the suggestions made:
1) ensuring adequate drug supplies and improved quality of care at government 
health centres;
2) including older girls, aged 18 years and above, who are unmarried and still living 
with parents, as eligible household members under CAM;
3) incorporating the mission health facilities so that CAM holders may receive either 
free or subsidized care at these institutions;
4) provision of exemptions for the very poor and widows.
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THE ABOTA VILLAGE HEALTH INSURANCE SCHEME
Introduction
The Abota system entails prepayment for essential drugs and the provision of primary 
health care at the village level by the community. Administration of the Abota system in 
each village is the responsibility of the village committee, the lowest level of the country's 
decentralised political system. As a consequence of this autonomy, prepayment terms 
vary substantially from one village to the other. Some villages accept contributions in kind 
of agricultural produce. Health care is provided voluntarily by members of the village, 
village health workers known as Agente de Saude de base, and by birth attendants at the 
village health posts (Unidade de Saude de base, USB). Patients referred by village health 
workers to the public health facilities were exempt from payment of consultation fees on 
showing evidence, usually a receipt, of having contributed to Abota.
Underpinning the approach to this evaluation are the same assumptions about the 
functions of health insurance scheme as discussed above with reference to that of CAM, 
namely that two prime functions are relevant; financial and social functions. 
Consequently, the evaluation of operations of the Abota in Gabu region focused on some 
specific indicators of Abota’s effectiveness and level of financial and social performance;
a) perceptions and the willingness of households to pay Abota contributions, b) the 
frequency of village health worker training/retraining and supervision, c) the level of 
revenues, and d) the adequacy of the supplies of inputs to the system. It also explored the 
contribution of the Abota experience to the debate about the merits of development by 
“discrete architectured projects” compared to that which relies on the gradual evolution 
of initiatives through participatory learning. Finally, it contributes to the debate and the 
argument that reflecting the collective nature of many African societies and cultures, 
some, if not most, African communities will prefer community health financing strategies 
that are based on an insurance mechanism rather those based on ‘fee-for-service’ at the 
point of use.
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Study area
Gabu region is in the north west of the country and has an estimated population of 
129,159. With the exception of the inhabitants of the regional capital, Gabu, the 
population consists of traditional rural farmers living in many small, isolated villages 
(tabancas) and hamlets. In 1989 the average number of inhabitants in a village was 
estimated to be 185. Many of the villages could only be reached using dirt tracks and/or 
foot paths. The major ethnic groups in the study villages were Fula and Mandinga. 
Ninety nine percent of the households surveyed were Moslems. The average residential 
compound in the rural area had several units occupied by co-wives and their children. 
Government health facilities in Gabu consisted of USBs (125), health centres (Centros de 
Saude) (15) and sectoral hospitals (5). Private health facilities were not available. The 
USBs provided preventive services (screening for tuberculosis and leprosy, 
immunizations, and growth monitoring); antenatal care and deliveries; and basic curative 
care, including oral rehydration and treatment of uncomplicated malaria. Sixty percent 
of villages in the region have USBs and in most cases they are open for a few hours each 
morning. Emergency care was obtainable at any time by calling at the home of a health 
worker or birth attendant. Referrals from the USBs were made either to a Centro de 
Saude or a sectoral hospital (these facilities have qualified, paid staff and provide more 
comprehensive curative care, preventive outreach services and supervision of the USBs).
Perception and Willingness to Pay
Over 94% of the respondents in the household survey stated that they held a "good 
opinion" as opposed to "no opinion" or "bad opinion" about the Abota12. There was 
consensus that an important benefit of the system was accessibility; it was frequently 
communicated to the team that having people in the village, who had been trained to give 
health care and medication, eliminated the need to walk long distances to government 
health centres to obtain treatment for common problems such as headaches and mild 
fevers. A significant percentage of respondents (26%) stated that the quality of care 
available at the USB was inappropriate. Over 30% of participating households stated that
It was the view of indigenous co- investigators that in the cultural context of the region such a 
qualitative measure of perceptions would be more valid than attempts to elicit more finely graded 
evaluations.
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they had experienced some shortage of drugs at the USB.
A high rate of willingness to pay was found: 87% were willing to pay twice their current 
contributions to the Abota to improve the availability of drugs13. Figure 6.4 shows the 
willingness o f households in villages without Abota schemes to pay different levels of 
Abota contribution, thus making it possible to start schemes in their villages. 
Approximately 78% stated that they would be willing to pay 2000 P.G. or more. Only 
8% o f the households stated they would be unwilling to contribute were schemes to be 
established in their villages or one nearby.
willingness to pay Abota contributions
Zero (8.31%)
1000 PG (13.31%)
2000 PG (13.31%)
>2000 PG (65.
Figure 6.4
Village Health Worker training and supervision
All village health workers in the study villages were male, aged 28-65 years. About 50% 
had received some formal education (1-5 years of primary level schooling). On average 
they had been functioning as village health workers for 6.5 years (ranging from 3 to 11
The question asked was, “Would you agree to pay twice the current Abota contribution to permit the 
system to always have drugs available, Yes or No?”
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years). All had received an initial 2-3 weeks residential training and had also attended up 
to five retraining courses and/or refresher courses since becoming health workers. In the 
two years prior to the study only three of those 15 health workers interviewed had not 
attended retraining courses. Judging from interviews with village health workers, 
supervision visits appeared to have been frequent over the previous 12 months. The last 
supervision visits to six USBs had occurred within six weeks prior to the survey. The 
others had been supervised within eight weeks prior to the survey.
Revenue and the supply o f inputs
The USBs in the study had an average of 6 of the 11 essential drugs and wound dressing 
materials in stock (see Table 6.5). It is disturbing that chloroquine and aspirin, drugs used 
in the basic management of malaria, were available in less than a quarter of the USBs 
surveyed. On average the most recent stock acquisitions had been 5 months prior to the 
survey. The frequency at which stocks were replenished at the USB was dependent on 
the frequency of contributions, total revenue and the availability of drugs at the 
government medical stores. The number of times prepayment contributions were collected 
in a year varied, some villages collected twice yearly, others once.
Table 6.5 Availability of drugs and wound dressing material in 15 village health posts
(proportion of health posts with item in stock at time of survey)
Chloroquine syrup 0.38
Chloroquine tablets lOOmg 0.15
Aspirin 0.15
Oral rehydration salt 0.54
Tetracyclines eye ointment 0.38
Antibiotic dermatologic cream 0.46
Bandage 0.54
Cotton wool 0.54
Benzyl benzoate(disinfectant) 0.46
Compression cotton 0.54
Neomycin ointment 0.54
Average 0.43
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Table 6.6 shows the amounts of Abota revenues presented by villages to the regional drug 
store between February and June 1992, value of drugs supplied, levels of contribution per 
family/person and the indicative number of participants per village Abota14. The most 
recent sums (Abota revenue) that had been presented by village Abota schemes for the 
purchase of essential drugs ranged from 30,000 - 139,800 G.P. The average contribution, 
per person (1,367 P.G.) was significantly higher than that estimated from data collected 
in 1989, of 199 P.G. The nominal increase (approximately 690%) in the mean 
contributions by individuals between 1989 and 1992, appears to have kept pace with 
inflation, as is judged from the trend in the economic deflator15 (World Bank 1992). The 
average contribution per household was 3,778 P.G.16 All but two of the ten USBs, for 
which drug purchase data were available, had presented sufficient funds to purchase more 
drugs than they had received and had some money returned. The funds returned ranged 
from 5,250 - 68,500 P.G. At the time of the survey a reliable supply of inputs to the 
health centres in Gabu had been established as part of the UNICEF supported Bamako 
initiative. This stock appears to be maintained separately from that procured through the 
Ministry's logistics channels. The prevailing arrangements at the time prevented the USBs 
from purchasing essential drugs from these BI stocks.
The Abota schemes studied used revenues from each collection round to make a purchase of drugs 
supplies. They did not wait to combine revenue from several collection rounds in order to make bulk 
purchases.
The deflators, taking 1987 as 100, were 174,296, and 399 in 1988, 1989 and 1990 respectively. 
Figures are not available for 1991 and 1992.
In 1989 only one out of the six Abota studied in Gabu collected contributions on a household basis, 
the level was 300 P.G. per household.
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Table 6.6 Abota Revenues, Contribution Levels and Implied Participation
- 1 -2 -3 -4 -5 -6 -7
Sector village amount
presented
amount
returned
unit of 
contribution
level of 
contribution
level of 
contribution
implied no. of 
participants
implied no of 
participants
P.G P.G. P.G/a P.G/h adults households
Sonaco Namataba h 5000
It Samba Djan 99,500 6,400 h 3000 11
ft Lenquito a 1000
Buruntuma Camadjaba 98,200 29,300 a 200 345
1 Fulamansa 90,500 24,000 a 3000 22
ft Nhawah h 3500 9
Pirada Sintchia Sama 66,000 26,000 a 1000 40
If Samba Taco 75,000 15,250 h 5000 12
It Sorilumbata h 2000
Boe Patagui 100,000 68,500 a 1000 32
ft Sutumaca a 2000
ft Teche-tche 60,100 41,650 h 5000 4
Gabu Candjia h 2000
ft Candata 139,800 4,700 h 2000 46
If Sumacunda h 6500
MEAN 1,366.7 3,777.8
(1) The amount of money presented to MOH for purchase of essential drugs and other inputs (P.G.6,670 = US $1 in 1992) 
(3) = the basis of contribution; a = adult, h = household (6) = (1)/ (4) (7) = (1)/ (5)
In summary, despite experiencing some logistical problems, the Abota system was 
observed to be functional and to have considerable support, in terms of training and 
supervision of village health workers, from the government and NGO health workers in 
the region. There was also some evidence, namely continued high rate of participation 
and positive evaluations by almost all respondents, that suggested social commitment to 
the system was strong. The evaluation in Guinea Bissau, although exploratory, concerns 
itself with aspects of community financing of health care that have largely been ignored 
in the ongoing debate on options for health financing in Africa. It provides preliminary 
observations on organizational and socio-anthropological issues in relation to insurance 
for health care in a rural area in an African country.
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Chapter 7: Morbidity, and Health Expenditure in Osudoku Ghana
INTRODUCTION
The design of the study in Osudoku was guided by the conceptual model of demand for 
health insurance described in Chapter 2. This model assumes that the determinants of the 
demand for insurance include the socio economic characteristics of the consumer, health 
care costs without insurance cover, and the expected state of health. To obtain measures 
of these determinants the study collected data on household composition and income, past 
expenditure on health care, and recent illness experiences. The latter (recent illness 
experiences) were taken as a proxy of health status. This was in addition to information 
about expected state of health obtained indirectly by asking respondents about their 
households’ health compared with others in the community. In this chapter these 
dependent variables are described and their correlations with each other are explored. 
This prepares for the data to be related to the willingness to pay variable in chapters 8 and 
9.
The analysis in this chapter also provides the basic estimates required to achieve the 
following objectives of the Ghana fieldwork already stated in Chapter 4.
a) To estimate the community risks, calculated as the proportions of the population 
in the study area who would seek western type health care during the dry season 
and the wet season, for serious and mild illness, if such care were physically 
accessible and affordable.
b) To estimate average costs for outpatient and inpatient episodes in health facilities 
preferred by households in the study area.
HOUSEHOLD COMPOSITION
Eight hundred and fifty-three households in Osudoku Health Area (Figure 7.1) were
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interviewed in the first round. However, 44 households were lost to the study during 
the second round either because they could not be traced or because they declined to be 
reinterviewed. The final sample size was 809 households in which there were 3,871 
individuals. The median household size in the sample was six persons. Households with 
three or four persons were 30% of the sample, and those with five to seven persons 45%. 
Approximately 34% of households had female heads.
Adults (15-50 years) were 40% of the members in the sample households. "Children of 
the household head” (offspring below 15 years) constituted 46% of household members. 
Five percent of individuals were parents of either the household head or parents of the 
spouse. Overall, individuals above 50 years (“the elderly”) made up 14% of the sample.
The overall level of education was low; approximately 5% of females and 16% of males 
had attended secondary school or higher educational institutions. This was comparable 
to 1984 national statistics on educational attainment in Ghana; percentage of population 
age 25 and over having no formal schooling - 60.4%; primary education - 7.1%; middle 
school - 25.4%; secondary - 3.5%; vocational and other post-secondary - 2.9%; higher - 
0.6%. In the study a higher percentage of females were uneducated compared with males; 
sixty four percent of females had received no formal education compared with 29% of 
males.
The occupation of adults reflected the general low level of education; only 8.5% were 
professionals. The three most common occupations were crop farming (51%), petty 
trading/ table trading (13%) and craftsman/artisans (8%).
Seventy one percent of household heads stated their religion as Christianity. The next 
most common religion was Traditional African Religion (24%) and only 3% were 
Moslems. Forty five percent of household heads were members of saving groups or 
associations that provided financial assistance in times of unforseen need such as death or 
illness.
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MORBIDITY AND ACTIONS TAKEN IN RESPONSE
Reported illness episodes and actions
In each round of data collection respondents first provided information about illness 
episodes and treatments that had occurred in the 2 weeks prior to the interview. In 
addition they gave information on illness that had occurred within 6 months of the 
interview. Therefore, the household survey findings related to 2, “two-week recall” 
periods and 2, “six- months recall” periods. The former (2, “two week recall” periods) 
provided data for a four week period consisting of two weeks in each of the dry and wet 
seasons. The latter (2, “six month recall periods”) provided data for a 12 month period.
The study population reported 1,684 actions that were taken in response to illnesses 
during the 12 months investigated. Some of these were sole actions taken in respect of a 
single episode of illness and others were part of a series of actions in respect of an illness 
episode. In 1477 (87.7%) of actions the patient stayed at the place of care for less than 
24 hours. These actions were classified as “non-admitted actions” and included outpatient 
episodes and instances of self-medication. Where individuals reported that they did 
nothing in response to an illness episode this was included in this broad category of 
actions as it was considered to be a form of "expectant management”. In 207 (12.3%) of 
actions patient stayed at the health care provider or remained in bed at home for more 
than 24 hours. Any action of this nature was classified as an “admitted action” and 
included also instances of inpatient care.
Actions in a 2 week recall period
Approximately 38% (549) of the reported non-admitted actions occurred within one of 
the 2 “two-weeks recall” periods (within two weeks of the first interview carried out in 
the wet season or within two weeks of the second interview carried out in the dry season 
interview). Of the admitted actions 26% (54) occurred within one of the 2 ‘two-weeks 
recall period’. Table 7.1 provides the distribution of these actions by the seasons. The 
household rate of non-admitted and admitted in the wet season was 0.46 and 0.04
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respectively, approximately twice the corresponding rates for the dry season, 0.21 and 
0.02 respectively.
Table 7.1 Morbidity in 2 two-week recall periods in dry and wet seasons
Wet season Dry season Total for 2 periods
No of non-admitted actions 374 175 549
Admitted actions 34 20 54
Non-admitted
actions/household
0.46 0.21 0.67
Admitted actions/household 0.04 0.02 0.06
Frequency and age distribution of types of illness related actions 
Figure 7.2 shows the distribution of a) actions not involving an admission (non-admitted) 
and b) action involving an admission (admitted) by age category. Adults (15-50 years), 
children (1-14.9 years) and those over 50 years constituted 45%, 35% and 19% 
respectively of the non-admitted actions. Adults (15-50 years), children (1-14.9 years) and 
those over 50 years constituted 44%, 31% and 25% respectively of admitted actions. 
Since individuals over the age of 50 years made up only 14% of members in the study 
households they were over represented among the non-admitted (19%) and admitted 
actions (25%). Although to a smaller extent, adults (40% of members) were also over 
represented in both types of actions. Actions by adults and the elderly females constituted 
two thirds of actions, although they made up only half of the household members.
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USE OF HEALTH CARE PROVIDERS 
Sources o f treatment associated with actions
Table 7.2 provides counts and percentages for non-admitted actions reported in the two- 
week recall periods involving different sources of care. (The table also includes figures 
for non-admitted actions in which treatments were not given and therefore the treatment 
source was ‘nothing’.) In the first round of the household survey (the rainy/wet season) 
374 non-admitted actions were reported in the 2 weeks prior to the interview. O f these 
374 non-admitted actions, 29% involved self medication with western medicines, 15% self 
treatment with traditional cures, 31.5% treatment either at Battor or Akuse Hospitals and 
3.2% treatment at the health clinic at Volu. Only 2.4% were treated at the four 
community clinics in the sub-district.
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Table 7.2 Counts and Percentages of Non-admitted Actions by Sources of Treatment 
in a Two Week Recall Period in Osudoku Sub-district.
TREATMENT SOURCE WET SEASON 
Count % of total
DRY SEASON 
Count % of total
Akuse 51 13.64 41 23.43
Battor 66 17.65 56 32.00
Local health centre 6 1.60 0 0.00
Volu Health Centre 12 3.21 8 4.57
Asutura MCH clinic 8 2.14 0 0.00
Community Clinics 9 2.41 4 2.29
Self-medication (western drugs) 107 28.61 25 14.29
Self-medication (traditional medicine) 57 15.24 10 5.70
others 49 13.10 23 13.14
Nothing 9 2.41 8 4.57
All actions 374 100.00 175 100.00
In the second round of the household survey (dry season), 175 non-admitted actions were 
reported in the 2 weeks prior to the interview. Of these 175 actions, 14% involved self 
medication with western medicines, only 6% self treatment with traditional cures, and 
55% treatment either at Battor or Akuse hospitals. Less than 3% received treatment at 
the health clinic or the community clinics.
One hundred and twenty five (125) actions in which patients stayed at the health care 
provider or remained in bed at home for more than 24 hours (admitted actions) were 
reported in the six months prior to round 1 and 82 prior to round 2. Table 7.3 provides 
counts and percentages for admitted actions reported in the six month recall periods 
involving different sources of care. (The table also includes figures for admitted actions 
in which treatments were not sought and not given. Therefore the treatment source was 
‘nothing’.) Forty four percent (44%) of wet season admissions were in Akuse 
Government Hospital, 26% in Battor and 22% were admitted in facilities other than those 
included in the survey.
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Of the eighty two (82) admitted actions reported in the six months prior to round 2, fifty 
one percent (51%) of these admissions were in Akuse Government Hospital, 26% in 
Battor and 10% were admitted in facilities other than those included in the survey.
Table 7.3 Counts and Percentages of Admitted Actions by Sources of Treatment in a Six Month Recall
Period in Osudoku Sub-district
TREATMENT SOURCE WET SEASON DRY SEASON WET & DRY
count % of total count % of total count % of total
Akuse 55 44 42 51.22 97 46.86
Battor 33 26.4 21 25.61 54 26.09
Volu Health Centre 1 0.8 1 1.22 2 0.97
Asutura MCH clinic 0 2 2.44 2 0.97
Self-medication( western drugs) 2 1.6 2 2.44 4 1.93
Self-medication (traditional medicine) 1 0.8 4 4.88 5 2.42
others 27 21.6 8 9.76 35 16.91
Nothing 6 4.8 2 2.44 8 3.86
All actions 125 100 82 100.00 207 100.00
CHOICE OF CARE SOURCE FOR EPISODES OF ILLNESS
Table 7.4 shows that there were 496 episodes of illness among the population in a two 
week recall period and that as a result 603 treatment actions (both admitted and non- 
admitted) were taken. This is because seventeen percent of illness episodes involved more 
than one treatment action; 14.6%, 2.6% and 0.5% of actions were second, third and 
fourth attempts to obtain cure for an episode of ill health. Column 1 of Table 7.4 shows 
the percentage of the first actions that were treated by each of the types of health care. 
Columns 2, 3 and 4 give these percentages for second, third and fourth actions. In 
approximately 44% of the episodes the first action taken was care at the local hospitals 
and in 21% self medication with western drugs. Only for about nine per cent of episodes 
was care at a primary care facility the first line of action.
WTP for RHI Morbidity & Expenditure Chapter 7 125
Table 7.4 Sources of treatment by order of action (2, two week recall periods)
Health care type First response 
actions
Second response 
actions
Third response 
actions
Fourth response 
actions
no. % no. % no. % no. %
Traditional medicine self 
medication (n = 68)
47 9.5 16 18.2 5 31.3 0 0.0
Western drug self 
medication (n= 133)
104 21.0 22 25.0 6 37.5 1 33.3
Hospital care-Battor and 
Akuse (n = 256)
219 44.2 34 38.6 3 18.8 0 0.0
Primary Health Care 
(n = 48)
45 9.1 2 2.3 0 0.0 1 33.3
Other (n = 78) 64 12.9 12 13.6 1 6.3 1 33.3
Waiting/spiritual healing 
(n=20)
17 3.4 2 2.3 1 6.3 0 0.0
Total 496 100 88 100 16 100 3 100
SEASONAL DIFFERENCES
Figures 7.3 and 7.4 show the sources of treatment in the wet and dry season for non- 
admitted actions and admitted actions respectively. The data showed a significant 
difference in the pattern of health care action between the wet and dry. In a two week 
recall period more than twice the number of non-admitted episodes of health seeking 
actions in the wet season was observed compared with the dry season (374 as opposed 
to 175). The difference in number of admitted episodes was less marked; wet-season 
admitted actions exceeded that of the dry season by 52%. The high incidence of 
morbidity suggested by this data is consistent with seasonality of prevalence of diarrhoea, 
nutritional disorders and respiratory infections, and the increased incidence of vector- 
borne infections, for example malaria, during wet periods in Africa (Ferguson et al 1993; 
Bradley 1991; Feacham etal 1978).
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The source of the health care used by individuals for outpatient care (non-admitted 
actions) differed between the seasons. Whereas a high percentage of non-admitted health 
related actions (44%) involved self medication in the wet season, the percentage was only 
20% in the dry season. Discussions during the focus groups and general information 
about the study area suggests two probable explanations for this difference. First, during 
heavy rains mobility is reduced in rural areas because of poor road conditions. Therefore, 
patients living far from the hospitals are more likely to self diagnose and/or self-medicate 
and are less likely to attend clinics in the wet season. Second, the latter part of the wet 
season is associated with reduced cash availability in rural communities because by this 
time several months would have passed since the last harvest. Consequently, reduced 
ability to pay for consultation and treatment contributes to the lower proportional use of 
Akuse and Battor Hospitals during the periods of rains. These explanations are also 
consistent with the observed rise in the percentage of actions in which care was sought 
at these facilities during the dry months, 55.5% in the dry season compared with 31.4% 
in the wet. Thus, despite more frequent actions being taken to restore ill health in the wet 
season, a significantly smaller proportion were associated with the use of formal health 
facilities where diagnosis and treatment could be provided by trained personnel.
Another possible explanation for the reduced use of formal health care in the wet season 
is that illnesses were less severe in the wet season and/or were of the type that could be 
adequately treated within the household by self medication and or spiritual healing. This 
explanation is not supported by the findings about the outcomes of actions or the number 
of actions taken per episode of illness. In 27% of wet-season episodes more than one 
action was taken and in 65% of actions the outcome was unsatisfactory (health problem 
persisted or improvement was minor), as compared to 17% and 54% respectively in the 
dry. These findings suggest that the care obtained in the dry season was more effective. 
However, the data does not permit conclusion about the relative severity of episodes in 
the two seasons. Secondly it is not possible to conclude whether or not individuals chose 
non formal care in the wet season because they perceived it to be the most effective since 
respondents were not asked to give their reasons for selecting treatment sources.
WTP for RHI Morbidity & Expenditure Chapter 7 128
Nine of the original ten categories of sources of care were grouped into 5 health care 
types; self-medication with traditional medicine, self medication with Western drugs, local 
public hospitals (Battor or Akuse), Primary health care, and others (facilities outside the 
mission/government sector and/or outside the subdistrict). This was done to reduce the 
number of categories in subsequent analysis and to allow results to be obtained for units 
of analysis that were of general policy relevance rather than limited to specific facilities. 
The tenth source included both actions where nothing was done (waited) and actions in 
which care was obtained from spiritual healers and would have given a biased estimate of 
the expenditures on spiritual healers. Therefore it was not included in the groups.
Table 7.5 Treatment types for first response actions in a 2 week recall period by season
Health care type Wet season Dry season
no. % no. %
Hospital care-Battor and Akuse 119 36.5 100 58.8
Western drug self medication 81 24.8 23 13.5
Others 46 14.1 18 10.6
Traditional medicine self medication 40 12.3 7 4.1
Primary Health Care 32 9.8 13 7.6
Waiting/Spiritual healing 8 2.5 9 5.3
Total 326 100 170 100
Table 7.5 shows that there were differences between the wet and dry seasons in the type 
of care that patients used as a first choice similar to the differences in the sources of 
treatment described above. In the dry season care at a local hospital was the first action 
taken in 59% of cases compared to only 36% in the wet season. In over a third (37%) of 
episodes in the wet season self medication was first choice, compared to only less than a 
fifth (18%) in the dry season.
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EXPENDITURE PER EPISODE OF CARE
Expenditure associated with treatment actions
The total household expenditure for each non admitted action was estimated by adding 
the costs of consultation, drugs, transport and indirect costs. The total expenditure 
ranged from cl 00 to c63,00017. Transport costs accounted for approximately 30% of the 
total expenditure for each non admitted episode. The distribution of the total expenditure 
was such that for approximately 75% of actions, it was c5,000 or less, and approximately 
95% were cl 0,000 or less. Figure 7.5 shows the number of non-admitted actions that fell 
into different total expenditure groups. Figure 7.6 shows the percentage of the non- 
admitted actions by total expenditure groups. The direct expenditure for each non 
admitted action was estimated by adding the costs of consultation and drugs only and 
ranged from cl 00 to c33,000. The distribution was similar to that of total expenditure.
The total expenditure for each admitted action was estimated by adding the costs of 
consultation, drugs, transport and indirect costs, and this ranged from c l,000 to 
cl03,000. Figure 7.7 shows the number of admitted actions that fell into each expenditure 
group. Figure 7.8 shows the percentage of the admitted actions by total expenditure 
group. The direct expenditure for each admitted action was estimated by adding the 
costs of consultation, drugs and other direct costs such as food. The direct expenditure 
ranged from clOO to c!01,000. The distribution was similar to that of total expenditure.
In June 1993, one pound sterling = c l000 (One thousand cedis) 
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Expenditure on actions involving different health care facilities 
Tables 7.6 and 7.7 show the mean and standard deviation of expenditures for non- 
admitted and admitted respectively for different health care facilities. At 95 percent 
confidence level there was no statistical difference in the mean total expenditure per 
action in Battor and Akuse Hospitals. For example the mean expenditure on consultations 
and drugs per admission in these two facilities was almost identical: cl4,256 in Battor and 
cl4,702 in Akuse.
Table 7.6 Expenditure per Non-admitted action in 2, two-week recall periods (cl000)
Health facility type Drugs and 
consultation
Transport Total
mean Std. Dev mean Std. Dev mean Std. Dev
Akuse Hospital 3.112
(n=87)18
1.905 0.318
(n=91)
0.787 4.072
(n=83)
2.452
Battor Hospital 3.172
(n=118)
2.154 1.4 05 
(n=121)
2.478 5.531
(n=118)
4.163
Local health Centre 2.316
(n=6)
0.828 0.166
(n=6)
0.408 2.483
(n=6)
1.116
Volu Health Centre 2.555
(n=20)
1.506 0.200
(n=20)
0.695 3.000
(n=20)
2.011
Asutura MCH Clinic 2.375
(n=8)
2.152 0. 000 
(n=7)
0.000 2.800
(n=7)
2.516
18 Differences in sample sizes between this table and Table 7.2 are due to missing variables.
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Table 7.7 Expenditure per admitted action in 2, 6 month recall periods (c l000)
Health facility type Drugs and 
consultation
Transport Total
mean Std. Dev mean Std. Dev mean Std. Dev
Akuse Hospital 14.702
(n=92)19
15.111 1.757
(n=95)
2.927 21.245
(n=85)
20.008
Battor Hospital 14.256
(n=48)
12.907 3.648
(n=54)
5.002 26.393
(n=47)
24.007
Expenditure by health care type
Table 7.8 shows the mean and standard deviation of expenditures for non-admitted actions 
by health care type used. Since this table uses the type of care rather than the facilities as 
the unit of analysis, it provides an indication of the differences in prices encountered when 
seeking care from different local professionals, non-local non-public providers and self- 
care. The costs incurred by households with respect to actions of self medication with 
western drugs were similar to those incurred when an illness was treated without 
admission at a primary health care facility. In spite of these similar costs, the frequency 
of self medication as a first action for an episode of illness was twice that of care at a 
primary health care facility. Although this may have been because minor illnesses were 
more common than those requiring professional care, it may have been because more 
time was required for travelling and waiting when attending PHC facilities than when 
purchasing drugs on the market.
Comparing total expenditure for care at the local hospitals with those of primary health 
care facilities shows a significant difference, the mean of the former being 61% and 22% 
greater for admitted and non-admitted actions respectively. Nevertheless, as Table 7.4 
showed, aggregating wet and dry season episodes, in 44% of cases care at Battor and 
Akuse was the first action taken for an illness episode. The costs incurred when care was
Differences in sample sizes between this table and Table 7.3 are due to missing variables. 
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obtained from providers outside the mission/government sector and/or outside the 
subdistrict was similar to that of obtaining care from Battor and Akuse Hospitals.
The total expenditure for an action of obtaining health care could have various 
components. They included costs for drugs, consultation, transport, other direct costs 
such as costs of additional purchases including any special diet, and indirect costs such as 
that of maintaining a relative in the hospital to assist with the care of a patient. 
Households frequently incurred costs that were in addition to those of drugs, consultation 
and transport for admitted actions but rarely did so for non-admitted actions. 
Consequently, in the expenditure tables for admitted actions (Tables 7.7 and 7.9), the 
costs in the final columns exceed the sum of the second and third columns.
Table 7.8 Expenditure per Non-admitted action in 2, two-week recall periods (cl000)
Health care type Drugs and consultation Transport Total
mean Std. Dev. mean Std. Dev. mean Std. Dev.
Self medication with 
traditional medicine
1.638
(n=57)
2.700 0.083
(n=60)
0.645 2.160
(n=56)
3.748
Self medication with 
western drug
2.594
(n=235)
2.941 0.757
(n=240)
1.895 3.849
(n=235)
4.245
Local hospital care - 
Battor and Akuse
3.112
(n=87)
1.906 0.318
(n=91)
2.012 4.072
(n=83)
2.452
Primary Health Care 2.193
(n=46)
1.548 0.133
(n=45)
0.504 2.533
(n=45)
1.891
Others 3.790
(n=63)
3.738 0.848
(n=66)
1.449 5.175
(n=62)
5.375
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Table 7.9 Expenditure per Admitted action in 2, six-month recall periods (clOOO)
Health care type Drugs and consultation Transport Total
mean Std. Dev. mean Std. Dev. mean Std. Dev.
Self medication with 
traditional medicine
18.900
(n=3)
22.603 2.500
(n=4)
1.732 35.900
(n=3)
43.403
Self medication with 
western drug
11.920
(n~5)
22.423 .0000
(n=5)
.0000 13.320
(n=5)
25.551
Local hospital care- 
Battor and Akuse
14.549
(n=140)
14.348 2.443
(n=149)
3.903 23.078
(n=132)
21.568
Primary Health Care 12.875
(n=4)
21.425 1.000
(n=4)
2.000 18.900
(n=4)
32.752
Others 22.615
(n=32)
22.657 3.911
(n=34)
5.743 34.546
(n=30)
31.997
Table 7.10 Mean Expenditure for Drugs and Consultation by Care Type and Age
(ClOOO)
Health care type
Non-admitted in 2, two-week recall 
periods
Admitted in 2, 6-month recall periods
Children 
( <  15yrs)
Adults Children 
( <  15yrs)
Adults
mean Std.
Dev.
mean Std.
Dev.
mean Std.
Dev.
mean Std.
Dev.
Self medication with 
traditional medicine
1.310
(n=10)
1.644 1.708
(n=47)
2.884 - - 18.900
(n=3)
22.603
Self medication with 
western drug
2.313
(n=76)
1.897 2.728
(n=159)
3.324 - - 11.920
(n=5)
22.42
Local hospital care - 
Battor and Akuse
3.094
(n=38)
1.963 3.126
(n=49)
1.876 9.120
(n=51)
5.284 17.660
(n=89)
16.806
Primary Health Care 2.321
(n=28)
1.570 1.994
(n=18)
1.534 - - 12.875
(n=4)
21.425
Others 4.004
(n=22)
4.518 3.675
(n=41)
3.301 12.437
(n=8)
14.555 26.008
(n=24)
24.070
All 2.574
(n=178)
2.415 2.758
(n=323)
3.321 9.569
(n=59)
5.284 18.430
(n=133)
18.511
Table 7.10 shows the mean expenditures for drugs and consultations for children and 
adults, by health care types used. For non-admitted actions, irrespective of the type of 
care sought, the mean expenditures were similar for adults and children. With respect to
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admitted actions however, the mean expenditures for adults were approximately twice 
those for children, and approximately 6 times those for care not involving admission. A 
greater preference for adult health insurance cover as compared with children could be 
explained by these differences. The relatively high expenditures associated with adult 
admissions may be an important factor that encourages higher WTP for adults’ insurance 
cover than for children.
HOUSEHOLD INCOME AND EXPENDITURE ON HEALTH ACTIONS
Household Income and Wealth respectively. The upper income for the lowest quintile 
was c l20,000 and the lower income for the highest quintile was c600,000 giving an 
inequality ratio of 5.0 (600/120). The income inequality is graphically represented in 
figure 7.9 by a Lorenz curve.
The graph (Figure 7.9) shows that the relative income share of the poorest quintile is 
approximately 8%. This is comparable to that reported by Fabricant for a rural area in 
Sierra Leone (Fabricant 1992). However, this level of inequality is less than that reported 
for rural and urban areas combined in Ghana in 1988-1989 (World Bank 1993) and is 
similar to that of some high income countries.
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Household incomes were assessed using two approaches:
1) household heads were asked to estimate the annual income for their households,
2) estimations of agricultural outputs were obtained and added to earnings from non 
agricultural sources such as wages.
Six hundred and forty nine household heads (80% o f sample) provided estimates o f the 
annual incomes for their households. The mean annual household income for this self 
selected sub-sample was c369,800. The mean and modes were c300,000 and 200,000. 
The "total income after production cost (Ia)" was estimated for each household and 
represents resources available for household consumption and savings during the 12 
months investigated. Figure 7.10 shows the proportion of households corresponding to 
different ranges of I*. For 98.5% of households Ia ranged from negative cl 8million (ie 
household was in debt) to c3.0 million. Twenty eight percent o f households had a 
negative total after the deduction of production costs (see methods section).
Household incomes
after production costs in 1993/4 
( in million cedis)
negative
incomes
^ .O l  to 0.99
Figure 7.10
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When households were grouped into income thirds on the basis of their stated incomes 
to give high, middle and low income classes, and also grouped according to a variable 
describing their most valuable household asset, the two groupings showed a strong 
association (Table 7.11). This suggested that the income variables were valid. The 
hypothesis that the most valuable household assets and the income class were independent 
was rejected (chi-square test p<0.00001). The correlation and the sensitivity between the 
most valuable asset and the household income class is illustrated by figure 7.11. The 
probability of the most valuable asset being a vehicle, farming machinery or a commercial 
property (prob. Veh/prop) or a TV or bicycle increased with income. Households in the 
high income class were three times more likely to own a vehicle, farming machinery or a 
commercial property (prob. Veh/prop) than households in other income classes. Although 
the probability of the most valuable asset being a fan or radio decreased with income the 
change with income was not marked.
Classification of households bv income and wealth proxies
Table 7.11 Income Class by Most Valuable Asset
income class Vehicle/commercial property TV/bicycle radio/fan none Row total
high 36 90 27 66 219
27.1%
middle 16 56 27 95 194
24.0%
low 12 57 42 128 239
29.5%
unknown 12 26 15 104 157
19.4%
column total 76
9.4%
229
28.3%
111
13.7%
393
48.6%
809
100%
Chi-Square value df significa
nee
Pearson 76.21224 16 0.00001
Likelihood 76.38738 16 0.00001
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Figure 7.11
Transfers of Cash and Goods Into and Out o f Households
Thirty five percent of households received cash transfers in the six months prior to the 
first round of data collection. The transfers ranged from c200 to c l 50,000 (mean c9,800). 
The source o f transfer was a brother/sister or a child of the household head in 42% and 
30% respectively. Friends had transferred cash to 15% o f household heads. In 
approximately 90% of cases the purpose of the funds received was to supplement general 
costs o f living. Transfers to pay health care costs was an infrequent finding. This might 
suggest that the extended family system is not always able to provide funds when required 
to  hospital and clinic fees and therefore willingness to pay will be high. Although 
information on cash transfers out of the households was also obtained, some o f these were 
not true transfers but rather represented funds used by the household head to purchase 
goods and services for other members o f the household living elsewhere.
Household experience of and expenditure for actions
In a two week recall period 226 households o f the 809 sampled had one or more non­
admitted actions. The total expenditure on drugs and consultation for these actions was 
c927,000. On average the households experiencing a non-admitted action spent c4 ,102
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(c927,000/226) on drug and consultation costs. In the 6 months recall period 125 
households had one or more admitted actions. The total expenditure for drugs and 
consultations associated with these actions was c3,766,000 and so on the average the 
households in which admitted actions occurred, spent c30,128 (c3,766,000/125) on drugs 
and consultation. The estimates o f household risk and average losses are shown in Table 
7.12 below.
Table 7.12 Drug and consultation expenditure associated with illness related actions (cedis)
total drug and consultation 
expenditure
households
involved
household risk average loss
Non-admitted actions 927,000 226 0.279+ 4,102
Admitted action 3,766,000 125 0.1545++ 30,128
♦monthlyrisk : s e e  p i 5 ?  for dC'f\V\\t"»Ort 
♦♦annual risk: p ^  f o r
Table 7.13 shows the average household expenditure (for drugs and consultation in one 
month) by income class, for outpatient care among households in which outpatient 
episodes occurred. Households with “high incomes” (above c420,000) spent an average 
of c 4,646, as compared to c2,589 spent by “low income” households (below c200,000) 
respectively. There was no significant difference between high and middle income groups 
in this respect. The average annual expenditure for inpatient care was highest among the 
low income households whose members were treated as inpatients.
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Table 7.13 Household income and expenditure for OPD and inpatient care by income 
group
(a)
income group
(b)
households 
No Mean 
income 
(c xlOOO)
EXPENDITURE ON DRUGS AND CONSULTATIONS 
(cx  1,000)
(c)
expenditure for opd care* 
mean Std Dev.
(d)
expenditure for inpatient care** 
mean Std Dev.
“Low”
=<c200,000
237 121 2.589
(n=59)
2.906 40.604
(n=22)
33.134
“middle”
c200,000-420,000
193 322 4.742
(n=52)
5.829 27.417
(n=29)
17.491
“High”
>420,000
219 680 4.646
(n=69)
5.638 34.136
(n=38)
26.283
unknown 160 3.560
(n=46)
5.522 23.773
(n=36)
28.833
Total 809 4.102
(n=226)
5.194 30.127
(n=125)
29.777
* in a four week period ** in a one year period n = number of households in which actions occurred
Table 7.14 presents the expenditure on drugs and consultation per non admitted action 
for those illness episodes reported to have occurred in the two 2-week recall periods, and 
for which respondents were able to provide expenditure information. The low income 
patients had the lowest mean expenditure on drugs and consultations for self medication 
with western drugs, hospital care and others. However, where the health care consumed 
involved self medication or primary health care the middle income group had the lowest 
means. In Table 7.15 the mean expenditures on drugs and consultations for illness 
reported in the same recall periods are presented for admitted actions and they range from 
c29,173 to c37,650 for care received at the two local hospitals Battor and Akuse. The 
highest mean occurred among those households in which the income was unknown. In 
the twenty-three actions in which the health care type was “others” the range was c 
23,900 to 59,542 and the low income group had the highest.
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Table 7.14 Expenditure on drugs and consultation per non-admitted action in two week recall period
Health care Low income Middle income High income Unknown
type
mean Std.
Dev.
mean Std.
Dev.
mean Std.
Dev.
mean Std.
Dev.
Self medication 
with traditional 
medicine
1.770
(n=10)
2.128 0.836 
(n-11)
1.454 2.047
(n=17)
3.798 1.668
(n=19)
2.422
Self medication 
with western 
drug
0.757
(n=21)
0.637 1.996
(n=26)
2.158 1.924
(n=25)
2.030 2.651
(n=45)
5.062
Local hospital 
care -Battor and 
Akuse
3.091
(n=24)
1.452 4.048
(n=27)
2.535 4.044
(n=34)
2.184 2.701
(n=120)
1.854
Primary Health 
Care
2.357
(n=7)
2.312 2.127
(n=ll)
1.687 2.333
(n=9)
1.539 1.241
(n=19)
1.241
Others 2.850
(n=10)
1.150 4.133
(n=6)
3.388 5.266
(n=15)
5.121 3.504
(n=32)
3.504
All 2.064
(n=74)
1.731 3.007
(n=82)
3.750 3.173
(n=101)
3.226 2.578
(n=245)
2.956
Table 7.15 Household expenditure on drugs and consultation for admitted actions in 2, two week recall period
Health care 
type
Low income Middle income High income Unknown
mean Std. Dev. mean Std. Dev. mean Std. Dev. mean Std. Dev.
Local hospital 
care - Battor 
and Akuse
30.940
(n=10)
13.778 29.173
(n=15)
16.469 31.150
(n=24)
19.135 37.650
(10)
46.372
Others 59.542
(n=7)
49.881 23.900
(n=4)
13.628 46.457
(n=7)
49.090 47.800
(n=5)
25.121
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DIFFICULTIES IN PAYING FEES ASSOCIATED WITH OBTAINING HEALTH 
CARE
Participants in the focus group discussions said that individuals in their communities who 
were in need of hospital or clinic health care faced the problems of i) insufficient cash to 
pay fees and transport costs, and ii) unavailable or inadequate transportation. This led 
to delays in obtaining care and sometimes deaths.
“We try to care for the sick person at home for a while because we do not have 
the money to go to the hospital”
‘We don’t have a clinic nearby so sometimes by the time we get transport to the 
far away hospital or clinic it’s too late”
“Those who live near to the hospital are always there early in the day and those 
who come from far away get seen after a long delay”
“There is the lack of transport and the other problem is that the roads are very 
bad”.
The lack of cash was attributed to the types of occupations in the community and 
underemployment:
“We are farmers and at times when the season fails us in terms of good rainfall 
there is a lot of financial problems”
“The money we use in trading is very small so it is not able to bring large profits”.
Eighty four percent of households reported that in the past they had difficulties paying the 
fees associated with obtaining clinic or hospital care (Table 7.16). Twenty one percent 
of households reported that this situation had occurred often and 47% had experienced 
difficulties within the previous six months. Within the previous six months, 23% and 18%
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of households had difficulties funding health care expenditures of cl00-c5,000 and 
c5,000-c20,000 respectively. Forty-two households had bills of over C20,000 that they 
found difficult to pay. The association between experiencing difficulties in paying health 
care costs and income group was not statistically significant. The Chi-square test 
accepted independence of these two variables and difficulties in paying to be statistically 
as common in high income groups as in low income groups.
Table 7.16 Difficulty in Paying Health Fees in the Past
Difficultv in pavine frequency no of households % of
sample
Many times 168 20.8%
Sometimes 348 43.1%
Infrequently 166 20.5%
Never 126 15.6%
Frequency of difficultv in previous 6 months no of households % of
sample
Difficulties in the previous 6 months 376 46.8%
No difficulties in the previous 6 months 413 51.4%
No answer 3 0.4%
Unable to recall 12 1.5%
Missing data 4
Level of fees “not afforded”in previous 6 months no of households % of
sample
Very high fee (cl00,000-c500,000) 2 0.2%
High fee (c20,000-c100,000) 40 5.0%
Moderate fee (c5,000-c20,000), 148 18.4%
Low fee (cl00-c5,000) 182 22.6%
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SUMMARY OF FINDINGS ON MORBIDITY AND HEALTH CARE EXPENDITURE
The majority of household heads were Christian farmers of whom 45% were members of 
solidarity groups or associations. Approximately a third of households experienced illness 
that they treated as outpatient cases in 2, two-week recall periods. In 15% of households 
one or more members received inpatient treatments for illness. In the wet season 
frequency of self medication as a first treatment choice was equal to that of care at the 
local hospital but in the dry the hospital treatment as a first choice was almost three times 
more frequent than self medication. Mean total expenditures arising from self medication 
and care at the local hospitals were similar and were greater than those paid to PHC 
facilities and smaller than the costs of seeking care outside the mission/government sector 
or outside the subdistrict. Expenditures incurred with self medication with traditional 
medicine were not different from the expenditure for care in PHC facilities.
The average household expenditure (for drugs, consultation and transport) for episodes 
of illness treated as outpatients increased with the income level of the household. 
However, the average expenditure for inpatient care was not significantly different for the 
different income groups. Almost half of the households had experienced difficulty in 
paying health care costs during the six months prior to the study.
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Chapter 8: Willingness to Pay Findings, Affordability and Revenue Predictions
INTRODUCTION
The first part of this chapter is devoted to willingness to pay results and qualitative 
findings about the characteristics of a rural insurance scheme preferred by the study 
population. Providing such data fulfills the first objective of the fieldwork in Ghana “to 
determine the preferred specifications of community-based risk sharing for health care and 
the “Willingness to Pay” - WTP (the maximum premiums/contributions that households 
would be willing and able to pay)”, stated in Chapter 4.
The chapter also focuses on two other stated objectives of the Ghana study, which are:
a) to estimate two sets of fair community rated premia using different approaches; 
i) with the aim of obtaining a contribution revenue equal to the total revenue 
currently raised from user fees and drug fees from the population, and ii) with the 
aim of obtaining a contribution revenue equal to a stipulated percentage of the 
cost of providing care at specified facilities to members enrolled in the insurance 
schemes;
b) to estimate the external subsidy from government and/or donor agencies that may 
be required to make the preferred schemes financially viable.
Calculations of the fair community premiums using the two approaches described above 
rely on estimates of the proportions of the households who would seek western type 
health care annually, if such care were physically accessible and affordable (the community 
risk). Chapter 7 provided estimates of community risks with respect to outpatient and 
inpatient care and these estimates are combined with the average household financial loss 
associated with ill health to arrive at one set of fair community premiums. (These financial 
losses were also calculated and presented in Chapter 7). The second set of fair premiums, 
using approach b, combines the community risk with health facility treatment costs 
presented in this chapter.
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The affordability of the premiums calculated using the above approaches can be assessed 
by relating them to the WTP stated by household heads. Some households' WTPs will be 
below the estimated premiums, and therefore a trade-off between achieving the revenue 
objectives underlying the premium calculation and making the premium affordable to the 
majority of households, will be required. Finally, to explore the need for subsidies from 
government to sustain the scheme, the willingness to pay data is then used to predict 
affordability and revenue implications associated with each premium.
PERCEPTIONS ABOUT HEALTH INSURANCE
A key finding of exploratory discussions was that the term "Health Insurance" appeared 
to be unfamiliar or not understood as a risk sharing mechanism by people in the study 
communities. This may partly be because, in the absence of clear descriptions and/or 
definitions by the mass media when reporting the debates surrounding the possible 
introduction of a national health insurance scheme, people had adopted a variety of 
different meanings. However, in spite of the marked differences in the descriptions of 
"Health Insurance" given by members of the communities, most considered it to be a 
product purchased mainly by the urban elite. Risk sharing arrangements that were familiar 
to the communities were conceptualised and described as being solidarity schemes, ie 
"associations of people who assist each other in events of specific needs".
WILLINGNESS TO PAY FOR FREE ACCESS TO EXISTING CARE: ROUND 1
Almost all household heads (98%) said they would be willing to pay an annual 
premium/contribution to obtain free access to existing locally available care, at the time 
of need, for all persons in their households. Figures 8.1, 8.2 and 8.3 show the amounts 
households heads were willing to pay to have access to existing care types (ie to obtain 
different health insurance benefits). Demand is expressed in 1000s of cedis per year that 
the household was willing and able to contribute to be a member of an association that 
entitles its members to different care benefits. The benefits differed in the type of care 
covered (outpatient only and inpatient only), and in the provider (Battor Mission Hospital,
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Akuse Government Hospital, health posts and the nearest community clinic).
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Approximately 20% of households did not state a demand in terms of money that they 
would be willing to pay for membership that provided free treatments at health posts only 
and, similarly, 20% did not state a demand for membership that provided combined 
outpatient and inpatient care at Akuse hospital20.
WILLINGNESS TO PAY FOR PROPOSED HEALTH INSURANCE COVERS: 
ROUND 2
Each household respondent was given descriptions of three hypothetical goods - three 
health insurance options linked to membership of an association. He or she was also given 
some details o f the hypothetical market for these goods, in particular that payment is by 
instalment and that management of the clinic providing the care under the insurance cover 
would be undertaken jointly by members of the association. The three options described
20 This was difficult to understand since there was not a similar percentage of household heads who 
expressed zero/“non demand” for inpatient-only or outpatient-only packages provided at Akuse 
hospital.
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were (see page 4 round 2 questionnaire):
a) clinic outpatient care that satisfied the conditions specified during the 
focus group discussions (see Preferences Associated with WTP values 
below);
b) inpatient care at Battor Hospital;
c) clinic outpatient care as in (1) combined with inpatient care at Battor 
Hospital.
The respondent was then asked to state the maximum that he or she would be willing and 
able to pay per adult and per child - that is their demand for each cover option provided 
to an adult and a child in their household. Table 8.1 shows the mean, mode and median 
of these WTPs and the mean, mode and median implied household contributions, 
calculated from the age composition of the respondents' households. The respondent was 
then provided with an average annual risk of requiring OPD care and hospital admission 
for an adult and a child in the community. This risk was estimated as the average 
frequency of treatment-seeking actions in the first round. He or she was also given the 
average expenditure for outpatient and inpatient care for an adult and for a child, again 
these were estimated from the data collected in the first round. Finally the respondent was 
asked to state the maximum that he or she would be willing and able to pay - that is their 
demand for each type of cover in the light of the new information they then possessed.
The percentage of household heads who revised their WTP per adult for options after 
they had been provided with the frequencies of illness and the average expenditure per 
illness obtained in round 1 of the survey were: outpatient at a clinic, 21%; inpatient care 
at Battor Hospital, 17%, and outpatient at the clinic/inpatient at Battor Hospital, 12%. 
The corresponding percentages for WTP per child were 24%, 18% and 12%. Although 
the majority who revised their WTP did so upwards, the increases were modest and the 
effect on the overall pattern of WTP for the groups was insignificant.
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Table 8.1 Willingness to pay for different benefit options
insurance 
cover type
mean willingness to pay 
(mode, median) 
cedis x 1000 
per child per adult
implied
per
household
OPD at clinic 2.5 3.67 13.09
(option a) (10, 1.5) (2.0, 2.4) (12.0, 9.0)
inpatient at 4.33 7.84 23.07
Battor Hospital (2.0, 2.1) (6.0, 4.1) (8.0, 13.0)
(option b)
OPD and inpatient 5.22 7.84 28.18
at Battor Hospital (2.0, 3.2) (6.0, 5.2) (12.0, 15.0)
(option c)
Table 8.2 WTP for individual for insurance option c (1,000)
income group mean 
child adult
mode 
child adult
median 
child adult
high 5.224 8.439 3.000 6.000 4.000 6.000
middle 6.551 9.059 2.000 5.000 4.000 7.000
low 4.621 6.870 1.000 2.000 3.200 5.150
unknown 4.250 5.150 2.000 3.000 3.000 6.000
The central measurements for the willingness to pay results were all lowest for the low 
income group. It was however common for the mean and median to be higher for the 
middle income group than the high although the difference was often not statistically 
significant. This overall picture is illustrated using the WTP per adult and per child for 
insurance option c (Table 8.2).
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Table 8.3 WTP per individual for insurance option c (1,000)
sex of household 
head
mean 
child adult
mode 
child adult
median 
child adult
Female 4.039 6.175 3.000 6.000 3.000 5.000
Male 5.893 8.791 5.000 10.000 5.000 7.000
Thirty four percent of household heads were females (Table 8.3). Their mean WTP for 
adults and children were lower than male heads, the difference being statistically 
significant (p<001) and smaller for children than for adults. Since females in the sample 
were less educated than males and there was some correlation between education and 
income, this finding was probably the combined effect of education and income.
Table 8.4 WTP per capita for insurance option c
household heads level of 
education
mean 
child adult
mode 
child adult
median 
child adult
Professional 7.171 10.706 1.000 5.000 5.000 9.000
Secondary/vocational 6.605 9.263 4.000 6.000 5.000 8.000
Primary /middle 5.329 8.052 3.000 5.000 4.000 6.000
none 4.737 7.173 2.000 4.000 3.400 6.000
The median WTP for different options increased with the education level of the head of 
the household (Table 8.4). For adults, household heads who attained secondary or 
vocational school were willing to pay almost 50% more than household heads who had 
receive no schooling. Although increased knowledge of the concept of insurance among 
the educated may account for this finding it may also be the effect of income since 
households with higher education are more likely to have additional sources ie from 
formal employment. The modes however did not show an association with the level of 
education. For all educational groups the WTP central values were higher for adults than 
children.
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Table 8.5 WTP per capita for insurance option c
Response to “past 
difficulty in paying for 
health care?”
mean 
child adult
mode 
child adult
median 
child adult
many times 7.698 10.570 2.000 5.000 5.000 8.000
sometimes 4.247 6.857 3.000 6.000 3.000 6.000
infrequently 3.816 6.337 2.000 4.000 3.000 5.000
never 6.617 9.045 5.000 6.000 4.500 8.000
Households heads who reported having had difficulties paying health care charges “many 
times”, had the highest mean WTP for children and adults (see Table 8.5) compared with 
households who sometimes, infrequently or never had such difficulties. The next highest 
group mean was that of the group who said they never had difficulties. It is 
understandable that households who have already found constraints in meeting health care 
bills may be more willing to purchase health insurance cover. The relatively high 
willingness of those who have never faced such problems is likely to be due to an income 
effect (“never” households are likely to be wealthiest).
PREFERENCES ASSOCIATED WITH WTP VALUES
The expandatory focus group discussion confirmed the findings of the household survey, 
that household heads overwhelmingly preferred the option of making regular membership 
payments to a solidarity association that provided protection against financial 
consequences of ill health rather than pay out of pocket user charges at the time of illness. 
In addition these discussions produced the consensus that such an association should be 
locality-specific/decentralised and should have direct managerial and financial links with 
the health facilities that contracted to provide health care to association members.
The focus groups envisaged that the association would set its annual membership dues 
equal to or above the percentage of the expected average costs of health care per 
household to be borne by the consumer. The association, by investing membership 
contributions in local health facilities, would act as a co-financier of government health
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facilities in the district and provide a risk sharing mechanism for its members.
Conditions required for Willingness to Pay
The money contributions that households were willing to make were on the condition that 
the plans gave access to health care o f acceptable quality. The indicators o f quality used 
by the focus groups were, the availability of drugs at facility dispensaries, the availability 
of basic equipment for physical and laboratoiy examinations and the expedient and friendly 
response of health staff to patients. The staff are expected to be professionals rather than 
trained community members. Proximity of the participating health facility to household 
residence was the factor that would most influence household heads' decision to select a 
particular facility-linked health insurance plan. Thus the facilities available to association 
members must be geographically located to provide acceptable accessibility to the majority 
o f the districts' population.
Schedule of payment
The most preferred schedule of payments was bi-annually. Figure 8.4 shows the 
percentage of households that selected each of the payment schedules. Forty five (45%) 
of households preferred to make payments bi-annually, 24% quarterly and 23% annually. 
Only 7% selected monthly payment as their preferred option.
Preferred schedule for contributions
quarterly (24.05%
annually (23.Of
O t l i u s monthly (7.01%)
bi-annually (45.19%)
Figure 8.4
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COST OF OUTPATIENT AND INPATIENT CARE AT A REPRESENTATIVE 
MISSION HOSPITAL
Holy Family Hospital, Berekum's expenditure data for 1992 financial year was adjusted 
for inflation and used to calculate the total and the non-salary recurrent cost of each OPD 
and inpatient episode (Table 8.6)21.
Table 8.6 Cost of Outpatient and Inpatient episodes at a Representative Mission
Hospital (Holy Family Hospital Berekum, Ghana)
Patient numbers
new OPD cases 52,973
OPD re-attendances 12,903
total OPD 65,876
admissions 7,691
total cases 73,567
% reatt. OPD 0.196
% new OPD 0.804
Expenditure cedis 1992 cedis 1993
total expenditure 274,500,904.00 356,851,175.20
total personal emoluments 148,203,416.00 192,664,440.80
non salary expenditure 126,297,488.00 164,186,734.40
Unit costs cedis 1993
non salary recurrent cost per new OPD 398
non salary recurrent cost per reattend OPD 1,593
non salary recurrent cost per admission 15,932
Studies in another low income African country, Malawi, by Adu Boahene, Mills and 
others have shown the relationship between recurrent cost per OPD visit and inpatient
Attempts to use similar data from Battor Hospital to obtain unit costs per patient were unsuccessful 
because of the difficulty of obtaining the value of donated supplies. Data of the inputs in providing 
care for a sample of patients from this hospital has been collected and will also be used to calculate 
unit costs.
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admission to range from 1:34 to 1:55 (Mills et al 1993)22. Applying the mean of the 
ratios found in six Malawian hospitals to the expenditure and patient numbers in Berekum 
Hospital in 1993, gave the non-salary recurrent cost per new outpatient visit, reattendance 
outpatient visit and inpatient admission as c398, c l,593, and c 15,932 respectively. In 
these calculations it was assumed that a reattendance was four times more expensive than 
a new OPD because this was the approximate relationship observed for a small sample of 
patients attending Battor Hospital.
AFFORDABILITY AND REVENUE IMPLICATIONS OF TWO LEVELS OF 
PREMIUMS
A health insurance scheme in Dangme-West could set premiums/annual contributions to 
achieve one of the following objectives:
1. to obtain a total contribution revenue equal to the total revenue currently raised
from user fees and drug fees from the population;
2. to obtain a total contribution revenue equal to a stipulated percentage of the cost 
of providing care at specified facilities to members enrolled in the insurance 
schemes.
The premiums obtained from either of these approaches must then be related to the WTP 
stated by household heads. Since some households' WTPs will be below the estimated 
premiums, a trade-off between achieving the objectives and making premiums affordable 
to the majority of households, will be required. The next section considers the 
affordability and the revenue consequences of each of these approaches in order to assess 
the financial feasibility of an insurance scheme in the study area.
1 Estimating fair household premiums such that the total contribution revenue
equals the current revenue from user fees, makes use of the average household
risk (ie a community based risk) and the average value of the loss. This premium 
is equivalent to the expected value of the loss/expenditure per household. It is
Similar data for Ghana was not available at the time of the study. 
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calculated as follows:
For OPD only cover:
^  opd — ^  opd ^  ^opd
Where
P1 opd = annual household " revenue recovery " premium for OPD cover
R opd = average household risk of requiring OPD care in a year
Vopd = average value of loss, that is the average expenditure for
households that require OPD care.
In a four week period, consisting of two weeks dry and two weeks wet season, 
out of a sample of 809 households, 226 had a positive OPD experience, the 
average monthly household risk for OPD being (226 /809) = 0.279.
The total consultation and drug expenditure for the non-admitted, incurred by the 
226 households, was c927,000. The average value of the loss associated with a 
positive OPD experience was c927,000/ 226 = c4,102.
Therefore
P1 opd = 0.279 x 12 x c4,102 = cl3,733 
For inpatient admission cover only
P1inp = RinpX Vmp = (125/809)(3,766,000/125) = 0.1545 x 30,128 = c4,655 
Where
P1 inp = annual household "revenue recovery " premium for inpatient
admission cover
R inP = average household risk of requiring admission care in a year
Vjnp = average value of loss, that is the average expenditure for
households that required admission
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The household risks of opd and admission are overstated in these estimations because all 
current levels of self medication are included as occasions where formal treatment at 
clinic or hospital will be sought. However this over-estimation may partly be cancelled out 
by the effect of moral hazard.
The total annual premium for health providers to recover the current consultation fees and 
drugs costs paid by the population would be c l8,388 for an average household. This 
"revenue recovery annual premium" exceeds the mode and median annual willingness to 
pay (WTP) for option c. For associations that ensured OPD at a clinic and inpatient care 
at Battor Mission Hospital, the mean and median WTPs per adult were c7,840 and c5,200 
respectively. The WTPs per adult and per child stated by households, taken in 
conjunction with the age composition of households, make it possible to derive the mean 
and median household WTP of c28,180 and c l5,000 respectively (Table 8.7) and a 
household demand curve for option c (figure 8.5). For a district with a population of 
150,000 (27,270 households) the household demand curve, derived from the willingness 
to pay findings, indicates that the expected household participation rate would be 
approximately 45% percent, and thus the expected revenue approximately c220,000,000 
(figure 8.5).
Table 8.7 Willingness to pay and premium levels
insurance 
cover type
mean willingness to pay 
(mode, median) 
cedis x 1000 
per household
household
"revenue
recovery"
premium11"
household
"cost
recovery
premiumb"
OPD at clinic 
(option a)
13.09 
(12.0,9.0)
13.73 "
inpatient at Battor 
Hospital (option b)
23.07 
(8.0,13.0)
- 2.71
OPD at clinic and inpatient 
at Battor Hospital (option c)
28.18
(12.0,15.0)
18.38 5.04
* premium providing a contribution revenue equal to current health fees paid to all providers 
b premium providing full recovery of non-salary recurrent costs
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Demand for combined insurance
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Figure 8.5
Figures 8.6 and 8.7 show the demand curves for options a and b.
Demand for OPD insurance
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Figure 8.6
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Demand for inpatient insurance
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Figure 8.7
2 Estimating fair household premiums such that the total contribution revenue 
provides 100 % nonsalarv recurrent cost recovery of outpatient (OPD) costs and 
100% non salary recurrent inpatient costs (using Berekum Hospital as 
representative provider). Using the basic cost data from this hospital, it is possible 
to calculate the premium that would be required per household to provide cost 
recovery. The widely quoted highest cost recovery rate achieved in Ghana is 
15% of the recurrent cost of the Ministry of Health. For the illustration below, the 
cost recovery objective has been set at 100 % recovery of non-salary cost for 
OPD and 100% recovery o f non-salary costs for inpatients at Berekum hospital.
For OPD only cover
P2 opd =  R opd x Vopd
= 0.279 x 12 x c632 = c2,120
Where
P2 opd = annual household "cost recovery"premium for OPD cover
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R opd = average household risk of requiring opd care in a year
Vopd = average value of loss, that is the average non salary costs involved in
treating an OPD episode, calculated as (% of new OPD x non salary cost 
per new OPD) plus (% of reattendence OPD x non salary cost per 
reattendence OPD). Table 8.6 provided these data.
For inpatient admission cover only 
p 2  Y Vinp inp v inp
=0. 1545 x cl5,932 =c2,462 
Where
P2 ^  = annual household "cost recovery" premium for inpatient admission cover
R in? = average household risk of requiring admission care in a year 
Vjnp = average value of loss, that is the non salary recurrent cost per admission
As with the calculation of the “revenue recovery”, the household risks of OPD and
admission are also overstated in these estimations. Again, the reason is that all current 
levels of self medication are included as occasions where formal treatment at clinic or 
hospital will be sought. The total annual fair premium for combined outpatient and 
inpatient cover would be c4,581 per household. It is important to recognize that a fair 
premium does not include "loading" for administrative costs and profit. Assuming 10% 
of this will be required for administrative costs, the " loaded premium" for combined 
outpatient and inpatient cover would be c5,039. These estimates of premiums presume 
that the type and quantities, and also relative costs of the production inputs used to 
deliver inpatient and outpatient care are the same as those in Malawi (the unit costs were 
calculated using ratios observed in this country, see Appendix 4). Secondly, for cost 
recovery to be achieved the hospital must be used by other communities so that the 
current average costs are maintained.
For a district with a population of 150,000 (27,270 households) the demand curves, 
derived from the willingness to pay findings, indicate that at the premium rate of c5,000,
WTP for RHI- Willingness & Revenue Chapter 8 162
the expected household participation rate would be approximately 80% per cent and the 
expected revenue c l09,000,000 (figure 8.8). This implies that a premium that is 
affordable to more than 80% of households would recover almost all non-salary recurrent 
costs. By setting the recovery target at less than 100% of non-salary costs (establishing 
a trade/off between achieving high revenue objectives and making premiums affordable 
to the majority o f households), the expected participation rate would approach 100% of 
households.
Premiums, participation and revenues
Predictions for option c
100250
-8 0200
- 6 0150
-4 0100
50 20
0
1 5 9 13 17 21 25 29 33 37 41 45 49
household premium (xlOOO cedis)
-■ - revenue participation rate
do
1
exo
exX?O'"
Figure 8.8
The substantial difference between the "revenue recovery" premium and the "cost 
recovery" premium (the latter is 28% of the former) suggests that the study population 
is currently paying high health care prices for consultation and drugs due to one or more 
o f the following reasons:
1) the unavailability o f drugs at government facilities, leading patients to purchase
drugs on the open market at inflated prices;
2) some households using expensive private health facilities, possibly because o f
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better quality and/or accessibility;
3) some households being charged high “informal” charges at government hospitals.
Revenue versus participation
Figure 8.8 shows the expected participation rates and, hence, the expected revenues 
(assuming a district population of 150,000) at different levels of household premiums for 
option c. The highest revenue is predicted at the premium level of approximately c25,000 
and corresponds to a low participation rate of 35% of the population. Above this 
premium level the total revenue starts to decline along with a falling participation rate.
The marginal rate of increase in revenue starts to decline at a lower level, approximately 
cl 1,000, in that the rise in total revenue, as the premium is increased, begins to slow 
down while the drop in participation remains steep. If both a) revenue from the scheme 
and b) utilization of health care by individuals and hence participation, enter into the utility 
function of decision maker(s), then setting the household premium level above cl 1,000 
would not be rational. The fall in participation would not be compensated by the rise in 
revenue and total utility would start to fall. On the other hand, below this level a 
particular utility may be obtained with different premiums and therefore different 
participation rates. The optimum premium will then depend on the relative values of 
revenue and utilization and hence the relative revenue and participation. Introducing a 
concern for consumers' own utility and their incomes leads to a lower premium, depending 
on the inequality of incomes.
The basis for this approach to setting the premium level assumes that the health system 
decides on the number and type of health facilities to operate, and the services to provide, 
irrespective of the revenue that can be obtained from consumers. This implies that price 
does not determine the supply. Starting from this premise, and assuming both revenue and 
utilization to be part of the utility function of the decision maker, also leads to low user 
fees (Musgrove 1989).
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Premium verses income levels
The mean household income was c369,800 and the median was c300,200. Table 8.8 
shows the mean annual incomes by quintile of the population. These estimates are based 
on the answers provided by 80.2% of respondents when they were asked to estimate the 
annual incomes for their households. (The remaining respondents either said they did not 
know the household income or declined to provide this information.)
Table 8.8 Annual Household incomes and premium levels
mean "revenue "recovery
income group income ( i ) premium" premium"
(X I000 cedis) as% ofi as % ofi
lowest 20% 80.84 22.25 6.2
Second quintile 118.61 15.17 4.2
third quintile 310.30 5.79 1.6
fourth quintile 495.30 3.63 1.0
highest 20 % 871.00 2..07 0.6
Table 8.8 also shows what percentage of the mean income for each of the groups is 
required to pay a) the " the revenue recovery" premium and b) the "cost recovery" 
premium. For the average household in the lowest 20%, the former premium would 
clearly be unaffordable and the latter would constitute 6% of the annual income. It is 
reasonable to deduce that households in this quintile make up the bulk of the 20% whose 
WTP was below c5,000. This implies that access to the scheme for very poor households 
could only be achieved by setting the revenue target at less than 100% of non-salary 
recurrent costs and/or implementing exemption or subsidy mechanisms. One of the 
suggestions to improve the CAM system, stated by women who took part in the focus 
group discussions, was to provide exemptions for the very poor and widows.
Almost a third of households were estimated to have had total incomes, after deduction
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of production costs, that were negative (figure 7.10) for the 12 months under 
investigation. So even households in the two highest quintiles, for whom the "cost 
recovery" premium constitutes less than 4% of annual income, may be unable to purchase 
cover if the time of registration is after investments in production inputs have already been 
made.
CONCLUSIONS OF WILLINGNESS TO PAY AND PREDICTED REVENUES 
Willingness to pay and Affordability
Households in the study had preferences which could be interpreted as conditions attached 
to their WTP answers. These preferences were in three broad areas; the quality of care 
provided under the insurance policy, the schedule of premium contributions, and the role 
of officials managing the scheme with respect to management of the health facilities 
providing care to insured persons. It was assessed that the affordability of two sets of fair 
community rated premiums, derived with two explicit revenue goals, differed substantially. 
The goals were a) to recover the recurrent cost (excluding salary) of the predicted health 
care consumption of the insured households and b) to extract from each insured household 
the average annual expenditure for consultation and drugs found in the study. Based on 
the WTP findings, the premium derived from the former goal was affordable by 80% and 
that of the latter goal by only 45%.
Predicted revenues and financial feasibility
The above indicates that a health insurance scheme offering policies at the “cost recovery 
premium” to the study population would achieve 80% of the non-wage recurrent costs 
of caring for the households in the district. In view of the financing situation in Ghana, 
the ability to fund 80% of the non wage recurrent budget from an insurance scheme would 
be an attractive financing option and therefore when considered in context, the schemes 
seem to be financially feasible. The prediction is that the scheme would lead to a 
substantial increase in the percentage of the recurrent budget funded directly by 
households in the district. This statement is supported by the following observations 
about health financing in Ghana (see the review of health financing in Ghana in chapter
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5); a reasonable extrapolation, is that at the time of the study the percentage of the 
recurrent budget used on non-wage expenditure was in the region of 45%; user fee 
revenue, having peaked in 1987 at 15% of the recurrent budget, was 7.9% for 1992, the 
year prior to the study (MOH, Ghana 1994) and therefore, non-salary recurrent items in 
MOH districts were funded mostly from the Government budget allocation channelled 
through the regions. Applying the above reasoning, a health insurance scheme offering 
policies at the “revenue recovery” premiums to the study population would also be 
financially feasible. However, it would differ from the first scheme in that it would exclude 
more than half of the households in the district.The predicted revenue from a “low 
premium-high affordability and therefore high participation” scenario was 50 % less than 
that of a “high premium-low affordability and low participation” policy.
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Chapter 9: Factors Influencing WTP for Health Insurance in Osudoku,Ghana
INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this chapter is to present the method and the findings of statistical 
selection of household and household head’s variables that determine households’ WTP 
for one of the insurance options in Osudoku. The aim was to choose a small set of models 
which best explain the WTP valuations as it has been stressed in the literature that a single 
model is unlikely to dominate all others in all the criteria used to select models and 
therefore the focus was developing a set of models and not a single model (McCullagh & 
Nelder 1983). Another objective was to assess the proportions of the variations in the 
WTP findings explained by these household and household head’s variables. A 
comprehensive and accepted list of explanatory variables for the demand for insurance 
polices that could be used to evaluate WTP for insurance cover has yet to emerge from 
the literature. Therefore, it was envisaged from the onset that the analysis would be 
exploratory.
The impact of uncertainty is likely to be one reason why an established list of independent 
variables for health insurance demand is currently absent from the literature. Uncertainty 
affects the utility provided by insurance, making the demand for insurance different from 
that of demand for other goods. Secondly, the consumer’s risk aversion plays an 
important role but is difficult to measure. In view of these problems, in attempting 
regression models of WTP, the implicit assumption being made was that all the 
independent variables for WTP had been collected by the Osudoku study. However, as 
time and travel costs of obtaining inpatient care for those insured under two of the options 
did not form part of the data, this assumption was only realistic in the remaining option, 
option a, (insurance for OPD at a nearby clinic). Hence there was justification for 
attempting to use the data available to estimate models for option a, but not for the others.
Beside the objectives stated above, the rationale for attempting the econometric analysis 
included that it would illustrate how the results presented in the previous two previous
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chapter could be summarised statistically. Secondly, it was a means of investigating 
whether or not a statistics-based test of validity and reliability of the WTP findings would 
support the confidence placed in the findings based on more subjective tests. These 
subjective tests mainly involved comparing WTP findings with socio economic data to 
judge plausibility (chapter 7 and 8) and comparing respondent answers to very similar 
questions (methodological section of chapter 10). It was reasoned that if the objective 
test indicated that respondents’ answers for one option were valid and reliable, then it 
would be irrational not to assume that this applied to answers given for other options. 
Consequently, the fact that the constraints of the data made it meaningful to attempt 
econometric analysis for only one option would not prevent this aim of testing validity 
and reliability from being realised. Furthermore, limiting the regression analysis to one of 
the three insurance options accords with the fact that modelling the demand for rural 
health insurance per se was not one of the objectives of the research.
The first part of the chapter conceptualizes models of WTP and reviews briefly the 
literature on models of the demand for insurance. The second part presents the regression 
models of WTP for option a (cover for OPD care at nearby clinic).
PREDICTORS OF WTP AND MODELS OF WTP/DEMAND FOR HEALTH 
INSURANCE
The decision about how much to pay for insurance cover in the period t (Wt) depends on 
price in period t (P,), the income in period t (YJ, illness occurrence and health expenditure 
in previous periods t-1 (EM), and perceived risk/need in period t (RJ. That is
W, = /(P„ y , e ,., R,)
In reality precise measures of perceived risk/need are not available and proxies for this 
variable must be used instead. Therefore, how much an individual is willing to pay for an 
insurance cover may also be represented by the following
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w, = /(P„ Y, Em ( x , p, z ) ,)  
where x, p, z are proxies for perceived risk/need.
Since WTP is a measure of demand for insurance, it is useful to consider what models of 
demand for insurance have been developed. The literature on empirical research in this 
area emphasizes that the demand for health insurance is conditioned by the insurance 
status of the consumer (Cameron et al 1988). Due to uncertainty, the expected utility of 
insurance with respect to the consumer's a priori distribution of health states should be 
included as an independent variable in a joint demand model for insurance and care. The 
econometric implementation of such a model is difficult. Consequently a recent study in 
Australia designed to determine whether insurance led to significant overconsumption of 
services relied on a reduced form model (Cameron et al 1988). The authors argued that 
a "tractable structural model for insurance demand is (therefore) virtually impossible".
Other empirical studies have attempted to model the demand for health insurance in 
developed countries as functions of co-payment rates and deductibles (Propper 1987). 
Commonly the researchers are not able to observe individuals’ maximum evaluation for 
an insurance policy and consequently they have modelled the decision to buy or not to buy 
using logit or probit regressions.
ESTIMATING WTP MODELS FOR STUDY AREA
Reliability of WTP data
Model specifications for the demand for non insurance goods, for example health care, 
have been developed and are widely available in the literature. In addition the variables in 
these models have been established and are generally readily measured. Therefore in the 
literature, WTP for such goods is equated to demand, and regressing the independent 
variable in these models with WTP as the dependent variable is expected to provide a 
reasonable goodness of fit. The rule of thumb for assessing the reliability of contingent 
valuation measures for these goods is that the adjusted R2 for an OLS regression of the
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independent variables be at least 0.15 (Cameron et al 1995). However, with regard to 
the demand for insurance, independent variables and their measures have yet to be 
established and therefore applying this rule of thumb is problematic. The high possibility 
of measurement errors, for risk aversion in particular, means the adjusted R2 may be lower 
than 0.15 even when WTP is reliable and equal to the demand for health insurance cover. 
Nevertheless, the performance of data on WTP for insurance in this test should provide 
supportive secondary evidence for evaluating reliability.
Conceptualizing a model of household WTP for insurance cover 
The starting point of the model is that the decision to purchase insurance cover is 
dependent upon the indirect utility and expected health care consumption (Cameron et al 
1983). In developing the model it is assumed that the consumer makes a choice between 
the two prospects - insurance and no insurance- on the basis of expected utility of the two 
alternatives. Uninsured individuals may obtain care by paying the full cost out of pocket 
(user fees). As insurance financed care can only be used in certain states of health (ie 
illness), the expected utility of no insurance relative to insurance is a function of the 
expected distribution of states of health.
The expected utility of the two prospects will also depend on the costs and benefits of 
treatment obtainable in the prospects. In the proposed market the insured person does not 
gain access to care that is quantitatively different from that accessed by the uninsured 
person23. The difference is therefore in the costs. The uninsured faces the indirect costs, 
such as transport fares and waiting, and direct financial costs. The insured is constrained 
by only the indirect costs of seeking care.
The household is assumed to be the choice-making unit because the insurance policies to 
be offered are household premiums and the health of one member of the household will 
affect the utility of other members. The WTP variable for each household provides a 
continuous variable that measures the expected utility of the insurance prospect.
23 It could be argued that the insured will have improved quality of care if for example they have access
to drugs that are unaffordable to the uninsured but this effect is incorporated in the difference in costs 
faced by insured and uninsured.
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Based on the above outline of the theory underlying WTP, in developing the model it was 
anticipated that the demand for insurance will be positively related to the level of direct 
cost (fees for drugs and consultation) faced without insurance. It was also envisioned that 
the utility of insurance relative to no insurance (WTP) was a positive function of the risk 
aversion, and a positive function of perceived risk of loss. The perceived risk of loss was 
anticipated to be positively related to a) the extent to which the mass of the distribution 
of the health states is expected to concentrate in the set of states for which insured care 
is available and b) the expected health expenditure in the absence of insurance. Finally, 
since formal credit is relatively unavailable to these households it was postulated that the 
ability of the household to cope with unexpected expenditures (the robustness of cash 
flow) as perceived by the decision maker in the household, would also affect the 
household’s demand for insurance.
From the above conceptualization of WTP, in theory six WTP models could be estimated 
from the data obtained in the study employing the equation
wt =/(P1, Y. E,., (x, p, z)t)
(W,) is how much to pay for insurance covers in the period t 
(Pt), is the price in period t 
(Yt) is the income in period t
(Ej^) is illness occurrence and health expenditure in previous periods t-1 
(x, p, z)J are proxies for perceived risk/need in period t
The possible models are as follows:
1. for insurance policies to cover adults for outpatient care at nearby clinic;
2. for insurance policies to cover children for outpatient care at nearby clinic;
3. for insurance policies to cover adults for inpatient care at Battor Mission Hospital;
4. for insurance policies to cover children for inpatient care at Battor Mission 
Hospital;
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5. for insurance policies to cover adults for inpatient care at Battor Mission Hospital 
and outpatient care at nearby clinic;
6. for insurance policies to cover children for inpatient care at Battor Mission 
Hospital and outpatient care at nearby clinic.
The dependant variable Wt in each equation would be the amount that households were 
willing to pay per adult or child for that cover type. For example in the equation for 
option a, Wt was the WTP per child for free outpatient care at a nearby clinic or WTP per 
adult for free outpatient care at a nearby clinic. This regression did not require inclusion 
of the distance of the respondent’s home to health facility because although this is a 
measure of the indirect cost associated with the utility of the insured, since option a states 
“nearby clinic”, the distance is a constant for all respondents. The distance however 
would be an important variable in models explaining WTP valuation for options b and c, 
because the cover provided by these options included care only available at one central 
facility, Battor Hospital. However, the distance from each household to Battor Hospital 
was not collected and therefore only the regression results for option a are presented in 
this thesis.
The data set
Given the above proposed model the research sought to generate a data set that included 
information on the following measurable variables
willingness to pay for insurance cover (dependent)
the household income
education and sex of household head
number of adults and children in the household
illness occurrence (as an indication of perceived risk of ill health)
past expenditure on health care in a previous month and previous year
difficulty in paying health care charges.
Proxies were included in questionnaires that attempted to measure variables central to the 
theoretical model that could not be measured directly. Smoking, immunization of children
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less than five years, and past participation in solidarity associations were proxies to 
measure risk aversion. The perceived "robustness of cash flow" was proxied by the 
frequency of past difficulty in paying health care fees.
Selection process for study area models
Collinearity between some independent variables was considered likely because socio­
economic data tend to be associated. Before the econometric analysis, intra- household 
variables were tested for association. The variables were grouped in the following sets: 
income, illness occurrence and health expenditure, risk/need proxies, and correlation 
matrixes were produced for each set. No variable pair correlation coefficient was greater 
than 0.5.
Models were selected on the basis of theoretical validity, model fit statistics, the outcome 
of evaluations for heteroscedasticity24 and the Durbin-Watson test for serial correlation 
of the residuals (Pokomy 1997). The model fit statistics used were the multiple R, R 
squared and adjusted R squared, standard error of the estimate, and an 
analysis-of-variance table. Past expenditure was hypothesised to be an important 
determinant of WTP and therefore two approaches to specifying this variable were tested.
The two approaches to specifying past expenditure produced two models. For these two 
models, Table 9.1 shows descriptive statistics for the independent variables and the 
hypothesised relationship between variable and WTP. In model 1 two variables were used 
to specify past expenditure variables: a)household expenditure on drugs and consultation 
for out patient care in the previous 12 months; and b) dummy variable for whether or not 
households incurred an OPD episode in the previous 12 months. Model 1 was therefore 
constrained that the expenditure on drugs and consultation for OPD episodes in the period 
being available and greater than zero. Since in only about 45% of households were both 
consultation and drug fees for OPD known for the period, the number of observations in 
the model was significantly lower than the total sample, ie sample = 809 and n=326. In
Heteroscedasticity refers to situations in which the variances of the disturbance terms are not all 
equal so that one of the assumptions for the simplest form of model specification is broken.
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model 2 this constraint was removed by omitting the former variable and all other 
variables in the table were used as independent variables; the resulting sample size in 
model 2 was 633 households.
The hypothesis that WTP depended on income, illness occurrence, health expenditure, and 
perceived risks of requiring health care meant that many independent variables were used 
in the model estimations. With the exception of income, the means and the standard 
deviations were for the constrained and the unconstrained models. The mean income for 
households in model 1 (ie those who had an OPD expenditure in the previous 12 months) 
was slightly higher than those in model 2 (households who had and had not had OPD 
expenditure in the previous 12 months).
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Table 9.1 Descriptive statistics of independent variables with hypothesised relationship 
between variable and WTP
Variable label model 1
Mean
n=326
Std Dev M odel 
2 Mean 
n=634
Std Dev Expecl 
ed sig
income annual household income+ 481.82 348.49 461.58 344.44 either
totdif health expend, difficult to pay + 392.36 383.97 416.42 382.62 either
age household head’s age 45.55 17.64 43.36 17.21 none*
opdexcd annual expend. OPDconsult.& drug 6.63 8.50 - - +ve
hsize number of people in household 3.91 2.03 3.68 1.96 none
assdmy dummy of associations needed 0.98 0.14 0.98 0.12 +ve
christ dummy Christian household head 0.71 0.45 0.73 0.45 +ve
sexdmy dummy for male head of household 0.67 0.47 0.67 0.47 none
opdxdm dummy for positive OPD 
expenditure in last year
- - 0.46 0.45 either
memass dummy for member of saving 
association
0.49 0.50 0.46 0.49 +ve
adhealth dummy for member adult healthy 
compared to other households
0.41 0.4 0.45 0.50 -ve
neverdif dummy for never had difficulty 
paying for health care
0.13 0.34 0.15 0.36 -ve
manydif dummy for difficulty many times in 
paying for health care
0.21 0.41 0.21 0.40 +ve
secbvdm dummy for household educated to 
level of secondary schooling or 
above
0.15 0.36 0.15 0.35 +ve
smoked dummy for household head ever 0.15 0.36 0.14 0.35 -ve
smoked
chhealth dummy for children healthy 
compared to other households
-ve
islam dummy household head follows
islam religion
none
+ in thousands o f  cedis
* none = no hypothesis to be a determinant (considering evidence from literature review and findings in chapters 7 and 8)
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REGRESSION RESULTS
Tables 9.2 and 9.3 compare models 1 and 2 for WTP for an adult cover and WTP for 
child cover respectively. Although the pattern of coefficient estimators is largely similar 
for the two models, the multiple R, R squared and adjusted R squared were slightly poorer 
in model 2. A third specification (model 3) was also attempted in which variables were 
picked by a statistical computer package (SPSS) using stepwise selection and is also 
presented in Tables 9.2 and 9.3. The signs and magnitude of the parameter estimates were 
similar for several models irrespective of whether they used all the variables or selection 
of them.
Model fit statistics
The multiple Rs indicate that correlations between the natural logs of the observed WTPs 
and the predicted values based on the regression models are low (ranging from 0.35 to 
0.45). Similarly, the R squares were low for all the models estimated, their values ranging 
from 0.11 to 0.18. Although low R squares are to be expected because of the discrete 
nature of many explanatory variables, they also strongly suggest that variables fully 
capturing risk aversion and demanders perceptions of differences in the care for insured 
and uninsured, if this were the case, were important missing variables. From the analysis 
of variances of the models the overall regression F test rejected the null hypothesis that 
there is no linear relationship between the WTP for option a, and the independent 
variables included in the model. This in turn is strongly suggestive that the WTP 
observations are reliable though the adjusted R squared exceeded 0.15 in only one 
estimate.
Evaluations for heteroscedasticity
To evaluate the models for violations of the assumptions of linearity and equal variance 
(homoscedasticity) scatterplots were produced (see Appendix 4) (Norusis 1990). A 
scatterplot of predicted and observed values of natural log of WTP for model 2 showed 
the distribution around a straight line to be even, suggesting that a linear model was an 
appropriate choice. On the whole in this model, for observed values of WTP, the range
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of predicted values were similar, indicating that the assumption of equal variance was not 
seriously infringed. When residuals were plotted against the predicted WTP for adult care 
in model 2 most of the residuals fell in a horizontal band around zero (Appendix 4).
In the constrained model, however, at high observed WTP, the range of predicted values 
was narrower. This may have reflected the fact that there are possibly maximums that 
households are prepared to pay for health insurance irrespective of how high positively 
associated variables rise. In any case it does suggest that heteroscedasticity may have 
been a problem in the model and that it was probably inferior to model 2.
The Durbin-Watson test
This is a test for serially correlated (or autocorrelated) residuals (Kmenta 1986). An 
assumption of regression analysis is that the residuals for consecutive observations are 
uncorrelated. If this is true, the expected value of the Durbin-Watson statistic is close to
2. Values less than 2 indicate positive autocorrelation and values greater than 2 indicate 
negative autocorrelation. For the estimated model the value ranged from 1.726 to 1.903 
and therefore autocorrelation was not seen as a problem.
Variables Influencing WTP
Although only 14% of household heads had secondary education or above, this level of 
education relative to lower levels or no education was a strong positive determinant of the 
observed WTP. Experience of difficulty in paying health care charges, where notable in 
frequency ie difficulties had been experienced many times, had significant coefficients for 
all adult and child models estimated. Regarding having never had difficulty paying, it was 
significant in the unconstrained models. Being a male, rather than a female, head of 
household was a significant positive determinant of WTP and being a Christian was also 
significantly positive though to a lesser extent in model 2.
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Table 9.2 OLS regression results (adult) showing influence on willingness pay for option a
VARIABLE MODEL 1 (opd expenditure>0) MODEL 2 (unconstrained ) MODEL 3 (stepwise selection)
Coefficient (b) SEB Coefficient (b) SEB Coefficient (b) SEB
annual household incomer- - - 6.304E-05 8.367E-05 -
annual consult & drug expend for OPD+ 0.008 0.004 - -
number of people in household -0.002 0.022 .007 0.016 -
dummy of associations needed 0.537** 0.264 0.400* 0.226 -
dummy for Christian household head 0.176** 0.010 0.148** 0.067 0.161** 0.064
dummy for male head of household 0.451*** 0.086 0.278*** 0.064 0.295*** 0.061
dummy positive OPD expenditure in last year - - -0.041 0.057 - -
dummy for member of saving association 0.115 0.077 0.070 0.057 - -
dummy adult healthy compared to others -0.076 0.079 -103* 0.050 - -
dummy never had difficult paying for health 0.197 0.124 0.251** 0.087 0.259** 0.085
dummy difficulty many times paying for health 0.307** 0.010 0.380*** 0.075 0.389*** 0.075
dummy head educated secondary or above 0.348** 0.114 0.348*** 0.084 0.362*** 0.089
dummy for household head ever smoked -0.102 0.115 0,066 0.087 -
health expenditure difficult to pay+ -5.470E-05 1.142E-04 -1.829E-04** 8.452E-05 -1.838E-04*** 0.316E-05
household heads age -6.532E-04 0.003 -0.002 0.002
constant -0.072 0.315 0.309 0.263 0.634 0.076
Multiple R 0.457 0.398 0.381
R* 0.209 0.158 0.145
n 326 633 633
Durbin Watson statistic 1.72240 1.81073 1.79801
+ in cl,000 *p<0.10 **P<0.05 ***p<0.005
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Table 9.3 OLS regression results (child) showing influence on willingness pay for option a
VARIABLE MODEL l(opd expenditure>0) MODEL 2(unconstrained ) MODEL 3 (stepwise selection)
Coefficient (b) SEB Coefficient (b) SEB Coefficient (b) SEB
annual household income+ -1.245E-05 1.345E-04 -4.460E-06 1.005E-04
health expenditure difficult to pay + 9.784E-05 1.383E-04 -8.334E-05 1.013E-04
household heads age 9.738E-04 0.003 9.335E-05 0.002
annual consult & drug expend for OPD+ 0.005 0.0056 - -
number of people in household 3.205E-04 0.026 0.003 0.019
dummy of associations needed 0.551 0.316 0.454 0.270
dummy for Christian household head 0.199* 0.109 0.160* 0.080 0.169** 0.076
dummy for male head of household 0.421*** 0.104 0.302*** 0.077 0.309*** 0.073
dummy positive OPD expenditure in last year - - -0.089 0.068 - -
dummy for member of saving association 0.150 0.093 0.035 0.069 - -
dummy adult healthy compared to others -0.204 0.094 -0.213** 0.068 0.199*** 0.067
dummy never had difficult paying for health 0.112 0.148 0.246 0.104 0.218** 0.095
dummy difficulty many times paying for health 0.365** 0.120 0.441*** 0.090 0.469*** 0.086
dummy head educated secondary or above 0.434** 0.139 0.401*** 0.100 0.395*** 0.098
dummy for household head ever smoked -0.135 0.138 0.044 0.010 - -
constant -0.681 0.382 -0.282 0.314 0.107 0.085
Multiple R 0.404 0.364 0.353
R* 0.163 0.133 0.125
n 326 630 630
Durbin Watson statistic 1.90376 1.72612 1.73675
+ in cl,000 * p<0.10 **P<0.05 ***p<0.005
In three of the four estimates where all variables were entered, “adults perceived as 
healthy compared with those in other households” had a significant negative effect on 
WTP. When variables were entered stepwise, this variable was a significant explanatory 
variable of WTP for child cover but not for adult cover. In preliminary estimates the 
dummy variable “children perceived as healthy compared with those in other households” 
reduced the fit statistics for all models and was therefore excluded. Another variable 
excluded for this reason was the dummy variable for household head following Islam.
The results failed to demonstrate that WTP is affected by past expenditures for the type 
of care to be covered by the insurance, ie OPD expenditure in this model. The 
significance of the variable, measured by the drug and consultation expenditure, could 
only be assessed in model 1. Model 1 also differed from others in that a positive answer 
to the question “are associations that help individuals with costs of funerals and other such 
unexpected costs needed in this community?” was found to be a significant determining 
variable of WTP for adult cover. (Apart from these two exceptions the magnitudes of all 
other coefficients were stable for different specifications.)
Several other statistically insignificant findings are particularly noteworthy. In all models 
estimated income and household size (number of individuals in the household) coefficients 
were insignificant in explaining the WTP. In addition being a member of saving and/or 
solidarity associations did not significantly influence WTP. Current and past smoking of 
respondents used as a proxy for “risk loving”, though hypothesised to be correlated with 
willingness to take risk with health and therefore lower WTP, was rejected as a 
determinant by all the estimated models.
Confirmation of a hypothesised relationship between variables and WTP for adult cover 
Table 9.4 shows whether or not the hypothesised relationship between variables and WTP 
for adult cover was confirmed by the sign and significance of the coefficient found in each 
of the three models. On the whole the models confirmed the sign and significance of 
three variables: dummy for difficulty paying health charges many times (manydif), dummy 
for household educated to secondary level or beyond (secbvdm), the total expenditure on
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drugs and consultations for OPD care that was difficult to pay in the past (totdif), 
household head a Christian (Christ). Although the hypothesised relationships for three 
variables (assdmy, memass, smoked) were that they were significant determinants, they 
were insignificant. Models 2 and 3 found the dummy for “never had difficulty paying 
health care” a positive determinant whereas the hypothesis was that it would be negative. 
One possible explanation is that households in which such difficulties had not been 
experienced envisaged themselves as being more “able to pay” insurance contributions, 
rather than not requiring such measures. The hypothesised relationship was based on the 
assumption that the latter would be true. As described above the models were 
inconsistent regarding the role of the dummy “adults perceived as healthy compared with 
those in other households” (adhealth) in influencing WTP per adult for OPD cover, ie 
option a.
CONCLUSIONS FROM REGRESSIONS ON THE FACTORS INFLUENCING WTP 
IN STUDY AREA
Overall, the results of the econometric analysis for option a (OPD insurance cover) 
suggest that in the study area household WTP is influenced positively by a) past 
difficulties in paying health care fees, b) sex of household head being male, c) secondary 
education and above of household head, and d) household head being a Christian. The 
perception by a household head that adult members of his household were healthier than 
those in other households, however, had a negative effect on the willingness to pay for 
OPD insurance. The stated annual household income was not a statistically significant 
determinant of WTP for this type of cover in the study area.
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Table 9.4 Model confirmation of hypothesised relationships between variables and WTP for 
adult cover
Variable label model
1
model
2
model
3
Expected
sign
income annual household income(clOOO) n/a n/a n/a either
totdif health expenditure difficult to pay no yes yes -ve
age household heads age n/a n/a n/a either
opdexcd annual consult. & drug expend for 
OPD*
no n/a n/a +ve
hsize number of people in household n/a n/a n/a either
assdmy dummy of associations needed yes no no +ve
christ dummy for Christian household head yes yes yes +ve
sexdmy dummy for male head of household n/a n/a n/a either
opdexdm dummy for positive OPD expenditure 
in last year
n/a no no +ve
memass dummy for member of saving 
association
no no no +ve
adhealth dummy for member adult healthy 
compared to other households
yes/no+ yes yes/no+ -ve
neverdif dummy for never had difficult paying 
for health care
no no++ no++ -ve
manydif dummy for difficulty many times in 
paying for health care
yes yes yes +ve
secbvdm dummy for household educated to level 
of secondary schooling or above
yes yes yes +ve
smoked dummy for household head ever 
smoked
no no no -ve
islem dummy household head follows islem n/a n/a n/a +ve
religion
+ no for adults yes for child ++ sign was positive rather than negative
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Chapter 10: Discussions of Methods and Findings
INTRODUCTION
This chapter is divided into three parts. The first part considers the strengths and 
limitations of the research design. In particular it discusses the appropriateness of, and the 
success achieved in, using focus group discussions and contingent valuation questions to 
determine the perceptions of and the demand for health insurance in the study areas. The 
second part discusses the findings of the two case studies, and the third addresses some 
aspects of the findings of the feasibility study in Ghana that were not discussed in chapters 
seven and eight. Parts two and three also include comments on the relationship between 
findings and policy decisions involved in implementing health insurance in a rural African 
setting.
Methodological Issues: Study limitations and strengths
In this research four types of instrument were used to collect data in the field studies: a) 
household surveys, in which household heads (those responsible for the welfare of family 
members residing in one compound) were individually interviewed using a questionnaire;
b) focus group discussions involving 6-12 participants; c) retrospective outpatient surveys 
in health facilities; and d) review of health facility financial records and reports.
Household surveys
In Burundi the questionnaires were written in the local language (Kirundi), thus avoiding 
potential distortions due to incorrect translations and so increasing the reliability of the 
answers to the survey questions. In the other two sites, as several African languages were 
used in the study areas (in Guinea Bissau two main languages were spoken and in Ghana 
households were fluent in either Ga-Adanbe, Twi or Ewe) this approach was not possible. 
Therefore, to reduce problems associated with poor comprehension by respondents, in 
these two countries, the questionnaires were first written in the official languages 
(Portuguese in Guinea Bissau and English in Ghana). Interviewers were then carefully 
selected so that they were literate in the official language and fluent in all the common
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local languages. In addition, the training of the interviewers involved role play of different 
interviewing scenarios in which translations of questions by interviewers were assessed 
and improved by using peer review techniques.
In the CAM study the main limitations arose from its cross-sectional design. Projections 
of annual household illness rates were made based on illnesses reported to have occurred 
in the four weeks preceding the study. The findings of the household survey may 
therefore be subject to some degree of recall error, and any seasonal variations in illness 
occurrence will not be reflected. A four-week recall period was adopted to facilitate the 
estimation of illness incidence and health care utilization rates, that could be projected to 
annual rates and then meaningfully related to annual CAM revenue.
Household heads in Gabu, Guinea Bissau, were required to recall few details in their 
interviews because the study had hoped to obtain health care utilization rates and levels 
of fees paid from health providers. In Ghana, the likelihood of recall error was reduced 
by using a two-week recall period for health seeking actions that did not involve 
admissions. For admitted episodes, however, a six-month recall period was used because 
it was assumed that such events would be unusual and sufficiently significant (distressing 
and disruptive of normal life) for household heads to remember details for a long period. 
Furthermore, prior to the study it was estimated that a two-week recall would have 
provided only a small sample of actions involving admissions and this was borne out by 
the low admission rate found. An attempt to take account of seasonal variations was 
made in the Ghana study by collecting the data in two rounds, in the dry and rainy 
seasons.
Besides illness occurrence and health care expenditure, the other major component of the 
survey questionnaires was the questions on willingness and ability to pay for health 
insurance. In the two case studies this was assessed by respondents’ past decisions 
whether or not to participate in the existing scheme. In addition, they were asked how 
much more they would be willing to pay for improvements in the CAM and Abota studies. 
Respondents in non-Abota villages in Guinea Bissau were asked how much they would
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be willing to pay for schemes to be initiated. The increases in the contribution that 
respondents stated they would be able and willing to pay were their evaluations of the 
improvements being offered. The highest total contribution stated provided the amount 
that the respondent was willing and able to pay for a new hypothetical good - health 
insurance organized as that of existing schemes but of different quality. The new good 
was only partially hypothetical and so the approach used to elicit a response did not have 
to follow the strict guidelines suggested by other researchers and reviewed in chapter 3. 
Therefore it is likely that the responses are reliable and valid valuations and not subject 
to the problems associated with true contingent valuations.
CONTINGENT VALUATION QUESTIONS
Open versus closed
In the study in Ghana different approaches to valuation of contingent demand were used. 
In round one an open question was asked first, followed by a closed question in which the 
premium was approximately equal to a fair recovery premium. This was one way of 
ensuring that if the respondents’ answers to open questions did not take into account 
existing/real prices, they could revise their answers in the light of the additional 
information. The differences in the WTP values obtained are illustrated using insurance 
for inpatient and outpatient care at Battor Hospital. The percentage of households willing 
to pay c l,000, c4,000 and c8,000 from the open questions were 65%, 15%, and 2% 
respectively. However the closed question found that a much higher percentage of 
households, approximately 75%, were willing to pay c4,000 for this insurance option.
Russell (1995) notes that open contingent valuation questions are associated with the 
following problems:
a) they produce an unrealistic scenario, since in normal circumstances people face 
given prices for goods and are rarely asked to place a monetary value on a good 
or service;
b) respondents often find it difficult to state the maximum they are willing to pay 
without the assistance of a price “label”;
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c) compared with other elicitation methods, open-ended questions offer the 
respondent the opportunity to over or understate WTP in a strategic attempt to 
influence future pricing.
The above differences in the WTP for open-ended and closed questions could have been 
due to any of the above.
For the above reasons it is likely that the initial answers to the open-ended questions did 
not reflect true household willingness to pay, although they will have provided the order 
of preference. For example, they gave an indication that households would be willing to 
pay more for an insurance policy providing care at Battor Hospital than one providing 
care at a local health centre. In the first round the problems associated with open-ended 
questions were probably further aggravated by the fact that the questions were asked 
before the respondent was reminded of prices paid for health care in the past and the 
constraints on their household budgets. (Questions about health care expenditure in the 
previous two weeks and six months were asked after the open-ended contingent valuation 
questions.)
On the whole, it is unlikely that the inadequacies with the contingent valuation questions 
in round one adversely affect the study as these initial WTP findings were used only to 
guide the specification of the health insurance options offered to respondents in round 
two. In round two, since the respondent had gained price information from the previous 
interview and had the time to consider the issue of health insurance compared with user 
fees, it was reasonable to expect that the open-ended questions provided unbiased WTP 
values. Although they were not followed by closed questions, the respondent was 
provided with new information to help in the way a “price label” would have. They were 
told the average annual risks of requiring OPD care and hospital admission for an adult 
and a child in the community. These risks were estimated as the average frequencies of 
treatment-seeking actions in the first round. He or she was also given the average 
expenditure for outpatient and inpatient care for an adult and for a child, again these were 
estimated from the data collected in the first round. Finally respondents were asked to
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state the maximum that they would be willing and able to pay - their demand for each type 
of cover in the light of the new information they then possessed.
The percentage of household heads who revised their WTP per adult for options, after 
they had been provided with the frequencies of illness and the average expenditure per 
illness obtained from round one of the survey, were: outpatient at a clinic, 21%; inpatient 
care at Battor Hospital, 17%; and outpatient at the clinic/inpatient at Battor Hospital, 
12%. The corresponding percentages for WTP per child were 24%, 18% and 12%. 
Although the majority who revised their WTP did so upwards, the increases were modest 
and the effect on the overall pattern of WTP for the groups was statistically insignificant.
Partial hypothetical versus full hypothetical questions
As stated, in both rounds of data collection open contingent valuation questions were 
used, but the nature of the questions was different in the two rounds. In round one the 
health insurance was only partially hypothetical because, although premiums rather than 
user fees were the form of payment for health care, the quality of care that would be 
received was not hypothetical or new to the consumer. (The consumer was asked for his 
willingness to participate in risk sharing associations that provided access to health care 
whose characteristics were known, ie existing care from existing facilities.) The demand 
in round two however was truly hypothetical as contingent valuation questions provided 
a concise description of the services available if the respondent purchased the insurance. 
Below is an example of descriptions provided.
“This clinic would be within an hour of walking and be staffed by nurses. Equipment for 
physical and laboratory examination would be available. Drugs would also be available 
at the clinic. Members of the association would help manage the clinics.”
Insurance for care at Battor Hospital in round one and insurance option b in round two 
are identical goods/services, and therefore, the WTP responses are compared in Table 
10.1. The purpose of this comparison is to provide information about the difference that 
the two approaches may have made to the answers given by respondents. The dramatic
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increase in the willingness to pay for this type of insurance in round two, when the good 
was fully specified in hypothetical terms (before additional “price label” information had 
been provided), may also be because other changes occurred in the time intervening. 
However, it seems that revision may have occurred because of the effect of participating 
in the initial interview and, for some respondents, in the focus discussions. In addition, 
the low WTP value in round one may be due to the larger number of options offered to 
the respondents in round one compared with round two. Although it is very difficult to 
be sure why these changes occurred, it suggests that contingent valuation questions should 
be repeated to respondents after a suitable time interval to allow them to become familiar 
with a new service or good. Also, the WTP should be sought for only a limited variation 
of the good in one interview.
Table 10.1 WTP in round 1 and 2 for insurance providing inpatient care at Battor (1,000)
mean mode median
inpatient at Battor Hospital 
round 1
1.92 1.0 1.5
inpatient at Battor Hospital 
option b - round 2
23.07 8.0 13.0
Validity and reliability of WTP measures
In general the WTP results were consistent with economic predictions (where insurance 
is assumed to be a good), indicating theoretical validity. The results of the second round 
of data collection showed that income and other socio-economic variables that implied 
increased disposable income, in particular the education and sex of the household head, 
were associated with higher values of WTP. (As stated above, the WTP questions in 
round one provided respondents with exposure to the subject and hypothetical questions 
and the results were used primarily to narrow the options for the proposed insurance. For 
these reasons the relationships between round one WTP and socio-economic variables 
were not explored in the analysis.) When open-ended questions were asked, the WTP 
answers, when taken as the maximum price, were negatively associated with the
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population’s demand (more households would purchase covers offered at low prices than 
at high prices, thus for inpatient care at Battor, 65% would purchase if the price was 
c l,000 but only 15% would, if the price was c4,000). The observed positive income 
effect on WTP and the negative “implied price” effect on the demand derived from the 
WTP answers suggest that the hypothetical nature of the question probably did not impair 
the ability of respondents to make demand decisions rationally.
Besides the consistency between the WTP assessments in round one and in round two, 
correlation between the two also provides information on the reliability of the WTP 
answers. A high correlation coefficient of 0.856 was found, suggesting that when faced 
with questions about identical goods, household heads gave answers that were 
systematically related rather than unrelated. It is possible that the focus group discussions 
and the first interview helped the respondents to understand the hypothetical scenario 
created as part of contingent valuation questions. They therefore gave answers that were 
reliable rather than random. The adjusted R2s of the ordinary least square regressions 
were close to 0.15, suggesting that the variables explained significant amounts of the 
variation in the dependent variable. This provides further evidence that the contingent 
valuation measure used in the research was reliable.
GENERALIZABILITY OF WTP FINDINGS
One limitation common to all the sites is that the absolute level of willingness to pay found 
may not be applicable to the countries as a whole. In Burundi this inability to generalize 
the absolute values is because: 1) the relatively high altitude of Muyinga Province may be 
associated with a climate, and therefore illness patterns, that differs from lower lying 
provinces; and 2) Muyinga Province is a major coffee growing area, the relatively high 
household incomes may make household health expenditure significantly different from 
other provinces. However, the proportions of CAM and non-CAM households willing 
to pay more for the CAM card are unlikely to differ significantly from one province to the 
other. The socio economic status of the different rural areas of Guinea Bissau appear to 
be more uniform than in Burundi and therefore it is possible that generalization may be
WTP for RHI- Discussions Chapter 10 190
feasible.
In contrast to Muyinga, Osoduko in Ghana, was relatively poor at the time of the study 
compared with other rural areas in the south of the country. The main economic activity 
in the 1960s and 1970s was sugar growing and factory work, providing incomes 
comparable to some urban areas. However, with the collapse of the sugar factory incomes 
reduced significantly. Past high incomes and possibly high levels of education make it 
unlikely that the absolute WTP findings can be generalized to the whole of Ghana. 
Nevertheless, on balance, the findings were probably typical for rural areas in the richer 
southern parts of the country in 1993/94.
Effectiveness of study design
On the whole, the design of the three field studies produced the type and quantity of data 
anticipated. The one exception was the Abota study with regard to data required to 
estimate health care utilization rates and health care expenditures. One of the original 
objectives of the household survey was to assess the adequacy of contributions by 
estimating rates of illness episodes, rates of utilization of different levels of government, 
private and traditional health care and the average cost per USB visit. However, in spite 
of the measures taken to ensure rigour, it was found that some parts of the data had 
internal inconsistencies and records of treatment by village health workers were 
unaccessible. For these reasons it was impossible to provide illness and utilization rates, 
or to evaluate the relationship between Abota revenues and the costs of providing 
components of care at the USBs.
Focus Group Discussions and Ethnocentrism
Focus group discussions have been developed as a tool for determining the perceptions, 
attitudes, manner of thinking and opinions of participants. Used for this purpose, they 
produce results that have high face validity and, in some cases, greater predictive validity 
than individual questionnaires25. Focus group findings are qualitative and are therefore
See study comparing focus group discussions with a large-scale mail-out survey, Reynolds F. and 
Johnson D. Validity of focus group findings. Journal o f  Advertising Research 18(3): 21-24, 1978.
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associated with the problem of ethnocentrism (the tendency to take for granted one's own 
cultural view and to evaluate other behaviour in terms of it), thereby increasing the 
possibility of misinterpretation. Sackmann argues that individuals of dual-cultural 
backgrounds may be able to overcome some aspects of ethnocentrism26. Teams in which 
members are of different cultural backgrounds may have multiple and conflicting 
interpretations of qualitative data, thus increasing the problem. The background of the 
principal investigator in this study is bi-cultural, Ghanaian and English27, and it was hoped 
therefore that the ethnocentrism would be reduced.
THE CASE STUDY FINDINGS
Social impact
This section discusses findings of the case studies that provide insights into the social 
impacts of implementing rural health insurance schemes in Africa. These findings include 
those that allow inferences to be drawn about a) the ability of schemes to reduce the 
financial barriers to health care utilization, and b) the impact of the scheme as perceived 
by women (those mainly responsible for health care in the household). In addition findings 
that have a bearing on the affordability of premiums and appropriateness of payment 
schedules provide evidence about the social functioning of the schemes.
CAM
Approximately 27% of households gave financial inability to purchase a CAM card as one 
reason for non membership. It seems, therefore that the scheme was unable to remove 
the financial barrier at the time of illness for a significant proportion of the population. 
However, non-CAM patients referred from health centres to higher level facilities often 
purchased cards before, or on arrival at, the referral centre, thus manipulating the scheme 
to reduce their financial barrier to expensive curative care without participating in the risk
For a discussion of the heritage of the "culture" concept and the major anthropological approaches 
to the study of culture. See Sackmann SA Cultural Knowledge in Organizations: Exploring the 
Collective Mind. London: Sage Publications, 1991.
Dr Aihin spent part of her childhood in England and after her primary and secondary education she 
returned to West Africa.
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sharing.
Women reported that they had limited access to cash and, therefore, by eliminating cash 
payment at the point of care, CAM empowered them to decide the need for, and timing 
of, health care consumption by household members. (Women in CAM households did not 
require money, and hence permission, from male household heads to seek health care.) 
Cash has become less of a barrier to obtaining curative treatment for card holders, but 
sometimes the quality of care was considered inadequate. Women who participated in the 
focus groups gave reasons for purchasing CAM cards which suggested that they were risk 
averse. (Economic theory postulates that risk averse persons purchase insurance policies 
to maximize the expected utility from their income.) Many women were willing to pay 
higher CAM prices to improve the benefits. Generally, it appears that women, being the 
main carers, derive additional utility from the knowledge that in the event of child illness 
treatment was available even in the absence of cash in the household.
Abota
In villages that had an Abota, participation was about 94% (Eklund and Stavem (1990) 
reported more than 90%). Therefore, for almost the entire populations of these villages 
the financial barriers to obtaining health care at the time of illness were removed. 
Similarly most of the physical barriers were removed (generally, people in Abota villages 
said that an important benefit of the scheme was increased physical accessibility of primary 
health care). Since the 1989 evaluation of prepayment conducted by Eklund and Stavem, 
individual and household participation rates have not declined. In view of the problems 
faced by the scheme, reported by studies cited in Chapter 6, this was significant. The 
problems included inadequate drug supplies, instances of misappropriation of funds and 
the decline in actual benefits obtained when referred to government facilities. (In 
principle, treatment is free for inpatients at hospitals and health centres but due to 
shortages, patients must often purchase medications and dressings from private 
pharmacies.)
The ethnic homogeneity of the villages, the traditional nature of the society and the
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predominance of Islam (a religion that stresses collectivism), suggest that collectivism in 
the Abota villages was high. The Abota scheme’s ability to survive in spite of the many 
logistic problems mentioned above may be due to the level of collectivism in the local 
culture. Societal norms concerning the extent of individualism and collectivism expected 
by village members will have influenced the nature, structure and function of the Abota 
through the decisions made by the community. Therefore, it is conceivable that social 
cohesion is responsible for the near universal participation in the scheme in Abota villages, 
reducing adverse selection, and enabling the village health workers and the community to 
prevent excess utilization (moral hazard) through informal controls. In the CAM study 
in Muyinga Province, preference was shown for prepayments (rather than for user fees) 
by women who participated in the focus discussion. There did not appear to a religious 
origin to this preference since the women were of different religions.
Indirect evidence that the Abota contributions were affordable comes from the willingness 
to pay findings. At the time of the study the mean contribution per household was 3,438 
PG (approximately £0.92) collected once or twice a year, yet 87% of participating 
households were willing to pay twice their current contributions to the Abota to improve 
the availability of drugs28. Approximately 74% of households in villages without Abota 
schemes stated that they would be willing to pay 2,000 P.G.(£0.55) or more as regular 
contributions if Abota was started in these villages.
As the CAM card could be purchased at any time of the year, payment schedules did not 
present a barrier to any household. It seems that monthly contributions would be 
incompatible with the pattern of cash flow in rural households and would discourage 
households from participating in schemes. In the Abota scheme the number of times 
prepayment contributions were collected in a year varied, some villages collected twice, 
others once. The frequency of payments was determined by the villages themselves, 
therefore it is reasonable to assume it was the most appropriate for the community.
The question asked was, "Would you agree to pay twice the current Abota contribution to permit the 
system to always have drugs available, Yes or No?".
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Financial performance
For the CAM, a public treatment rate of 0.91 per household per month and a mean value 
of drugs of 134.1 FBu per formal treatment, implies that an average household consumes 
1,464.4 FBu of outpatient drugs annually. The current price of the CAM card would 
therefore cover 34.1% of the drug costs. In practice, revenue from CAM does not appear 
to be used to purchase drugs or medical supplies required for patient care at the health 
centre. Although a potential for improving financial performance exists, because there is 
some willingness to pay a higher price for the CAM card on condition that more drugs 
become available at government facilities, the findings indicate a lack of financial viability. 
It is important to note that, even at the present price, significant numbers of households 
stated that they could not afford to purchase the CAM.
Adverse selection and moral hazard are major causes of inefficiencies in the functioning 
of health insurance schemes and therefore have consequences for financial viability (Arrow 
1963; Pauly 1963; Lohr et al 1986; Manning et al 1987). The study found evidence to 
suggest that both these problems may be contributing to the poor financial performance 
of the CAM. Adverse selection arises when insurance policy suppliers lack perfect 
information about the risk of individual insurees, or, on grounds of equity, offer insurance 
policies based on community rated premiums (uniform premiums based on the 
population's average expected probability of loss). The alternative is experience rated 
premiums in which individual probabilities are assessed and individuals are offered 
premiums accordingly. It is reasonable to consider the fixed price of the CAM card as 
an example of the former scenario - a community-rated premium. Where the insurance 
is voluntary, as in the case of CAM, the community rated premium discourages those of 
low risk from purchasing while making it attractive to high risk individuals. The resulting 
"selection" of high risk individuals increases the average expected loss for the insured 
population in subsequent periods. The outcome is an inadequate pool of funds that 
diminishes the scheme's financial viability. The percentage of eligible members belonging 
to the scheme is one proxy measure of the degree of adverse selection affecting the 
scheme. The theoretical analysis of the cause and consequence of adverse selection 
assumes that individuals have perfect knowledge of their illness risks and that they are not
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prevented from purchasing insurance by inadequate incomes. In reality, however, 
especially in a country of low per capita income such as Burundi, the household 
membership rate in the CAM may be less related to perceived or actual risks of requiring 
health care and determined significantly by affordability. Thus an assessment of adverse 
selection in the CAM requires consideration of both affordability and perceived illness 
risks. The frequency of illness episodes among CAM and non-CAM households was 
sought in an attempt to ascertain the degree of adverse selection. If a statistically 
significant higher rate of illness per person were to be found in the former group this 
suggest that individuals with higher risk had 'selected' themselves to participate in the 
scheme.
The rate of illness per person was found to be almost identical for members of CAM and 
non-CAM households and, therefore, adverse selection of individuals did not seem to be 
a likely problem. However, since larger households were more likely to purchase the 
CAM than smaller households, illness episodes per household were significantly greater 
for CAM households than for non-CAM households. This situation may be described as 
'adverse household selection' and results in a sub-optimal level of risk sharing among 
households.
Moral hazard occurs when individuals, once possessing full and fair insurance policies, 
lack the incentive to take actions that reduce the probability of the insured event 
occurring, or the loss associated with it. (A full insurance policy is one in which the loss 
resulting from the insured event, in this case illness, is exactly compensated for. A fair 
policy is one in which the premium is equal to the expected loss: probability of loss times 
the value of loss.) In the context of health insurance, moral hazard may lead an insured 
person to invest less in preventive health measures and to use more resources to treat 
illness. In the presence of third party payment, the individual lacks an incentive to contain 
the cost of health care, faces zero marginal costs at the point of consumption and, 
theoretically, may consume to the point of satiation. The outcome is rising rates of 
utilization with increasing per capita health care costs. In the study the utilization rates 
per episode of illness of CAM households compared to non-members was proposed as
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an indicator of the extent of moral hazard.
The formal treatment rate for CAM patients was over 50% higher than the non-CAM 
group and this suggests that moral hazard existed, assuming illness severity was equal for 
the two groups. It is, however, noteworthy that this rate may be higher for the CAM 
group because some government health centres gave incomplete treatments (inadequate 
volumes of medication for patients' weight or volume) that may have delayed recovery 
and/or required additional visits to collect remaining drugs. Households participating in 
the scheme were three times more likely to use government facilities than non CAM 
households. During the course of the research it became apparent that incomplete 
treatment was an acknowledged problem receiving the attention of the MOH.
In theory, it is also possible that the higher utilization among CAM households was the 
outcome of “supplier induced demand”, i.e. changes, especially increases, in the demand 
and consumption of health care by patients as a result of the actions of doctors or other 
health care providers. Health centres and hospitals are not reimbursed, either a flat fee per 
patient seen or a fee per service rendered, and therefore the scheme does not provide an 
incentive for suppliers to influence demand in this way. On the other hand, neither does 
the scheme appear to create strong incentives for efficient use of health care resources by 
the consumer or the provider. Currently the organizations retaining CAM revenues (the 
"commune" committees) are not required, either by national law or legally binding 
contracts, to fund all or substantial percentages of the care provided under the scheme in 
health centres. The committees, therefore, have no financial incentive to minimize or 
rationalize the use of health services by the insured population.
It is difficult to evaluate the relationships between premiums and benefits in the Abota 
scheme from the study findings. However, since many USBs were supplied with fewer 
drugs than they could purchase with their contribution and had cash returned to them by 
the MOH, it appeared that revenues were higher than the value of supplies available to 
participating individuals and households. Since, in the long term, this situation is likely 
to reduce the incentive to collect contributions, future revenue is likely to be less related
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to the supply needs.
THE FINDINGS OF THE GHANA FEASIBILITY STUDY 
Quality issues
The willingness to pay expressed by households in the study was conditional that the care 
provided by the insurance was of specific quality. If the health care currently provided by 
government health facilities in the district is not of this quality, demand for health 
insurance that relies on these facilities may be far less than suggested by the research 
findings. When the quality of care specified is compared with that currently thought 
appropriate by the Ministry of Health it is comparable. Therefore it is likely that the 
District Health Administration would receive support from headquarters to achieve it and 
therefore the demand would be as suggested by the findings. This support would be 
required to train health workers, purchase equipment and carry out infrastructure 
improvement to allow the desired quality to be attained within a reasonable period.
Factors influencing household contingent valuations
In the literature, the individual’s cut-off price (the maximum he or she is willing to pay) 
that guides him or her in deciding whether or not to purchase an insurance policy is 
usually absent from the data used in estimating the demand for insurance. For this 
reason the estimates are of models of discrete choices, that is, whether or not to purchase 
health insurance. Therefore, the continuous choice models estimated in this research are 
unique since the dependent variable is the amount consumers are willing to pay rather 
than their probability of purchasing an insurance policy. (Predictions about discrete 
choices were however obtained in chapter 8 where the percentage of households who 
would purchase cover types at different premiums was calculated using a non-econometric 
approach.)
WTP values represent the amounts of money consumers are willing and able to pay for 
the proposed insurance schemes. Some of the estimated results in this research may be 
explained by assuming that the “willingness to pay” component is influenced largely by
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perceptions of the risk and the ease of accessing the care offered under the insurance 
cover (ie distance from home to health facility). In turn, perception of the risk (the 
likelihood of requiring care and the expected expenditure involved) will be moderated by 
past illness and health expenditure experiences. The econometric finding for option a, 
that WTP is positively influenced by difficulties in paying fees in the past, appears to 
support the link between WTP for insurance and past health expenditure experiences, the 
latter possibly parallelling perceived risks. The findings that adults being perceived as 
healthy had a negative effect on WTP, may also be related to risk perception; household 
heads reasoned that healthy adults were less likely to be ill and therefore insurance would 
be of less value as the need for health care will be low.
A second plausible assumption regarding willingness and ability to pay for health 
insurance, one that may also explain the findings, is that the “ability to pay” component 
is largely governed by income. However, in all models explored the income coefficients 
were insignificant in explaining the variation in WTP values. A possible reason for this 
finding is that sex (being a male head of household) and education (secondary schooling 
and above), both significant positive determinants, displaced the stated income as a 
measure of the disposable income in the estimation. Another possible reason is that 
where income disparity in absolute terms is low, the income level may not be important 
in explaining variation in WTP among households. The literature describing participation 
in insurance schemes in rural areas in Africa with relatively uniform incomes supports this 
argument. The fact that willingness to pay is a Hicksian benefit measure and is therefore 
not distorted by income effects may also account in part for this finding (Pearce & Nash 
1989).
The lack of significance of income in regard to WTP contradicts the results of 
econometric estimation of the demand for private health insurance in the UK by Propper 
(1987). In her models, earned and unearned income had positive coefficients that were 
significant. The situation in the UK, however differs in several ways from that of the 
study area; in the former, private insurance is purchased in addition to compulsory 
national health insurance cover, absolute disparities in income levels are large and
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consumers have no experience of user fees. These differences may be responsible for the 
dissimilarity between the two studies with regard to the income results. The fact that the 
UK study was not based on contingent valuation may also have made the two studies 
fundamentally different and therefore not comparable.
The R squares in the Ghana study ranged from 0.35 to 0.45 for the OLS models estimated 
for WTP for adult and child health insurance with the characteristics described for option
a. The discrete nature of many of the explanatory variables meant that this was an 
expected finding. Nevertheless, the R square values were probably not higher partly 
because variables included in the equations as measures of risk aversion and of the 
demanders’ perception of differences in the care for insured and uninsured, were 
inadequate measures. It was not possible to conclude on the effect of including such 
variables because of the failure to obtain significant coefficients for those variables 
hypothesised to be possible proxies. For example current and past smoking of 
respondents were used as proxy for “risk loving” but were rejected as a determinant of 
WTP by all models.
In the analysis of variance of the models, the overall regression F test rejected the null 
hypothesis that there is no linear relationship between the WTP for option a and the 
independent variables included in the model. This was therefore further evidence, in 
addition to adjusted R squared values of the estimated models being close to the rule of 
thumb value for reliability, that the WTP observations were reliable.
One finding of the focus group discussions was a consensus that the official of an 
insurance association implemented in the study area should be involved in the 
management of the health facilities that provide care for its members. This suggests that 
the personnel structure and their authority within the Ministry of Health may influence the 
scheme’s acceptability to, and patronage by, the community. Ultimately it would 
therefore influence willingness to pay for insurance polices offered by the scheme. In the 
review of the literature of health insurance schemes for rural populations (chapter 5), the 
management structure was one specification dimension that seemed important in
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distinguishing different schemes and their outcomes. Consequently, it was not surprising 
that the management personnel of the hypothetical scheme and their functions were of 
concern to those in the discussion groups. Unexpectedly, there were no findings from the 
discussions about the government’s role in the operations of the insurance association and 
its transactions with the MOH. This may be an indication that the participants in the 
discussions did not envisage that the government would have a major role in the insurance 
scheme.
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Chapter 11: Conclusions and Policy Implications
INTRODUCTION
This chapter presents the major research conclusions relating to the demand for health 
insurance in the study countries and comments how they provide support for the research 
hypotheses. It also describes the policy implications of the research findings for health 
care financing in the study countries and in other Sub-Saharan African countries. Finally 
suggestions are made about future research that is required in this area.
The demand for health insurance in the study countries
The findings of this study support a number of statements about the demand for rural 
health insurance schemes in Ghana, Burundi and Guinea Bissau. The statements are based 
on the evidence from an Anglophone, a Francophone and Portuguese speaking country 
in west and east Africa. In addition, all three countries had a Gross National Product 
(GNP) per capita of $ 400 or less in 1991 and are currently classified as low income 
countries by the World Bank. Consequently, these statements are likely to be of general 
relevance for the health financing policies of other low income African countries. The 
statements concern risk attitudes towards health care and the compatibility of different 
scheme specifications. These statements are stated and briefly explained below.
* Households in rural areas do appear to be risk averse with regard to health care.
a) The contingent valuation study in Ghana found that almost all household heads 
(98%) would be willing to pay a premium to obtain health insurance cover for all 
persons in their households. (This high rate of acceptance is partly explained by 
the focus group discussion findings that households in Dangme West 
conceptualise health insurance as a solidarity association to deal with the risk 
associated with illness. Also they had previous experience of solidarity 
associations for other social needs.)
b) The study of CAM found that only 7% of households reported reasons for non 
participation in the scheme that might suggest "non risk averse" attitudes to
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illness. These reasons included "absence of worries about health care prices, 
because of good family health." Where households reported "not willing to lose 
money in the event of non-use", one interpretation could be that they have a low 
monetary evaluation of the risk involved in illness. A low evaluation would lead 
to unwillingness to pay a positive price to avert the risk and therefore would be 
consistent with a low demand for insurance. Only 11 (3.6%) of households fell 
into this category.
c) The Abota case study found that over 94% of the respondents in the household 
survey stated that they held a "good opinion" as opposed to "no opinion" or "bad 
opinion" about the Abota29. Only 8% of the households stated they would be 
unwilling to contribute were schemes to be established in their villages or nearby 
villages.
* There is significant latent demand for health insurance policies among some rural
populations in Africa.
a) The contingent valuation study in Ghana found that the median WTP per 
household ranged from c9,000 (£8.60) to c l5,000 (£14.30) for different cover 
options (Table 8.7).
b) A moderate rate of willingness to pay was found for the Abota scheme: 87% were 
willing to pay twice their current contributions to the Abota to improve the 
availability of drugs30 when mean contribution per household was 3,438 PG 
(approximately £0.92) collected once or twice a year. Approximately 74% of 
households in villages without Abota schemes stated that they would be willing 
to pay 2,000 PG (£0.55) or more as regular contributions.
c) In Burundi fifty four percent of households were either participating in the CAM 
at the time of the survey or had done so in the past. Forty-nine percent of 
households were willing to pay more than 1,000 FBu (3.7 US$), twice the card
It was the view of indigenous co- investigators that in the cultural context of the region such a 
qualitative measure of perceptions would be more valid than attempts to elicit more finely graded 
evaluations.
The question asked was, "Would you agree to pay twice the current Abota contribution to permit the 
system to always have drugs available, Yes or No?".
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fee at the time of the study, to improve the quality of care provided under the 
scheme.
* Proximity o f providing facility was an important factor in determining demand for
rural health insurance schemes.
a) In the WTP study in Ghana the effect of proximity possibly explains the relatively 
small difference in the mean WTP for inpatient cover at Battor Hospital, option 
b, and combined OPD at clinic /inpatient cover at Battor Hospital, option c. This 
difference was less than 50% of the WTP for OPD at the nearby clinic, option a. 
The WTP for option c was only 78% of the sum of mean WTP for options a and
b. This could be interpreted as indicating that once access to inpatient care is 
assured, OPD care becomes less valuable. However this explanation is in contrast 
with findings of the focus group discussions since participants stressed the 
importance of having basic and emergency care close to their homes. Rather, it 
may suggest that once they have access to nearby OPD care, inpatient care at a 
more distant hospital becomes less valuable.
b) In the Abota case study it was frequently communicated to the research team that 
having people in the village, who had been trained to give health care and 
medication, eliminated the need to walk long distances to government health 
centres to obtain treatment for common problems such as headaches and mild 
fevers.
*Monthly contributions are incompatible with the pattern o f cash flows in rural
households and would discourage households from participating in schemes.
a) In Dangme West the preferred schedule of payments was bi-annual (45%), and the 
least preferred monthly (7.0%).
b) In Burundi the consensus among women who took part in focus group discussions 
about the CAM was that it especially benefited poor farming households who 
could purchase a CAM card when cash was available from the sale of crops. 
When asked if they would be willing to purchase the cards at a specified time in 
the year to facilitate the purchase of drugs in larger amounts, and therefore
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cheaper unit prices by the government, they suggested July-August, the months 
corresponding to the end of the harvest.
* Collaboration between officials o f a health insurance association and those managing 
facilities providing health care to the insured persons was thought to be a desirable 
features o f a rural health insurance system.
This collaboration could be described as a “insurer-provider unions” and would permit 
local insurance associations to be involved in the management of government, and where 
applicable NGO, health facilities who contract to provide care to members of the 
associations. In Dangme-West one consensus from the focus group discussions was that 
close working relationship between the health insurance and the government and mission 
health facilities was necessary. Possibly respondents stated this because they believed that 
the incentives created would help to improve quality of care and encourage accountability.
SUPPORT FOR THE RESEARCH HYPOTHESES
The research sought to test two hypotheses, one relating to the effectiveness of schemes 
designed to provide health insurance cover for rural populations and the other concerned 
with the information required to make economic predictions about proposed schemes.
Findings relating to Hypothesis 1
* A community health insurance scheme in a developing Sub-Saharan African 
country can be effective in reducing the financial barriers faced by those who are 
most vulnerable, such as the poor, the chronically ill, the elderly and children, and 
be financially viable.
The two case studies of schemes in Africa, undertaken as part of the research, showed a 
willingness to pay for health insurance among rural populations. Financial performance 
and efficiency was low in both schemes because of inadequate and/or erratic supplies of 
inputs for the care of participating households. The outcome has been a low participation 
rate, partly explained by the perception of poor quality of care provided to the insured,
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in the Burundian scheme, and a reduction in the pace of operational evolution in the case 
of the Abota in Guinea Bissau. However, in both countries it was observed that the 
schemes performed effective social and equity functions. It is therefore concluded that 
where quality of care is perceived to be adequate, a community health insurance scheme 
in a developing Sub-Saharan African country can be effective in reducing the financial 
barriers faced by those who are most vulnerable, such as the poor, the chronically ill, the 
elderly and children, and be financially viable.
Findings related to Hypothesis 2
* The health care utilization pattern of rural households in a sub-district in Ghana, 
their stated preferences for insurance coverage and basic health facility cost data, 
can be used to forecast the relationship between premiums that households are 
willing and able to pay, and those premiums that will cover a given percentage of 
the costs of providing care for those households.
Community rated health insurance premiums that would recover 100% of the non-salary 
costs of providing outpatient and/or inpatient care in a mission hospital in Ghana for the 
study population have been estimated (“cost recovery” premiums). The “cost recovery” 
premium for inpatient cover only was 12% of the mean WTP of households for this 
option. For combined outpatient and inpatient cover the cost recovery premium was 18% 
of the mean contributions that households were willing to make for this benefit, and 80% 
of households would be able and willing to contribute this premium.
REALIZATION OF RESEARCH OBJECTIVES
Original research objectives achieved
The research had two main aims; a) to assess the social and financial performance of the 
two schemes selected and b) to assess willingness to pay for and the revenue outcome of 
a proposed health insurance in a rural area in Ghana. Both aims were met and the 
following specific objectives were also achieved:
* The affordability of premiums charged by two schemes studied empirically were
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evaluated and found to be moderate, as judged by the level of participation and the 
willingness to increase contributions to improve the quality of care provided under 
the insurance scheme.
* The payment schedules for the two schemes were found to be appropriate for 
target populations most of whom were households living in the rural areas.
* The relationships between the premium revenue and benefits expenditure was 
successfully carried out for one scheme studied, CAM. (The literature review also 
provided information on the relation between insurance revenue and expenditure 
for other rural schemes.)
* The extent of adverse selection and moral hazard was assessed with varying 
degrees of success for the two schemes CAM and Abota.
* The preferred specifications of community-based risk sharing for health care and 
the “Willingness to Pay” - WTP was determined for households in a rural sub­
district in Ghana.
* The community risks (calculated as the proportions of the population in the study 
area who would seek western type health care during the dry season and the wet 
season, for serious and mild illness, if such care were physically accessible and 
affordable) was estimated for the households in the Ghana study.
* Average costs for outpatient and inpatient episodes in health facilities preferred 
by households in the study area were calculated.
* Using different approaches, two sets of fair community rated premiums were 
estimated for the Ghana household sample.
Additional objectives achieved
Another achievement of the study was that the evaluation of the Abota, by combining 
qualitative and quantitative methods, explored the links between the effectiveness of the 
scheme, participatory development, aspects of the indigenous culture, and institutional 
development. This was not an original objective of the research. However the Abota 
study findings highlighted some contractual and managerial problems that may face locally 
controlled health insurance schemes in rural areas. It appeared that cultural norms have 
influenced and are being reinforced by the Abota system suggesting that local cultures
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have central roles in determining the structure and functions of participatory development 
approaches. Furthermore, the historical background and status of the Abota system 
illustrate that grassroots initiatives in development may be assimilated into sustainable 
social institutions through a learning process.
Objectives not achieved
One objective that the research failed to achieve successfully was to assess objectively 
changes in the population’s access to health care resulting from the schemes studied. 
Rather it came to conclusions in the CAM study that females considered the insurance to 
be of particular value to them. They indicated that the schemes had increased their access 
to health care once their husbands could be convinced to purchase the CAM card. 
Similarly the issue of external subsidy from government and/or donor agencies that may 
be required to make the preferred schemes financially viable in Ghana was only addressed 
indirectly and not comprehensively.
Following the literature review, one research question that was identified was; were there 
household variables that could be used to predict WTP? Even though the objectives of 
this research were not intended to address this question, models of WTP were estimated 
using econometric techniques of analysis. This made it possible to search for such 
variables. The analysis demonstrated relationships between the WTP for option (a) and 
some independent variables collected by the household survey; therefore collectively these 
variables could have met the need for efficient predictors. However, health planners 
would probably find it difficult to use these variables to predict the WTP of populations 
targeted to receive health insurance. This was largely because many of them, for example 
difficulties in paying fees, can only be measured using a time-consuming household survey 
similar to that used in this research. Nevertheless, since the present study and 
econometric estimations were preliminary, future research may be identify variables that 
are more useful in this respect.
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POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF THE RESEARCH FOR THE CAM AND THE ABOTA
Improving financial performance of the CAM
The low level of risk-sharing among households arising from 'adverse household 
selection', the low membership fee (price of card) and low membership rate of 23% of 
households appeared to be the reasons for CAM's poor financial performance. Therefore 
measures to increase the participation of households that have few members would have 
helped to increase the level of risk-sharing and total revenue. In addition, funds external 
to the CAM scheme could have been sought as 'seed money' to permit improvements in 
the quality and efficiency of the services provided by the government under the CAM 
scheme. A significant increase in the funds available to the health centre could also have 
been achieved if the government required communes to use all, or a large percentage of 
the revenue from CAM and user charges for health care provision at the health centre 
level. The funds could be used not only to purchase an initial adequate quantity of drugs, 
but also to implement in-service training schemes for health workers in clinical practice. 
Training could usefully include rational prescribing, in order to eliminate the problem of 
incomplete drug treatments, and patient-sensitive consulting. It is likely that such 
measures would have significantly improved the financial performance of the scheme by 
encouraging membership of households who either withdrew or never purchased CAM 
cards because of the poor quality of care provided by government facilities. Improved 
quality may then pave the way for moderate increases in the price of the CAM.
Improving health care provided bv the Abota
Under the contracts that governed the Abota system, the government had specific 
obligations to the villages, including training and supervising village health workers and 
supplying essential drugs. Chabot and Waddington (1987) argue that these commitments 
involve substantial recurrent and capital investments by the Government. They show that 
much of the capital investment in this approach is associated with start-up training, and 
the purchase of vehicles and equipment of relatively short life span, and that reinvestment 
is therefore required as frequently as every four to five years. At the time of the study 
funds for both recurrent and capital expenditures had declined, and the Government is
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experiencing difficulties in meeting these obligations fully. There was, therefore, the need 
for USBs to have had access to other providers. For several years prior to the study, 
NGOs, such as GVC, had been providing support services to the Abota system, especially 
where government health workers were constrained by lack of resources.
Following evaluations such as that by the joint WHO/UNICEF and Netherlands 
Government team which stressed the need to improve training and supervision of village 
health workers, both the MOH and NGOs responded by intensified activities in these 
areas. However, in most cases, procurement of drugs has continued to be tied to the 
Ministry of Health drug supply system. It would have been helpful if BI inputs had been 
available for the USBs to purchase at a subsidized rate. This would have improved the 
supply of essential drugs at the village level and also helped to functionally integrate the 
village level community financing and the Bamako Initiative in the region.
POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF THE RESEARCH FOR GHANA
Compatible scheme specifications and sustainability of scheme 
The population in the study expressed a strong demand for health insurance policies 
provided by a community health insurance scheme. The following scheme specifications 
would be compatible with their stated preferences, willingness to pay and the illness 
experience of individuals in this population.
a Three cover options
i) OPD and emergency care at sub-district health facilities (health centres)
ii) inpatient care at the district hospital (initially to be provided at Battor 
hospital until a district hospital is established)
iii) OPD/emergency care at health centres and inpatient care at the district 
hospital
b Household contributions paid bi-annually, following the harvesting
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c Scheme operated and managed by a local health insurance association
d Community rated premiums set to recover non-salary costs of providing care to
association members and loaded by approximately 10% to fund administrative 
costs.
The sustainability of the above specified scheme has yet to be tested using simulation 
models or action research. However, to date, the research has produced substantial 
qualitative and quantitative evidence suggesting that the preferred insurance scheme will 
be financially viable and effective. The specific findings that support the feasibility of a 
community insurance scheme in this locality are as follows.
a Given the health care utilization pattern of the study population rate, the premiums
that household heads state they are willing and able to pay will recover 100% of 
non-salary cost to the Ministry of Health in providing care, even when allowance 
is made for increased utilization arising from moral hazard.
b Due to the solidarity nature of the scheme, its managers will not be paid
salaries/wages and individual bills will not be required for patients who receive 
care at the association funded facilities. It is therefore envisaged that the major 
administrative cost will be the provision of membership/payment cards and will be 
relatively low.
c Approximately 80% of households expressed a positive demand for insurance that
covered health treatments at a nearby health facility.
d The contributions that households were willing to pay were dependent on the
insurance plans giving access to health care of acceptable quality. The quality 
levels described are attainable using the injection of moderate external "seed 
money" to upgrade 4 health centres and 4-6 community clinics.
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e The consensus during the focus group discussions was that a close relationship 
between the elected managers of the health insurance association and health 
facility staff would ensure efficiency and accountability.
Support Programme for a Health Insurance Association
From the research findings it is possible to recommend that a programme be implemented 
to support the preparation period (12 months), and the first 24 months of operation, of 
a community insurance initiative in Dangme-West. Through the programme, technical 
assistance should be provided to:
a) support the communities in Dangme-West to form a legally recognized Dangme- 
West Health Insurance Association (DWHIA);
b) enable MOH Greater Accra Region, in collaboration with DWHIA, to specify in 
more detail appropriate coverage/premium options;
c) support MOH Greater Accra Region to introduce, into its financial management 
system, procedures for administering insurance contracts between MOH facilities 
and DWHIA; and
d) assist MOH and DWHIA to plan and execute upgrading of the existing 4 health 
centres and 4-6 selected community clinics, to provide the quality and distribution 
of health care demanded by the local population.
Other districts should be encouraged to explore the preferences of households for different 
forms of community financing using focus group discussion techniques similar to those 
developed for the work in the study district. Where preferences for insurance are found 
to be significant, a simplified version of the research protocol could be made available to 
districts to enable them to assess the feasibility of, and financial and managerial 
requirements for, a health insurance association.
Administrative and financial management capacity
The administration of the recommended scheme is probably within the capacity and 
experience of the consumer in the district because of the experience with saving groups 
and associations, the functioning of clans that are common in Ghana. Also in recent years
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the local political organization and the district assembly structure has exposed the 
population to formal collective decision making and public accountability. Nevertheless, 
training of officials of the health association will help it to operate efficiently.
For the insurance funds to improve the district health service the existing budgeting, 
accounting procedures and financial information systems must be strengthened. This is 
especially true because the Ministry of Health’s financial systems have been slow to keep 
pace with the strengthening of the capacity and capability and authority of the district 
health management teams. In the recent past budgets often did not encompass all sources 
of income and do not always reflect priority activities (Marshall 1992). Some minor 
modification of the existing financial monitoring process will be required (with the 
approval of the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning and the Accountant General’s 
Office) to ensure that the health insurance revenue is properly accounted for. The 
collection of premium funds from the health insurance association must be included in the 
internal audit system. In addition the funds must be readily available to be used for 
purchases that will ensure improved health care provision to the insured population.
Institutionalization of the insurance scheme
Although the 3 year support for a rural health insurance scheme recommended above 
would be important in providing the administrative and technical foundations of the 
scheme, in the long term the sustainability of its structure is likely to be one which is 
determined by the process of Institutionalization. The case study of the Abota revealed 
that institutionalization was important and that it involved a lengthy process of local 
innovations, political lobbying and geographical expansion. The process permitted 
individual communities to develop a financing system that they regarded as appropriate 
to local conditions, taking into account their administrative capacities and the seasonal 
availability of cash, and the prevailing cultural norms on collectivism. This would have 
been less likely if Abota had started as a detailed project proposal developed by what 
Chambers refers to as a “normal professional” (Chambers 1986). Development initiatives 
that have detailed plans at the onset provide limited opportunities for communities to 
participate fully. Therefore, it will be important that support facilitates the roles of the
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community and the MOH in adapting recommendations. It should not be the aim to steer 
the parties involved towards a scheme that conforms to a predetermined blueprint.
Participation, as used here, refers to a “process of empowerment of the deprived and the 
isolated” (Ghai 1988), and implies increasing the ability of social groups to exercise 
economic and political power and to make private and public decisions. It appears that 
community involvement in the Abota extended beyond the mobilization of local material 
and labour resources, mainly because the initiative from which it emerged did not follow 
a detailed project blueprint. This permitted the community to be empowered and to 
assume managerial and planning roles through a learning process.
Even so, community participation did not extend to the control of individuals and 
procedures involved in the purchasing of inputs for the USB. Instead, staff of health 
centres and sectoral hospitals acted as procurement agents, and received money from 
individual village Abota schemes to purchase and deliver inputs. Delays and supply 
failures sometimes originated from these elements of the system that were beyond the 
control of the village committees. The recommendation of a joint WHO/UNICEF and 
Netherlands government team charged to draw up a Bamako Initiative plan of action in 
1991, included establishing health (management) committees in each health zone. It was 
suggested that representatives of the Abota villages, including their health workers, 
would serve on this committee along with health centre and hospital staff. This type of 
committee would permit the Abota villages to increase their control of hands, procedures 
and individuals involved in the purchase of essential drugs and other inputs. Perhaps such 
an approach in Ghana would help ensure consumer participation and the acceptance of the 
scheme as social institutions.
RHIAs and the national health strategy
The above recommendations are compatible with the health strategy currently being 
pursued by Ghana. Firstly, Ghana endorsed the principle of "cost-sharing" for health care 
in 1971, with the introduction of government hospital and clinic fees. The Government 
has in recent years stated its desire to include insurance in its health financing strategy
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(several health insurance feasibility studies have been commissioned by the MOH since 
1985). RHIA would complement schemes implemented for those employed in the formal 
or semi-formal sectors. Secondly, recent changes, including plans to contract out non- 
clinical services of government facilities, such as catering and laundry, imply that the 
government wishes to encourage partnership with the private for profit and the non­
government sectors in the provision of health care in government facilities. The health 
insurance associations would be acting as local “block purchasers” of health care from 
government health facilities, and would also represent private partners in the financing of 
health care. An advantage of this arrangement is that it would lead to greater 
accountability of service providers to local consumers. Thirdly, the promotion of the sub- 
district facilities staffed by lower cadres of health professionals is also one of the current 
policies of the MOH.
POLICY IMPLICATIONS FOR OTHER SUB-SAHARAN AFRICAN COUNTRIES
Rural health insurance is a community financing option that has largely been ignored in 
the debate on health financing in Africa. The research findings suggest that some African 
communities prefer community health financing strategies that are based on an insurance 
mechanism, rather than those based on fee-for-service at the point of use. Their 
willingness and ability to pay for their preferred insurance covers was found to be high. 
In two Sub-Saharan African countries, innovative schemes have already been reasonably 
effective in reducing the financial barriers faced by rural households when seeking health 
care.
As already discussed, the common conjecture that health insurance schemes for rural 
populations in Africa would not be feasible, appears to be based on the following 
assumptions: (i) there is no preference or demand for health insurance among these 
populations, (demand is used in the economic sense of being the willingness and ability 
to pay for goods or services); and (ii) schemes would require management structures 
similar to those employed by Western health insurance systems. The research conclusion, 
based on evidence from West and East Africa (an Anglophone country, a Francophone
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country and a Portuguese speaking country), is that in a number of low income African 
countries there is significant economic demand for health insurance among rural 
households. The demand is adequate to permit schemes to harness vital private funds for 
the health care sector and to reduce the financial barrier faced by vulnerable groups to 
obtaining health care.
The second assumption concerning the administration requirement of a rural health 
insurance scheme, ie that schemes require management structures similar to those 
employed by western health insurance systems, would only be true if schemes were to be 
modelled on conventional health insurance. The latter schemes, found in Europe and 
North and Central America, are designed to cater largely for waged/salaried workers and 
therefore premiums are collected monthly or weekly. The administrative networks 
required to collect monthly insurance premiums from rural populations and manage 
individual claims are nonexistent in many African countries. (In any case, as already 
discussed, many rural households would not have regular cash incomes to permit them to 
make contributions throughout the year). Therefore it is reasonable to predict that in the 
foreseeable future, it is unlikely that either centralised government or large commercial 
schemes, as found in rich countries, can provide near-universal health insurance cover for 
people in Africa. The schemes studied in the case studies described in Chapter 4 are 
examples where the principle of “appropriate socio-technology” has been applied in the 
design of administration and management structures. Both schemes are administered by 
relatively few government officials at central levels and they rely mainly on local 
management by the community.
Another example of an “appropriate” insurance administration structure that may be 
feasible in the current socio-economic context of Sub-Saharan Africa, is 'local health 
insurance associations that contract with and/or co-finance providers of health care in their 
localities'. This structure was suggested by household heads who took part in the focus 
group discussions in Ghana.
The studies cited above also provide preliminary observations and conclusions on
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organizational and socio-anthropological issues in relation to insurance schemes in rural 
Africa. It is crucial that such evidence informs the policy debate among African countries 
and donor organizations seeking to promote sustainable and accessible health care 
services. Otherwise rural health insurance will continue to be dismissed and the 
possibilities for raising revenue for health without greatly decreasing access will remain 
unexplored.
The findings in Guinea Bissau exemplify that to maintain the effectiveness of decentralised 
and community controlled schemes, continuous appraisals of their contractual 
arrangements with both public sector and non-public private organizations may be 
necessary. In addition, the adoption of a learning process approach, in which the overall 
structure of community financing has evolved over time on the basis of experience, was 
found to be an important and distinctive feature of the Abota system.
To reject the option of rural health insurance because quality of services would be poor 
is not justifiable. Poor quality is not inherent to, nor is it confined to, health insurance. 
It has also contributed to low utilization and poor cost recovery rates where financing has 
depended on user fees. Poor quality is a symptom of the underlying economic malaise 
that requires consumers in Africa to fund government health services directly, as well as 
through their contributions to general tax revenue. All things being equal, the returns, in 
terms of improved access to health care would be higher if resources are used to improve 
quality of care within an insurance -financed system rather than one financed by user fees.
FUTURE RESEARCH
Operational Research on the process and outcome of a pilot district rural insurance 
scheme
The feasibility study component of this research, undertaken in Osuduku health area in 
Ghana, has produced detailed base line data on morbidity, health care expenditure and 
consumer perception about the quality of locally available health care. Therefore, if the 
recommended rural health insurance scheme is implemented in this study district it will
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be possible to carry out a “before and after” study of the impact of the scheme on 
efficiency and equity of the health care system. The indicators of health sector efficiency 
and equity influenced by health insurance include cost escalation, resource allocation, the 
use of specific medical technologies and equity of access to services (Kutzin & Bamum 
1992). The benefit type, the role of the insuring organization with respect to financing 
and health care provision and the system of reimbursing providers or patient are 
institutional characteristics of insurance schemes that will affect these indicators. A 
“before and after” study could evaluate changes in these efficiency and equity indicators 
and analyse the role of institutional characteristics of the pilot scheme in producing the 
observed changes. This would provide policy makers with information needed to improve 
the scheme and expand to other districts in Ghana.
If a rural health insurance scheme is voluntary, problems of ‘adverse household selection’ 
revealed by CAM case study may occur. Consequently, it may be advisable to base 
projections of the health care utilization rate (used to calculate premiums and government 
subsidies for such voluntary schemes) on illness rates of households that are likely to 
participate, rather than the entire household population. Operational research may 
therefore be required to monitor the size, composition and income of such households as 
soon as schemes are implemented. The estimates of the affordable contributions per 
household and the level of subsidies required from government and/or donors to fund the 
proposed benefits could then be revised at the appropriate intervals.
Research on the role of governments and capital markets in rural health insurance 
associations
When considering the operation and regulation of insurance contracts, a number of 
questions arise. They include: what is the appropriate quality of insurance to be 
stimulated by government? As in the developed countries, guarantees and/or regulatory 
legislation by the government will probably be necessary to ensure consumer trust in the 
solvency and integrity of the schemes. However the mechanisms for government 
regulation may need to be different from those in developing countries and research could 
be used develop the framework for designing the appropriate mechanisms.
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Another relevant question in this regard is; are capital markets, either local or external, 
likely to support rural health insurance schemes through the provision of reserve funds 
and/or reinsurance? The importance of capital markets in a given country is likely to be 
influenced by the level of public subsidy of health care provided to the insured but 
research could be useful in demonstrating the short and long term consequences of 
involving the private sector (both for profit and not for profit). Such research would also 
need to investigate the Government's role in regulating and funding schemes that depend 
on private capital for reserve funds as compared to those that do not.
Econometric research on modelling WTP
The econometric estimations in this research provide decision makers only with pointers 
about the relationship between WTP and household factors in a rural African setting. This 
is because independent variables collected by the household survey alone did not appear 
to be efficient predictors of WTP. Policy decisions about the feasibility of proposed rural 
insurance schemes would have found such predictors of value. Research into the methods 
of measuring risk attitudes might in future make it possible for econometric modelling of 
WTP to be more useful to health planners and policy makers in the future. It is 
noteworthy that the stated annual household income was not statistically a significant 
determinant of WTP, suggesting that establishing household incomes may not be vital in 
rural health insurance feasibility studies. (In any case estimating household incomes in 
rural areas is often problematic.)
Research on adverse selection arising from AIDS patients among target population 
Although moral hazard did not appear to be a problem in the two health insurance 
schemes studied in depth by the research and appeared not to be a major issue in the 
literature about schemes for rural households, adverse selection in one form or another 
appeared significant. In the CAM, larger households were more likely to have CAM cards 
than smaller households. In the Nkoranza Health Insurance Scheme it was estimated that 
19% of admissions among the insured would not have occurred in its absence and the 
available evidence suggested that part of the increase in utilization was due to adverse 
selection and that this was the major cause of the scheme’s expenditure exceeding its
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revenue.
A high prevalence of chronic health problems among an insured population will increase 
the likelihood of adverse selection. In the past sickle cell disease was the major chronic 
condition in Sub-Saharan Africa, but in recent years AIDS and associated conditions such 
as TB have become the common cause of chronic disease consuming high proportions of 
health resources. Three main types of costs are associated with management of AIDS and 
HTV: 1) direct treatment costs; 2) public health costs such as blood screening, promoting 
health life styles and research and 3) indirect costs ie. loss of income due to morbidity and 
mortality (Foster & Lucas 1991). Chela and co-workers found that the treatment of HIV- 
positive patients was more costly than HIV-negative patients in rural Zambia (Chela et 
al 1989). Likewise, a study of a random sample of 251 inpatients admitted to the medical 
wards of a hospital in Kinshasa, Zaire found the direct costs of illness were higher for 
HIV-positive patients ($170 vs $110) (Hassig et al 1990). With increasing numbers and 
improvements in treatment these costs are expected to escalate.
Given the likelihood of adverse selection, as the numbers of HIV and AIDS patients 
increase, the higher costs associated with their medical care will further threaten the 
financial viability of schemes as the Nkoranza Health Insurance Scheme or the 
recommended Dangbe scheme. (Recent estimates for the national prevalence of HIV for 
Ghana are high (2% by GTZ). In theory households that expect to have high health costs 
because of the poor health status of one or more of their members will be especially 
motivated to participate in the health insurance scheme. Some research will be required 
to investigate the distribution and characteristics of high-expenditure patients among the 
insured and non-insured population, in particular those with HIV and evaluate the impact 
of HTV, patients and other high -expenditure patients on the financial performance of the 
scheme. The findings will provide crucial policy information for the managers of the 
Nkoranza Scheme and the Ministry of Health in Ghana.
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SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
In conclusion, the schemes described in this thesis identified some "appropriate 
technology" solutions to the problem of how to promote sustainable and accessible health 
care in Africa. Furthermore it found evidence from socioeconomic evaluations of three 
health insurance schemes in Sub-Saharan Africa that suggest, were quality of care 
provided to the insured perceived by them to be adequate, appropriately designed rural 
health insurance in some African countries would reduce financial concerns faced by 
people at the time of illness. It would also raise significant revenue. By improving 
quality, coverage and efficiency, health insurance would contribute to fulfilling the 
primary goals of health sector reform in Africa.
Within the last 10 years some African countries have already experimented with rural 
health insurance schemes that cater for rural communities; these countries include 
Burundi, Ghana, Guinea Bissau, Zambia and Zaire. These countries will benefit from 
technical assistance to monitor, evaluate and improve these schemes, and in the future 
undoubtedly more countries will wish to initiate similar schemes. It is hoped that the 
achievements and weakness of the Abota village system and the CAM card scheme, 
documented in this research, will inform the policy discussions among African countries 
and donor organizations seeking to promote sustainable community financing schemes in 
the sub-region. The methodology developed in this research may also be developed 
further, tested and adapted to provide locality specific information upon which to base 
decisions in different countries and regions.
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THE HEALTH CARD INSURANCE SCHEME IN BURUNDI: 
A SOCIAL ASSET OR A NON-VIABLE VENTURE?
D y n a  C .  A r h i n
Health Policy Unit, Department of Public Health and Policy, London School of Hygiene and Tropical 
Medicine, Keppel Street, London WC1E7HT, England
Abstract—La Carte d'Assurance Maladie (CAM) is a national health card insurance scheme implemented 
by the government of Burundi since 1984. Focus group discussions, a household survey, and a 
retrospective outpatient survey were used in 1992 to assess its financial and social performance in Muyinga 
Province. The study showed that although the revenue from premiums was insufficient to fund even the 
recurrent costs of outpatient drugs consumed by participating households (the current price of the CAM 
card would cover approx. 34% of the outpatient drug costs), the scheme performed a valuable social equity 
function. Women reported that they had little access to cash and that CAM, by eliminating cash payments 
at the point of use, empowered them to decide the need for, and timing of, health care consumption by 
household members without consulting male household heads. Other findings suggested that the schemes 
financial performance was poor because current membership was low (23% of households) and, more 
importantly, households with relatively high risks dominated the scheme ('adverse household selection’), 
making risk-sharing sub-optimal. The author concludes that improvements in the quality of care, in 
particular increased drug availability and higher standards of prescribing by health workers, would 
encourage the participation of ‘lower risk' households, many of whom did not have a valid CAM because 
they judged the quality of care provided under the scheme to be inadequate. A policy obliging communes 
(local governments) to use the greater part of the scheme’s revenue, initially supplemented by external ‘seed 
money’, to fund services at the health centres would facilitate these improvements. It is envisaged that 
improved quality would also lead to increased revenue and therefore, greater financial viability, by paving 
the way for moderate increases in the price of the card.
K ey words—health, insurance, social equity, Burundi
I N T R O D U C T I O N
Sector restructuring programmes are common 
features of the economic reforms of many countries 
in sub-Saharan Africa. In the health sector, the aims 
of these reforms invariably include to rationalize 
budgeting, financing and management practices in 
order to improve efficiency, coverage and quality of 
health services. The reform packages in most cases 
have decentralisation and community financing as 
core components. Consequently, one of the 
challenges facing these developing countries is to 
organise community financing in a manner that does 
not deter poor and vulnerable groups from seeking 
health care. In most cases this is a formidable task 
because of the generalised nature of poverty in the 
sub-region.
Local health insurance is one in a portfolio of 
available options to promote community involve­
ment in health financing while maintaining access to 
free, or virtually free, health care at the time of illness. 
It also has the potential to foster decentralisation. To 
ensure health insurance coverage for the majority of 
people in rural Africa, schemes must be capable of 
accommodating individuals and households that 
have irregular and/or seasonal cash incomes. There­
fore, schemes cannot be modelled on conventional
health insurance schemes that cater largely for 
waged/salaried workers in Europe and North 
America. Rather, lessons should be drawn from the 
few innovative health insurance schemes currently 
functioning in sub-Saharan Africa. Analytical studies 
of these schemes would provide insights into policy 
relevant issues such as the affordability of premiums, 
the appropriateness of payment schedules, the 
relationships between premiums and benefits, and 
the resulting level of access to health care among the 
population. To date only a few studies in the sub- 
region have addressed some of these questions in 
relation to risk sharing schemes for rural populations. 
They include the evaluations of the Abota village 
insurance scheme in Guinea-Bissau [1-3] and hospital 
pre-payment in Zaire [4]. The broad aim of this case 
study of La Carte D’Assurance Maladie (CAM) in 
Burundi, was to contribute to current knowledge on 
this subject.
La Carte d’Assurance Maladie is a national health 
card insurance scheme implemented by the govern­
ment of Burundi since 1984. Purchase of a CAM card 
by a household entitles its members (restricted to two 
adults and all children below 18 years) to free health 
care at all public health facilities. The card is sold at 
a fixed price irrespective of the household size 
[in June 1992, the price of the card was 500 FBu (1.85
861
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U.S.S)]. Persons without cards are required to pay 
user charges for government health care. The level of 
user charge per episode of illness treated is 
determined by the health worker at his or her discre­
tion and generally varies with the age of the patient 
and the quantity and type of treatment received. All 
health services provided by the government are 
covered by the CAM scheme and therefore, in theory, 
CAM card holders who seek health care at 
government facilities should not incur out o f pocket 
expenses. However, due to the shortage of drugs and 
other inputs, CAM holders, like fee paying patients, 
are sometimes given prescriptions to purchase drugs 
on the open market. The names of household 
members entitled to use a card are written on the card 
at the time of purchase, making it difficult for it to be 
used by individuals from other households. The card 
is valid for one year and may be purchased from a 
community representative at any time of the year. 
This makes it possible for a non-CAM patient to pay 
a user charge at a health centre and on referral to a 
hospital, to purchase a CAM card in order to obtain 
free hospital care. The cards are not accepted by 
non-government health facilities, such as mission and 
for-profit clinics and hospitals.
The revenues from CAM card sales and user 
charges are retained by the ‘commune’ committees 
(the ‘commune’ is the lowest level o f local adminis­
tration in the country). These committees have some 
financial responsibilities for the health centres in their 
localities and are expected to fund recurrent expendi­
tures, such as stationery, fuel for refrigerators and 
linen, and in some cases capital projects such as 
construction o f new health centres. However, 
revenues from CAM and user charges are not 
designated to be used in the provision of health care 
and therefore in practice only a small fraction is 
allocated by communes to health. In 1990 8% of the 
revenues of communes in Muyinga Province came 
from the sale of CAM cards, whereas an average of 
only 1% of commune revenues were used to finance 
health care [5]. Health worker salaries and drug costs 
are funded by the government through the Ministry 
of Health’s budget.
F U N C T I O N S  O F  A  H E A L T H  I N S U R A N C E  S C H E M E  
Financial function
The approach used in the study is underpinned by 
the assumption that a health insurance scheme has 
two prime functions that merit separate consider­
ation, although they are intrinsically linked. The first 
is a financial function: to provide a pool o f funds to 
cover all, or (in government subsidized schemes) part, 
o f the cost o f health care for those who contribute to 
the pool; and to encourage providers and consumers 
to use health services in a cost-effective manner. 
Schemes that perform well financially by raising 
adequate revenues from insurer contributions to 
cover a high percentage of the costs of care provision.
plus all administrative costs, will provide meaningful 
additional funds for the health sector. On the other 
hand schemes may have poor financial viability 
because o f an excess of high risk members in the 
scheme (adverse selection), or as a consequence of 
levying an inadequate premium relative to the health 
care needs of the insured population. Finally, a 
scheme may be unable to fund the health care claimed 
by its insured because they make excess demands as 
a response to being insured (moral hazard).
The study sought to assess CAM ’s financial 
strengths and weakness. In particular to determine 
the existence o f adverse selection and moral hazard 
by establishing whether differences existed in the 
illness rates and utilization rates per episode of illness 
among individuals in households that participated in 
the scheme and households that did not. Another 
specific objective was to estimate the ratio of revenue 
to expenditure by determining the relationship be­
tween the average annual value of drugs obtained per 
participating household from public health facilities, 
and the annual cost of membership in the scheme. 
The study assumes that the percentage o f the drug 
costs covered by CAM revenue is central to the 
scheme’s financial performance. The rationale for this 
approach is that drug expenditure forms a major cost 
item in the provision of primary level care and 
therefore the ability of an insurance/prepayment 
scheme to fund drug supplies adequately will provide 
some indication of its level of financial viability; in 
addition community financing of drugs used at the 
local level is increasingly becoming a part o f the 
health financing strategics of developing countries. 
Although at the time of CAM 's inception it was not 
an objective to raise funds to cover drug purchases at 
the health centres, at the time o f the study the 
Ministry o f Health was exploring the potential of 
CAM to cover drug costs of government health 
centres in the future. The final specific objective with 
regard to financial function was to evaluate the 
potential for improved financial performance by 
considering household health expenditures and the 
willingness of heads of households to pay higher 
prices for membership of the CAM, if services were 
improved.
Social function
The second prime function o f a health insurance 
scheme is social, including social equity. It is to 
remove financial barriers to obtaining health care at 
the time of illness for the vulnerable groups in society, 
i.e. the very young and elderly, and the chronically ill. 
Many of these persons are also in the low income 
groups and/or require expensive health care. This 
social function is achieved through the subsidization 
o f the cost of caring for some individuals in the 
society by those who have lower risks, i.e. the wealthy 
and more healthy. This may be regarded as redistri­
bution of effective income. Thus a health insurance 
scheme promotes social equity because individuals
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who have equal health care needs, ‘need’ being 
defined as the capacity to benefit from care, arc 
assisted to obtain comparable care irrespective of 
their economic status. All members participating in 
the insurance scheme benefit from removal of the 
uncertainty about wealth or income arising from 
health care expenditure. In addition to providing 
private benefits to participating individuals, health 
insurance also increases overall social welfare by 
promoting the optimal consumption of health care 
and thus maximizing the resulting positive externali­
ties. A scheme may fail to perform its financial 
function adequately as a consequence of low partici­
pation of individuals of low risk (adverse selection) 
and high income, thus minimizing its impact on the 
distribution of effective incomes and making it im­
possible for it to perform the equity function of 
reducing the financial barrier to the disadvantaged 
when seeking health care. Financially non-viable 
schemes may, however, be assisted by government 
subsidies to have an impact on the levels of financial 
concerns faced by the poor at the time of illness, and 
thus still provide a valuable social function.
The study focuses on whether CAM improves the 
access of women and children to prompt health care. 
It was assumed that women and children had higher 
risks and less access to money, and therefore if the 
CAM affected their health care utilization favourably 
it was performing a positive social function. The 
specific objectives of the study relating to social 
benefits of the scheme were: to determine the percep­
tions of heads of households about the benefits of 
participating in the scheme; and to ascertain the effect 
of the scheme on the access of women and children 
to health care.
D a ta  co llec tion
A household survey was used to obtain 
information on illness occurrence in the month 
preceding the study, perceptions about the value of 
the health card insurance scheme and willingness to 
pay for membership from 300 households in Muyinga 
Province. Fifty ‘collines’ were randomly selected with 
probability proportional to population (1990 data) 
from 259 collines in the province. (A colline is a rural 
community commonly located on hill tops. Several 
collines form a sector administered by a Sector Chief, 
and several sectors form a commune governed by a 
committee, responsible for local development 
activities.) In each colline 6 households were 
randomly selected and the head of household 
interviewed by local college students trained to 
administer the questionnaire by the research team.
Four focus group discussions were conducted (the 
number was determined by time and resource 
availability). Three were held among farming women 
in rural collines and the fourth was held in Muyinga 
town. The collines were randomly chosen among 
approx. 50 of the collines that had local women’s 
credit associations. On arrival at the collines the
study team either randomly selected a group of 7-12 
women working in a field or women living in a cluster 
of houses randomly selected, and the women were 
invited to participate in discussion held in the local 
language, Kirundi. All those invited agreed to be 
members of the groups. The main question debated 
was “Has the card insurance scheme increased the 
access of women and children to health care?" The 
women’s general perception of the health insurance 
card scheme was the starting point of each of the 
discussions. Although women of widely differing ages 
participated in the discussions, the majority were in 
the child bearing age, 15-45 years. The discussions 
were permitted to last 40-55 min.
A retrospective outpatient survey was used to 
obtain data about 566 outpatient visits to 5 govern­
ment health centres in the preceding 12 months. For 
each month, in a health centre, 9 or 10 patients were 
selected by taking every tenth outpatient registered in 
that month. The age, sex, diagnosis and drug 
treatments of the patients in the sample were 
extracted from the registers. The completeness of a 
patient’s treatment was jointly assessed by the princi­
pal and co-researchers, both trained public health 
physicians with clinical experience in tropical Africa, 
by comparing the quantity of drugs prescribed to the 
quantity required for a person of the patient’s weight 
under the MOH’s dosing schedule. The patient’s 
weight was inferred from age and sex. In some of the 
health centres the register also provided information 
on the form of payment used by the patient, i.e. 
whether fee for service or a health insurance card.
Initial analysis of the data collected was carried out 
in the field. Epi Info, version 5, was used to analyze 
the household survey data. Costing of the drugs 
received by outpatients at the health centres was done 
using Quatro Pro spreadsheet package.
C A M :  C O N T E X T  A N D  P E R F O R M A N C E  
M u yin g a  P ro v in ce
The topography of Muyinga, like most of Burundi, 
is that of numerous hills and valleys. Agricultural 
land is sparse and therefore the slopes and valleys 
surrounding the collines are intensively cultivated. 
The majority of household units in the district consist 
of a mother, father and dependent children, and 
frequently one or two grandparents. Women produce 
the food crops consumed by the household, selling 
any surplus in village markets, while the cash crop, 
coffee, is harvested and sold by men in the town 
markets.
Some women brew and sell local beer made from 
bananas, and therefore periodically earn small 
amounts of cash income. However, in general, 
because women in male-headed households are 
excluded from trading in the cash crops, women have 
little access to cash. Consequently, it is common for 
household decisions about the use of cash to be made
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Table I. CAM status of male and female headed households
Male headed Female headed Total
Status N (%) N (%) N  (%)
Non-CAM households 111 42.5 27 69.2 138 46.0
Past CAM households 85 32.6 9 23.1 94 31.3
CAM households 65 24.9 3 7.7 68 22.7
261 100 39 100 300 100.0
by men. In order to obtain health care from fee-for- 
service health facilities, either for themselves or their 
children, women must frequently request cash from  
male heads o f  households.
The average household size was 5.34 persons. The 
majority o f  households (90%) said they were 
Christians. M oslems and other religions accounted 
for only 3% and 4% respectively. Alm ost all house­
holds in the study area were engaged in farming; 285 
(95% ) o f  heads o f  households were farmers. Only 9 
(3% ) had received more than 6 years o f  formal 
education, 129 (43% ) had attended school for 1-6  
years and 162 (54%) had received no formal
education. The majority o f homes were constructed 
either o f  bricks, tiles and mud (56% ), or mud and 
thatch (41% ). The households possessed few 
consumer goods: 128 (42.7% ) o f households owned 
a radio and/or a bicycle, and only one household  
possessed a car.
P a r tic ip a tio n
Fifty-four percent o f  households were either partici­
pating in the CA M  at the time o f  the survey or 
had done so in the past. Valid cards were held by 
23% o f  households. Table 1 shows the distribution  
o f  households in the sample with respect to their 
participation in CA M . The ‘CAM  households’ 
(22.7% ) presented valid CAM  cards to the interviewer; 
the ‘Past CAM  households’ (31.3% ) did not possess 
valid CAM  cards at the time o f survey but reported 
having purchased cards in the past; ‘N on CA M  house­
holds’ (46% ) reported never purchasing a card. 
Female headed households constituted 13% o f  the 
sample. Am ong female headed households only 7% 
had cards whereas 24% o f  male headed households 
had valid cards.
Table 2. CAM status by households size
Status
Household size (No. persons)
Row total
< 2
N  (%) N
3-6
(%)
>1
N (%) N (%)
Non-CAM households 27 84.4 88 50.9 22 23.4 137 45.8
Past CAM households 3 9.4 54 31.2 37 39.4 94 31.4
CAM households 2 6.3 31 17.9 35 37.2 68 22.7
Column total 32 10.7 173 57.9 94 31.4 299 100
Value d f Significance
Pearson 42.7634 4 0.0000
likelihood ratio 44.9698 4 0.0000
(a) Unable to afford CAM
(b) Poor quality o f government 
health service*
(c) Not well inform ed about CAM
(d) Not worried about health care 
prices because family healthy
(e) Family covered by other 
health insurance
(f) Not w illing to lose money in 
the event of non-use
never
purchased
•previously
purchased
20 40 60
Counts
80
Fig. 1. Reasons for non-purchase of CAM by households. N  = 232 households who did not have valid
CAM cards.
The health card insurance scheme in Burundi 86S
T a b l e  3 .  M o r b i d i t y  a n d  t r e a t m e n t  r a t e s  f o r  a c u t e  i l l n e s s  i n  a  o n e  
m o n t h  r e c a l l  p e r i o d  i n  C A M  a n d  n o n - C A M  h o u s e h o l d s
R a t e
C A M
h o u s e h o l d s
N o n - C A M
h o u s e h o l d s T o t a l
N o .  o f  p e o p l e 9 8 1 6 1 5 1 5 9 6
I l l n e s s  e p i s o d e s 4 0 0 2 5 9 6 5 9
I l l n e s s  r a t e  p e r  h o u s e h o l d 2 . 4 7 1 . 8 8 2 . 2 0
I l l n e s s  r a t e  p e r  p e r s o n 0 . 4 1 0 . 4 2 0 . 4 1
T r e a t m e n t  a c t i o n s 3 0 5 1 6 4 4 6 9 . 0 0
T r e a t m e n t  r a t e s  p e r  p e r s o n 0 . 7 6 0 . 6 3 0 . 7 1
( a )  F o r m a l  t r e a t m e n t  r a t e 0 . 5 4 0 . 3 5 0 . 4 6
p e r  e p i s o d e
( b )  P u b l i c  t r e a t m e n t  r a t e 0 . 3 7 0 . 1 6 0 . 2 8
p e r  e p i s o d e
( c )  F o r m a l  t r e a t m e n t  r a t e 1 . 3 3 0 . 6 5 1 . 0 2
p e r  h o u s e h o l d
( d )  P u b l i c  t r e a t m e n t  r a t e 0 . 9 1 0 . 3 0 . 6 3
p e r  h o u s e h o l d
( a )  a n d  ( c )  t r e a t m e n t  f r o m  f o r m a l  h e a l t h  f a c i l i t i e s  s u c h  a s  g o v e r n ­
m e n t  h e a l t h  c e n t r e s  a n d  h o s p i t a l s ,  m i s s i o n  c l i n i c s  a n d  h o s p i t a l s ,
a n d  p r i v a t e  c l i n i c s .
( b )  a n d  ( d )  t r e a t m e n t s  f r o m  g o v e r n m e n t  f a c i l i t i e s .
A hypothesis that CAM membership status of house­
holds and the size of households were independent was 
rejected (Chi-square test P <  0.001). Larger house­
holds were statistically more likely to be current or past 
CAM card holders than households with few members 
(Table 2). The Chi-square test of independence re­
jected independence between economic proxies (type 
of house and household possessions) and size of fam­
ily. However, test of association failed to indicate a 
linear relationship and rather suggested that house­
holds with either very few or many people were poorer 
than those of sizes close to the sample average. Tests of 
independence could not be used for cross-tabulations 
of economic proxies by CAM status because some of 
the expected frequencies were less than 5.
The most frequently selected reasons for non 
purchase were affordability, poor quality of govern­
ment services (lack of drugs) and insufficient knowl­
edge about the scheme (Fig. 1). Forty-five percent of 
the households who gave lack of funds as one of the 
reasons also said they would be willing to pay at least 
twice the present price if drugs were always available, 
suggesting that some of the reported inaffordability 
may have been relative rather than absolute. Compe­
tition from other health insurance schemes did not 
appear to be a significant factor influencing non par­
ticipation in the CAM scheme since only 4 (1.3%) 
households reported that they were covered by other 
health insurance schemes. Of the 232 households who 
did not have valid cards, 15 did not select any of the 6 
reasons offered in the questionnaire as possible expla­
nations for non-participation. (All reasons were first 
read to the respondent and during a second reading he 
or she was asked for an answer.)
Reasons that might suggest ‘non risk averse' 
attitudes to illness were reported by only 23 house­
holds. These reasons included ‘absence of worries 
about health care prices, because of good family 
health’ and accounted for 8.4% of the reported 
reasons for never having purchased a card and only 
2.1 % of the reasons for not having a valid card at the 
time of the survey. For households that reported ‘not 
willing to lose money in the event of non-use’, one 
interpretation is that they have a low monetary evalu­
ation of the risk involved in illness. A low evaluation 
would lead to unwillingness to pay a positive price to 
avert the risk and therefore would be consistent with a 
low demand for insurance. Only 11 (3.6%) of house­
holds fell into this category.
Illness rates and utilization
The main symptoms reported suggested that the 
principal illness conditions for all age groups were 
respiratory infections, malaria, digestive disorders, 
headaches, and injuries. These health problems 
accounted for 76% or more of illness episodes in each 
age group in the 4 weeks prior to the survey.
The illness occurrence as measured by episodes of 
illness per person, was almost identical for households 
that purchased the CAM and those that did not (Table
3). This suggests that there was not a predominance of 
persons with high tendencies/risks of becoming ill in 
the households purchasing CAM, compared to house­
holds that had not purchased CAM. This in turn 
suggests that adverse selection of individuals was 
probably not a major problem. Formal health care 
(modern/western care obtained outside the home) was 
not sought for all illness and therefore the number of 
formal treatment actions was less than 1 per illness 
episode. The formal treatment rate per episode was 
higher for CAM households as opposed to non-CAM: 
0.53 per episode for CAM households and only 0.35 
per episode for non-CAM. Public treatment (treat­
ment from government facilities) rates were also 
higher for CAM than non-CAM: 0.37 per episode and 
0.91 per household for CAM households, and only
0.16 per episode and 0.3 per household for non-CAM.
The average number of drugs (types) received by 
outpatients was similar for the five centres studied. The 
mean number of drug types was 1.58 (Table 4).
T a b l e  4 .  N u m b e r  o f  d r u g  t r e a t m e n t s  a n d  m e a n  c o s t  o f  d r u g  t r e a t m e n t s  b y  h e a l t h  c e n t r e  
P a t i e n t  ( % )  r e c e i v i n g  X  n o .  o f  d r u g s
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------  M e a n  n o .  M e a n  v a l u e
H e a l t h  c e n t r e  N  X  = 0 X  =  1 X  = 2 A f  =  3  o f  d r u g s  o f  d r u g s
G a s o r w e 1 2 0 0 . 8 3 0 . 0 5 5 . 8 1 3 . 3 1 . 8 2 1 6 5 . 5
G i t e r a y i 1 2 0 3 . 3 6 0 . 0 3 4 . 2 1 . 7 1 . 3 4 1 1 1 . 3
K a m a r a m a g a m b a 1 2 0 0 . 8 3 0 . 8 5 2 . 5 1 5 . 8 1 . 8 3 7 9 . 1
M u y i n g a 1 2 0 6 . 7 5 1 . 7 3 1 . 7 1 0 . 0 1 . 4 5 7 2 . 0
M u r a m b a 8 6 0 . 0 6 2 . 2 3 3 . 7 3 . 5 1 . 4 1 1 2 5 . 6
T o t a l 5 6 6 2 . 5 4 6 . 3 4 2 . 0 9 . 2 1 . 5 8 1 1 4 . 4
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The average value o f  the drugs received by patients 
in each facility, however, varied greatly, ranging 
from 72 FBu for patients at Muyinga to 165.5 FBu 
for those at Gasorwe. Significant numbers o f  
patients received incomplete treatments in the 
centres that had low values (Kamaramagamba and 
Muyinga), whereas most patients received adequate 
quantities in Gasorwe and Muramba. Distribution 
o f  the average value o f  the drugs received by 
patients in each facility is skewed towards the lower 
range o f  values (Fig. 2). The mean value o f  drugs 
per patient (both CAM  and non-CAM ) for the three 
centres that did not give incomplete treatments is 
134.1 FBu. (It was not possible to calculate the mean 
value o f  drug per CAM  patient because the health 
centre records did not state the method o f  payment 
in all cases. However, since drug treatments were 
generally adequate in these three centres, it was 
assumed that the mean value o f  drugs per CAM  
patient would not differ significantly from this 
value.)
H e a lth  e x p e n d itu r e  a n d  w illin g n e ss  to  p a y
In the month prior to the study, 110 (36.6% ) o f 
households had incurred out-of-pocket expenses for 
medical consultation(s) and/or drug purchases. O f 
the households who held valid CAM  cards 27.9%  
had incurred such costs, and o f  the households 
without valid cards the corresponding figure was 
39.85% . The mean expenditure per household was 
254.00 FBu for the former group and 192.84 FBu for 
the latter. The expenditure per treatment action 
ranged from 10 FBu to 9,000 FBu. For households 
possessing a valid CAM  the mean expenditure per 
treatment action was lower than for households that 
did not (136.00 FBu and 249.94 FBu respectively).
W illingness to pay a higher price for CAM  if 
drugs were more available at government health 
centres was expressed by 49% o f  households. About 
half o f  these households were willing to pay 
1000 FBu and the others were willing to pay 
2000 FBu (Fig. 3). O f those who said they were 
conditionally willing to pay more for the CAM  card, 
32% had never purchased a CAM  card in the past.
B e n e fi t  o f  C A M  to  w o m e n
Contributions in the focus group discussions were 
in general spontaneous and appeared to reflect a 
keen interest in the CAM . One rural group opened  
the discussions with a request that they be informed 
o f  the outcom e o f  our study because they had 
received no feedback from a previous study in which 
they had participated.
In response to the opening question, “do you 
think the CAM  has any benefits for women?” , con­
sensus in three o f  the groups implied that the CAM  
has important benefits for poor families, for house­
holds with seasonal cash availability and to women 
whose husbands spent significant am ounts o f  house­
hold cash on alcohol. In these situations the CAM  
ensured that in times o f  illness health care was avail­
able. This was thought particularly important in cases 
o f  child illness since they required prompt treatment.
“ Before the CA M  if you were unable to pay for 
expensive drugs then your child would die” . One 
member stated, “CAM  was started out o f  love for 
the people” . Som e members o f  the fourth group 
expressed the opinion that the CAM  provides no 
benefits because the government health centres 
provided poor quality service and insufficient drugs. 
Some o f  the com m ents in the early part o f  the 
discussions reflected an appreciation that the CAM
M
Gasorwe 
Gileranyi 
Kamaram 
M uyinga 
uramba
50-100 100-150 150-200 200-300 300-500 500-1000
Cost groups (FBu) Muyinga Province
Fig. 2. OPD drug treatment costs. Patients (%) by cost groups.
T h e  h e a lth  c a rd  in s u ra n c e  s c h e m e  in B u ru n d i 867
willing to pay four times 
current price, 2000FBu 
(27%)
unwilling to pay more 
(51%)
willing to pay twice 
current price, lOOOFBu 
(22%)
Fig. 3. Household willingness to pay more for CAM (willingness was conditional to drugs being available
at government health facilities).
removed the uncertainty about the affordability o f  
health care at the time o f  a child’s illness;
It is better to buy the card than to take the chance of illness.
To guard against falling sick in times of no cash it is well 
to buy the CAM.
The card is important because for one year use it is cheap, 
especially when one is referred to the hospital.
Overall the groups agreed that households’ 
decisions to purchase the CAM  were initiated by the 
women but that the cards were purchased by male 
partners. However, several women reported that they 
had purchased separate cards for older girls living 
away from home to ensure them antenatal care. The 
cards were either kept at home and women required 
no permission from husbands to make use o f  them or, 
as reported in one group, “ the card is kept in the 
pocket o f  the wom an just like an identity card” .
In three o f  the groups the issue o f  quality o f  health 
care received by CAM  holders became dominant 
after the initial debate about the merits o f  the CAM . 
There was agreement that CAM  holders had poor 
care because the drugs at government health centres 
were frequently out o f  stock. They also identified that 
in som e cases health workers discriminated against 
CAM  holders and gave preferential treatment to 
patients that paid cash. It was noted in one group that 
antenatal treatment was poor because there were few  
female medical technicians at the health centres.
M ost o f  the wom en in the group that were 
dissatisfied with the quality o f  care expressed 
willingness to pay a CAM  price o f  up to 2000 FBu if  
this would ensure adequate drug supplies at the 
health centres. (The groups believed that the revenue 
from the sale o f  the cards was used to purchase drugs 
and other supplies for the government health centres 
and hospitals.) These women were also willing to 
purchase the cards at a specified time in the year to 
facilitate the purchase o f  drugs in larger quantities 
and therefore cheaper unit prices by the government.
They suggested July-A ugust, the m onths correspond­
ing to the end o f  the harvest. One unwilling wom an  
explained that she was a poor widow. Another said 
she was elderly and had no children in her care.
In the latter stages o f  the discussions the groups 
were asked to make som e suggestions to improve the 
CAM . The following sum m arises the suggestions 
made;
(1) Ensuring adequate drug supplies and improved 
quality o f  care at governm ent health centres.
(2) Including older girls, aged 18 years and above, 
who are unmarried and still living with parents 
as eligible household members under CA M .
(3) Incorporating the m ission health facilities so 
that CAM  holders m ay receive either free or 
subsidized care at these institutions.
(4) Provision o f  exem ptions for the very poor and 
widows.
DISCUSSION 
S t u d y  l im ita t io n s  a n d  s tr e n g th s
T o increase the reliability o f  the answers to the 
survey questions the questionnaires were written in 
the local language, avoiding potential distortions due 
to incorrect translations. Som e o f  the lim itations o f  
the study arose from its cross-sectional design. 
Projections o f  annual household illness rates were 
made on the basis o f  illnesses that were reported to 
have occurred in the 4 weeks preceding the study. The 
findings o f  the household survey may therefore be 
subject to som e degree o f  recall error and any 
seasonal variations in illness occurrence will not be 
reflected. A four week recall period was adopted in 
order to facilitate the estim ation o f  illness incidence 
rates and health care utilization rates that could be 
projected to annual rates and then meaningfully 
related to annual CA M  revenue. Another limitation 
is that the absolute level o f  willingness to pay found  
may not be applicable to the whole country. This
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inability to generalize the absolute values is because: 
(1) the relatively high altitude of Muyinga province 
may be associated with a climate and therefore illness 
patterns that differ from that of lower lying 
provinces, and (2) Muyinga province is a major coffee 
growing area, and the relatively high household 
incomes may make household health expenditure 
significantly different from other provinces. However, 
the relative proportions found between CAM and 
non-CAM households is unlikely to differ 
significantly from one province to the other and 
therefore the results may be used to assist in the 
formulation of national policies.
F in an cia l p er fo rm a n c e
A public treatment rate of 0.91 per household per 
month and a mean value of drugs of 134.1 FBu per 
formal treatment, implies that an average household 
consumes 1464.4 FBu of outpatient drugs annually, 
The current price of the CAM card would therefore 
cover 34.1% of the drug costs. In practice, revenue 
from CAM does not appear to be used to purchase 
drugs or medical supplies required for patient care at 
the health centre. Although a potential for improving 
financial performance exists because there is some 
willingness to pay a higher price for the CAM card 
on condition that more drugs become available at 
government facilities, the findings indicated lack of 
financial viability. It is important to note that even at 
the present price significant numbers of households 
stated that they could not afford to purchase the 
CAM.
Adverse selection and moral hazard are major 
causes of inefficiencies in the functioning of health 
insurance schemes and therefore have consequences 
for financial viability [6-9]. The study found evidence 
to suggest that both these problems may be contribut­
ing to CAM’s poor financial performance. Adverse 
selection arises when insurance policy suppliers lack 
perfect information about the risk of individual 
insurees, or on grounds of equity, offer insurance 
policies based on community rated premiums 
(uniform premiums based on the population’s 
average expected probability of loss). (The alternative 
is experience rated premiums in which individual 
probabilities are assessed and individuals are offered 
premiums accordingly.) It is reasonable to consider 
the fixed price of the CAM card as an example of the 
former scenario. Where the insurance is voluntary, as 
in the case of CAM, the community rated premium 
discourages those of low risk from purchasing while 
making it attractive to high risk individuals. The 
resulting ’selection’ of high risk individuals increases 
the average expected loss for the insured population 
in subsequent periods. The outcome is an inadequate 
pool of funds that diminishes the scheme’s financial 
viability. The percentage of eligible members belong­
ing to the scheme is one proxy measure of the degree 
of adverse selection affecting the scheme. The 
theoretical analysis of the causation and
consequences of adverse selection assumes that 
individuals have perfect knowledge of their illness 
risks and that they are not prevented from purchasing 
insurance by inadequate incomes. In reality, however, 
especially in a country of low per capita income such 
as Burundi, the household membership rate in the 
CAM may be less related to perceived or actual risks 
of requiring health care and determined significantly 
by affordability. Thus an assessment of adverse 
selection in the CAM requires consideration of both 
affordability and perceived illness risks. The 
frequency of illness episodes among CAM and non- 
CAM households was sought in an attempt to 
ascertain the degree of adverse selection. A statisti­
cally significant higher rate of illness per person in the 
former group would suggest that individuals with 
higher risk had ‘selected’ themselves to participate in 
the scheme.
The rate of illness per person was found to be 
almost identical for members of CAM and non-CAM 
households and, therefore, adverse selection of 
individuals did not seem to be a likely problem. 
However, since larger households were more likely to 
purchase the CAM than small households, illness 
episodes per household were significantly greater for 
CAM households than for non-CAM households. 
This situation may be described as ‘adverse house­
hold selection’ and results in sub-optimal level of risk 
sharing among households.
Moral hazard occurs when individuals, once 
possessing full and fair insurance policies, lack the 
incentive to take actions that reduce the probability 
of the insured event occurring or the loss associated 
with it. (A full insurance policy is one in which the 
loss resulting from the insured event, in this case 
illness, is exactly compensated for. A fair policy is one 
in which the premium is equal to the expected loss: 
probability of loss times the value of loss.) In the 
context of health insurance, moral hazard may lead 
an insured person to invest less in preventive health 
measures and to use more resources to treat illness. 
In the presence of third party payment, the individual 
lacks an incentive to contain the cost of health care, 
faces zero marginal costs at the point of consumption 
and, theoretically, may consume to the point of 
satiation. The outcome is rising rates of utilization 
with increasing per capita health care costs. In the 
study the utilization rates per episode of illness of 
CAM households compared to non-members was 
proposed as an indicator of the extent of moral 
hazard.
The formal treatment rate for CAM patients was 
over 50% higher than the non-CAM group and this 
suggested that moral hazard existed, assuming illness 
severity was equal for the two groups. It is however, 
noteworthy that this rate may be higher for the CAM 
group because some government health centres gave 
incomplete treatments (inadequate volumes of 
medication for patients’ weight or volume) that may 
have delayed recovery and/or required additional
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I visits to collect remaining drugs. Households partici­
pating in the scheme were three times more likely to 
use government facilities than non CAM households. 
During the course of the research it became apparent 
that incomplete treatment was an acknowledged 
problem receiving the attention of the MOH.
In theory it is also possible that the higher utiliz­
ation among CAM households was the outcome of 
‘supplier induced demand’, i.e. changes, especially 
increases, in the demand and consumption of health 
care by patients as a result of the actions of doctors 
or other health care providers. Health centres and 
hospitals are not reimbursed either a flat fee per 
patient seen or a fee per service rendered and 
therefore the scheme does not provide an incentive 
for suppliers to influence demand in this way. On the 
other hand, neither does the scheme appear to create 
strong incentives for efficient use of health care 
resources by the consumer of the provider. Currently 
the organizations retaining CAM revenues (the 
‘commune’ committees) are not required, either by 
national law or legally binding contracts, to fund all 
or substantial percentages of the care provided under 
the scheme in health centres. The committees, there­
fore, have no financial incentive to minimize or 
rationalize the use of health services by the insured 
population.
S o c ia l p e r fo rm a n c e
Approximately 27% of households gave financial 
inability to purchase a CAM card as one of the main 
reasons for non membership and therefore the 
| scheme is unable to remove the financial barrier at the 
i time of illness for a significant proportion of this 
population. In practice non-CAM patients referred 
from health centres to higher level facilities often 
purchase cards prior to, or on arrival at, the referral 
centre thus manipulating the scheme to reduce their 
financial barrier to expensive curative care without 
| participating in the risk sharing. Women reported 
I that they had limited access to cash and, therefore, by 
j eliminating cash payment at the point of care, CAM 
) empowered them to decide the need for, and timing 
j of, health care consumption by household members. 
| (Women in CAM households did not require money, 
and hence permission, from male household heads to 
I seek health care.) Cash has become less of a barrier 
ij to obtaining curative treatment for card holders but 
in some cases the quality of care was considered 
inadequate. Women who participated in the focus 
groups gave reasons for purchasing CAM cards 
which suggested that they were risk averse. 
(Economic theory postulates that risk averse persons 
purchase insurance policies in order to maximize the 
expected utility from their income.) Many of the 
women were willing to pay higher CAM prices to 
improve the benefits. Generally, it appears that 
women, being the main carers, derive additional 
utility from the knowledge that in the event of child
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illness, treatment was available even in the absence of 
cash in the household. The conclusion is that the 
CAM provides a significant social function (and 
welfare utility) in the communities studied.
C O N C L U S I O N S
It is concluded that CAM’s poor financial perform­
ance was due to the low level of risk-sharing among 
households arising from ‘adverse household 
selection’, low membership fee (price of card) and the 
low current membership rate of 23% of households. 
To increase the level of risk-sharing and total 
revenue, measures are required to increase the 
participation of households that have few members. 
In addition, funds external to the CAM scheme could 
be sought as ‘seed money’ to permit improvements in 
the quality and efficiency of the services provided by 
the government under the CAM scheme. A signifi­
cant increase in the funds available to the health 
centre could also be achieved if the government 
required communes to use all or some large percent­
age of revenue from CAM and user charges for health 
care provision at the health centre level. The funds 
could be used not only to purchase an initial adequate 
quantity of drugs, but also to implement in-service 
training schemes for health workers in clinical 
practice. Training could usefully include rational 
prescribing in order to eliminate the problem of 
incomplete drug treatments, and patient-sensitive 
consulting. This would significantly improve the 
financial performance of the scheme by encouraging 
membership of households who either withdrew or 
never purchased CAM cards because of the poor 
quality of care provided by government facilities. 
Improved quality would also pave the way for 
moderate increases in the price of the CAM. The 
available evidence suggests that its social efficiency 
would be significantly enhanced by improvements in 
the quality of care.
Health prepayment/insurance schemes in other 
developing countries that rely on voluntary 
household membership and coverage are likely to 
have the problem of ‘adverse household selection’ 
revealed by the study. It is, therefore, advisable that 
projections of the health care utilization rate used to 
calculate premiums and government subsidies for 
such voluntary schemes should be based on illness 
rates of households that are likely to participate, 
rather than the entire household population. 
Operational research will be required to monitor the 
size, composition and income of such households as 
soon as schemes are implemented. This will permit 
estimates of the affordable contributions per house­
hold and the level of subsidies required from 
government and/or donors to fund the proposed 
benefits. Alternatively, where socially and politically 
feasible premium rates set per person may be a better 
option.
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Health insurance in rural Africa
Dyna Arhin
The 1993 World Development Report Investing in health 
made detailed policy recommendations about insurance 
financing in middle-income countries but this option was 
barely mentioned in respect of poorer countries 
(“idealistic but impractical”j it implies). The authors of 
that report, as do other professionals working in 
international health, dismiss rural health insurance in 
Africa as unfeasible, so excluding from the policy debate a 
crucial option—one that would allow rural households to 
make direct financial contributions to the cost of their 
health care without placing financial barriers to obtaining 
care at the time of illness. They suggest that patients 
should pay clinic and hospital fees (“user fees”) for 
consultations and treatments provided in government 
facilities. Sadly such fees will deter many rural patients, 
most of them children and women, from seeking health 
care. Incomes in rural Africa are very low and seasonal, 
and access to credit hardly exists. Waiting for crops to 
mature, be harvested, and then sold for cash can take up 
half the year, and during that period individuals requiring 
health services often find them inaccessible. Indeed in 
Afirica the introduction of fees has been followed by 
significantly reduced use of services. Evidence for this 
comes from Zaire,1 Swaziland,2 and Lesotho.’ Following 
significant increases in user fees in Ghana, clinic and 
hospital attendances fell sharply in rural areas and did not 
return to pre-increase levels even after several months. In 
urban areas utilisation did return to former levels.4
The conviction that health insurance schemes for rural 
populations in Africa would not be feasible appears to be 
based on the assumptions that there is no preference or 
demand for health insurance among these populations 
(“demand” being used in the economic sense of 
willingness and ability to pay for goods or services); and 
that schemes would require management structures
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similar to those of western health insurance systems. 
There is little evidence for either contention.
The assumption that demand for insurance cover would 
be low arises partly from the view that “African 
consumers prefer not to pay money for a future benefit for 
the simple reason that they lack confidence that the future 
benefit will be made available when they need it.”s It is 
therefore significant that villagers in Gabu region, Guinea 
Bissau, when given a choice, preferred collective 
prepayment to fee for service.* These villagers 
subsequently adapted a payment system originally used to 
finance ceremonies to fund inputs for primary health 
care—and thus began the Abota health insurance system, 
just over a decade ago. Today there are many hundreds of 
autonomous Abota schemes at village level organising 
prefinancing of essential drugs and the provision of 
primary health care.
Over 94% of heads of household surveyed in Gabu 
region in 1992 stated that they held a “good opinion” (as 
opposed to “no opinion” or “bad opinion”) about the 
Abota initiative.7 87% were willing to pay twice their 
current contributions to improve the availability of drugs. 
Participation in a national health insurance scheme in 
Burundi (Carte d’Assurance Maladie [CAM]) was high 
among rural households in Muyinga Province.* 54% of 
households in the study district were participating in the 
scheme or had done so in the past. 49% of households 
stated they would be willing to pay at least twice the 
premium charged at the time. “Women reported that they 
had litde access to cash and that CAM, by eliminating 
cash payments at the point of use, empowered them to 
decide the need for, and timing of, health care 
consumption by household members without consulting 
male household heads”.
These studies did not conclude that low demand for 
health insurance was itself a major cause of poor financial 
performance of the schemes. What they did suggest was 
that the efficiency and the financial viability of rural 
health schemes are likely to be hampered by poor quality,
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as perceived by the target population, of the care 
provided. About one-quarter of those surveyed judged the 
service provided by the CAM and Abota schemes 
inadequate for their needs.
To reject the option of rural health insurance because 
the quality of services provided would be poor is 
untenable. Poor quality is not inherent to—nor is it 
confined to—financing by health insurance. It has also 
contributed to low utilisation and poor cost recovery rates 
where user fees have been introduced in rural Africa. Poor 
quality is a symptom of the underlying economic malaise 
that requires consumers in Africa to fund government 
health services directly as well as through their 
contributions to general tax revenue. (In low income 
countries most government income from tax revenue is 
provided by duties on imports and exports; poorer 
households contribute a higher proportion of their 
incomes to this revenue when they purchase imported 
goods and they bear the brunt of taxes on exports because 
these taxes reduce profits on their agricultural and 
mineral outputs.) All things being equal, the returns, in 
terms of improved access to health care, would be higher 
where resources are used to improve quality of care within 
an insurance-financed system rather than a user-fee 
system. For example, in Burundi “seed money” to 
improve quality of services would significandy improve 
the financial performance of CAM by attracting back into 
it households which withdrew because of the poor care 
provided under the scheme by government facilities. 
Improved quality would also pave the way for moderate 
increases in the annual premium.
The assumption that a rural health insurance scheme in 
Africa requires a management structure similar to that of 
a western health insurance system would only be valid if 
schemes were to be modelled on conventional health 
insurance. The schemes found in Europe and North and 
Central America are designed to cater largely for 
employees on regular incomes from whom premiums can 
be collected monthly or weekly. The networks required to 
collect premiums from rural populations and to handle 
individual claims are non-existent in many African 
countries. Lessons must be sought from the few 
innovative and “appropriate technology” health insurance 
schemes that have arisen in sub-Saharan Africa. The 
schemes described above are two examples: both are 
administered by a few government officials centrally and 
rely mainly on local management by the community.
Another alternative that may be feasible in sub-Saharan 
Africa is to set up local health insurance associations that 
contract with and/or co-finance local health care 
providers. This structure was suggested by household 
heads who took part in group discussions in Dangbe-west 
District, Ghana, as part of a feasibility study 
(unpublished). The consensus was that such an 
association should be locality specific or otherwise 
decentralised and should have direct managerial and 
financial links with the health facilities contracted to 
provide health care to its members. It was envisaged that 
the association would set its annual membership dues 
equal to, or above, the percentage of the expected average 
costs of health care per household borne by the consumer. 
The association, by investing contributions in local health 
facilities, would act as a co-financer of government health 
facilities in the district and provide a risk- 
sharing/insurance mechanism for its members.
The Guinea Bissau and Burundi experiences provide 
preliminary evidence on the organisational and 
socioanthropological issues raised by insurance schemes 
in rural Africa. Such evidence should inform the policy 
debate both in African countries and among donor 
organisations that seek to promote sustainable and 
accessible health services. Otherwise rural health 
insurance will continue to be dismissed and an 
opportunity for raising revenue for health without greatly 
decreasing access will remain unexplored.
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1. The policy and research problem
Willingness to pay (WTP) is a concept which is 
being used increasingly to inform policy deci­
sions in the health sector. This paper briefly 
reviews the reasons why there is more interest in 
WTP studies and provides some examples of 
how they have been conducted. The final section 
of the paper emphasizes the need for caution in 
interpreting results as the WTP method is still in 
an experimental stage of development.
Declining budgetary resources and a political en­
vironment which has raised questions about the 
efficiency and equity of state subsidies for health 
care have stimulated health sector financing 
reforms in many countries. Governments are 
supplementing tax revenues by increasing direct 
household contributions to the health sector 
through a variety of policy reforms: user fees 
at government facilities; the adoption or en­
couragement o f community based financing 
schemes (such as pre-payments, revolving drug 
funds); and the encouragement of non-profit- 
making but fee-charging non-governmental 
organizations.
As a result, decision-makers at the government, 
facility and community levels are faced with the 
difficult but important policy question of how to 
price health services. One way is to measure the 
cost of supplying a service and to charge a price 
that will cover all or a proportion of that cost. 
The main problem with this procedure is that a 
price based only on costs takes no account o f de­
mand, or people’s willingness and ability to pay* 
that price. People’s WTP is important because
consumer responses to prices will influence ser­
vice utilization levels and patterns, and revenues 
collected. In particular, the efficiency and equity 
impacts o f prices for health care will be influ­
enced by people’s willingness and ability to pay:
• efficiency -  although it is argued that fees will 
reduce ‘frivolous’ use o f services and over­
crowding (World Bank 1987; 1993), especially 
at outpatient departments in hospitals, a 
decline in utilization may create a situation of 
surplus capacity and higher average costs.
• equity  -  in addition to revenue objectives, fee 
schedules and pre-payment mechanisms must 
be sensitive to local economic circumstances, 
especially people’s ability to pay. Fees may 
have to be waived or reduced for patients from 
vulnerable households or socioeconomic 
groups so that their utilization of health ser­
vices does not decline.
How much people are willing and able to pay for 
a good or service can be assessed in two ways: (a) 
by observing and modelling past health care 
utilization, expenditure and responsiveness to 
prices2 or; (b) by asking people directly how 
much they would be willing and able to pay for a 
specified health care service or product.
The first method will obtain information about 
the money people are currently spending on 
health care. This will inform decision-makers 
about the potential market in which they are 
operating, but observing how much people spent 
on a health service in the past to assess how much 
they will be willing to pay in the future may be in­
appropriate for a number of reasons:
•  a market for the health service may not 
previously have existed because health care has 
been provided free or because a new service is 
being introduced to an area.
• the price paid by patients in the past may not 
reflect the maximum  amount they are willing 
to pay, which may be greater.
•  willingness to pay for a service is related to 
particular situations and non-price factors, so 
that patients may be willing to pay a certain 
price to one provider but may not be willing to 
pay the same price to a different provider. For 
example, women might pay traditional mid­
wives or mission hospitals for delivery ser­
vices, but might not be willing to pay at the 
government hospital because of the particular 
quality o f care received, the accessibility of the 
government hospital, or because of lack of 
trust in the staff at the government hospital.
2. Asking people about their willingness 
and ability to pay
The second method, in theory, overcomes these 
three problems. It asks people directly the max­
imum amount of money that they would be will­
ing and able to pay for a specified health service. 
It assumes from the beginning that people have 
had no previous experience o f buying the health 
service which is going to be put on the market, 
and instead asks people their willingness to pay 
on the basis of their expectations:
‘The method...circumvents the absence o f 
markets for public goods by presenting con­
sumers with hypothetical markets in which they 
have the (hypothetical) opportunity to buy the 
good in question. Because the elicited WTP 
values are contingent upon the particular 
hypothetical market described to the respondent, 
this approach came to be called the contingent 
valuation method’ Mitchell & Carson (1986: 
2-3).
Since the health service and the circumstances 
under which it is bought are hypothetical, the 
respondent must develop an answer based on in­
formation provided by the interviewer. A WTP 
study therefore takes the form of a survey with 
several components:
(a) Past health care practices, expenditure and  
attitudes
According to WASH (1988: 19), these questions 
will establish the credibility of the subject matter 
and stimulate the respondent into considering 
what they are currently willing to pay for par­
ticular health services and why. To some extent 
these questions will remind the respondent of 
previous valuations and choices that they have 
made, so their WTP values for any new service 
will be made in the context o f knowing about 
alternative providers.
(b) Creation o f  a plausible hypothetical m arket
Because the health service and the market situa­
tion presented is hypothetical, it should be 
described to respondents so that they can make 
an informed decision. The types o f information 
that need to be considered include: 
a detailed description o f the service or treatment 
being valued;
the institutional and organizational circum­
stances under which the service will be made 
available;
the method of payment (out-of-pocket payments, 
instalments, pre-payment, etc.); 
actual or perceived risk o f illness and perceived 
effectiveness of the treatment (Morrison and 
Gyldmark 1992).
(c) Questions which elicit the respondent's 
willingness and ability  to  pay  f o r  the health 
service on offer
These questions must be designed to minimize 
any bias in respondents’ WTP values.
(d) Questions about the respondent's or 
household's characteristics
In order to understand more about why people 
give particular figures for WTP, socioeconomic 
information such as age, gender, income, at­
titudes to free health care, etc. should be 
collected.
In the last two decades economists have 
developed the WTP method in other sectors to 
put a (monetary) value on public goods such 
as cleaner air or recreational sites, which are 
not traded in private markets.3 For example 
respondents are asked how much they would be 
willing to pay for different gradations o f cleaner 
air, and the amount in dollars specified is taken 
to be a quantitative measure of the benefits of
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this cleaner air. Decision-makers require data on 
the monetary value or benefits of environmen­
tal goods to help them decide which public 
facilities or environmental qualities to prioritize 
(or to protect in the face of pollution). The 
assumption is made that if a person consumes an 
environmental ‘good’ he or she receives a certain 
amount o f satisfaction from it, and the money 
that he or she is prepared to forego provides a 
measure of that satisfaction. The more people 
are satisfied by, or value, a public good like 
cleaner air, the more they will be willing to pay. 
The argument is taken one step further to say 
that the maximum a person is willing to pay 
represents the degree of benefit they feel.4 More 
recently the benefits of health care programmes 
have been measured using the WTP method in 
order to provide information for decision­
making and priority setting in the health care 
sector.5
WTP studies have been developed in some in­
dustrialized countries to quantify the value of 
health programmes -  particularly in countries 
such as the United Kingdom and Sweden, where 
there is a large government-funded health sector. 
Other more market-oriented economies such as 
the United States have considered WTP in rela­
tion to the level of insurance premiums. With the 
rise o f cost recovery in low income countries, 
WTP studies are now being used in social and 
economic contexts very different from those in 
the West, to obtain information about the de­
mand for public services if user charges are in­
troduced, the potential revenue that can be raised 
and the financial sustainability o f the policy 
change. The water and sanitation sectors, for ex­
ample, have developed and tested the method in 
Burkina Faso, Haiti, Nigeria, Pakistan and Tan­
zania.6 The potential for cost recovery in the 
health sector is now also being explored using 
these methods.
Given this new context and purpose for using 
WTP studies, extra caution needs to be exercised 
both in the design o f WTP questions and in the 
interpretation of results. The rest of this paper 
reviews some o f the types o f question that have 
been used to elicit people’s WTP for health ser­
vices, and some of the problems with the method 
that are of particular relevance to the health 
sector.
3. How are WTP questions asked?
As with any survey method, careful attention 
must be paid to the development and piloting of 
questions. WTP surveys require a special series 
o f questions to elict a respondent’s WTP for ser­
vices, and these need to be designed in a way 
that minimizes bias. There is no consensus on the 
best question format to use, but a number of 
alternatives are discussed in the literature (Mit­
chell and Carson 1986; WASH 1988). Three of 
these have recently been used in the health sector.
Open ended questions
The National Impregnated Bednet Programme in 
the Gambia faced the question of how to obtain 
funds from villages to finance the cost o f insec­
ticide. A survey of village-level mechanisms for 
raising funds used open ended WTP questions 
(see Box 1) to obtain minimum and maximum 
WTP bids7 (Mills et al., forthcoming).
Box 1. An example of an open ended question
‘If people living in the village thought 
that dipping their bednets in insec­
ticide was effective in killing insects, 
what is the maximum (minimum) 
each compound would be willing and 
able to pay for the service?’
Researchers in other sectors have been critical of 
the open question format because if respondents 
are unfamiliar with the product, they find it 
difficult to pick a value out o f the air without 
some form of assistance (Mitchell and Carson 
1986:97). Experience from the water sector sug­
gests that individuals may respond to the ques­
tion by asking how much they should pay or 
would need to pay in order to have an improved 
service (WASH 1988:9).
Closed questions
In Ghana research into the WTP for rural health 
insurance, a new and unfamiliar method of 
financing health care in the area, is using both 
open and closed WTP questions (Arhin 1994). 
An example of a closed question is shown in 
Box 2.
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Box 2. An example o f a closed (take it or leave it) 
question
‘An association wishing to provide 
free care at specific facilities for its 
members will need to collect adequate 
contributions from each household. 
Would you be willing and able to pay 
the following yearly contributions for 
the stated benefits for all persons in 
your household?
(a) 4000 cedis for free care at 
Bator mission hospital -  would 
you be willing and able to pay 
this amount to be a member?
(b) 3000 cedis for free care at 
Akuse government hospital -  
would you be willing and able to 
pay this amount to be a 
member?
(c) 2500 cedis for free care at the 
nearest health centre/post 
-would you be willing and able 
to pay this amount to be a 
member?
(d) 1500 cedis for free care at a 
community clinic -  would you 
be willing and able to pay this 
amount to be a member?’
The strength of this technique is that it simplifies 
the market situation for the respondent. He or 
she must simply make a judgement about a price 
-  a yes or no, ‘take it or leave it’ type o f response 
(Mitchell and Carson 1986: 101). Its main 
weakness is that it does not provide a maximum 
willingness-to-pay amount. It is also ‘a relatively 
inefficient use o f the information potentially 
available from the respondent because, if asked 
further questions, he or she might be willing to 
reveal much more about household preferences’ 
(WASH 1988: 9).
Bidding games
Rather than using only one price, the interviewer 
could obtain more information about consumer 
preferences by suggesting different prices, bid­
ding the respondent up or down depending on 
the answers given. This sequence of questions is 
known as a ‘bidding game’ and has been used ex­
tensively by Whittington et al. (1987; 1988; 1989; 
1990) in the water sector. In a recent WTP survey
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designed for a non-profit-making hospital in 
Mexico (Russell 1994), a bidding format was 
designed to test WTP for an ante-natal, delivery 
and post-natal package. As a visual aid, 12 cards 
covering a range o f prices from N$40 to NS300 
were used, and the first card presented to the 
respondent was N$100.
To provide an example o f how a bidding game 
can be designed, the basic format of some of the 
questions (for prices N$40-N$200) is shown in 
Box 3. If the respondent is not willing to pay the 
starting price o f NS100, the interviewer presents 
the card of the next lowest value (N$80). This 
process o f moving down the scale continues until 
the respondent makes a bid, and if the respon­
dent is not willing to pay the minimum price 
(N$40), she is asked for her maximuim bid (see 
Box 3, Section C).
If the respondent is willing to pay N$100, prices 
are not presented in an incremental order. In­
stead, a much higher card is offered (N$200), 
and if the respondent is not willing to pay NS200, 
the interviewer moves back down the scale to a 
value (N $l25) just above the previously accepted 
bid. If she is willing to pay NS125, then a higher 
value card (N$175) just below the previously re­
jected bid is presented, and so on until a bid is 
made. The result o f the bidding game will not 
produce a maximum WTP bid, but rather an in­
terval within which the ‘true’ WTP falls (WASH 
1988: 11). For example if the respondent is will­
ing to pay NS100 but not willing to pay NS125, 
her bid will be between NS100 and N$124.
Bidding games have the advantage o f initiating a 
process o f thought and choice about different 
prices. The main disadvantage with bidding 
games (and closed questions) is that a starting bid 
has to be used, which implies a value for the 
good. There is a danger that this starting value or 
point can bias responses. Mitchell and Carson 
(1986) therefore favour a card technique which 
‘scatters a range of cards on the table’ to help the 
respondent visually but which presents them all 
at once, avoiding starting point bias.
This card technique and the bidding game are 
designed to ‘help’ the respondent decide on a 
price by presenting a range of prices. Although 
the range of prices offered could bias respon­
dents’ WTP statements, for policy purposes it 
may be necessary to offer consumers a range of
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Box 3. An example of a bidding question format
A.
A l. If the price you are charged for the whole package is (N$100) per month for 6 months.
would you or someone in your family be willing and able to pay this monthly amount?
(Enumerator hands card to the respondent)
Yes Go to B
No Go to C
Not sure Go to C
B. C.
Bl. Enumerator repeats question but with C l. Enumerator repeats question with price
price and card of NS200 and card of N$80
Yes go to D | Yes ... FINISH
No go to B2 No go to C2
Not sure go to B2 Not sure go to C2
B2. Enumerator repeats question but with C2. Enumerator repeats question bui with
price and card of NS125 price and card of N$60
Yes go to B3 Yes FINISH
No FINISH No go to C3
Not sure FINISH Not Sure go to C3
B3. Enumerator repeats question but with C3. Enumerator repeats question but with
price and card of N$175 price and card of N$40
Yes FINISH Yes FINISH
No go to B4 No go to C4
Not sure go to B4 Not Sure go to C4
B4. Enumerator repeats question but with C4. What is the maximum amount you
price and card of N$150 would be willing and able to pay for the
package?
Yes FINISH Unsure
No FINISH
Not sure FINISH
t Section D is not included in this example o f bidding formats. If the respondent is WTP NS200,
the next card offered is NS300.
Source: Russell (1994), adapted from WASH (1988)
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prices that are based on the costs of providing the 
service. For example the mid-point of the range 
of prices offered to respondents may be the 
average cost of providing the service. Whilst this 
provides a link between cost and demand, the 
cost may not be equated to the consumer’s value 
o f the service offered.
4. The need for caution
In addition to biases introduced by the wording 
of questions, a major doubt is whether people 
can give meaningful answers to these questions. 
The WTP method relies on the respondent mak­
ing rational and knowledgeable trade-offs and 
1 choices before quoting a price, and these deci- 
| sions are based on the information they have 
I about the health service, which is provided by the 
\ interviewer. A respondent’s WTP statements I may not be reliable if they have insufficient in- 
| formation about the characteristics o f the service
! being described, or if they do not understand the 
information. Providing information about 
health services to respondents may be especially 
;? difficult because, firstly, specialist knowledge 
; may not be available to provide all the details 
about the risks of disease and effectiveness of 
treatments. Secondly, even if this specialist 
knowledge exists, brief but comprehensible 
■ descriptions of risks and treatment effectiveness 
| are notoriously difficult to explain to people.
\ Some difficult questions to resolve are what in­
i' formation about health risks, treatment pro- 
j cesses and benefits should be provided to 
‘ respondents before they are asked their WTP, 
and how this information should be presented. A 
difficult balance between providing adequate 
j[ details and overloading the respondent with in- 
, formation must be sought and achieved.
I
? To be useful to policy-makers, the WTP method 
j must provide reliable and valid data. Yet any 
hypothetical statements about behaviour must be 
treated with caution. As one researcher in this 
field points out, the WTP method ‘is in an ex­
perimental state, and the studies carried out so 
far on health care have largely been experimental 
studies testing the feasibility o f the approach.
! Now when the method is becoming more popular 
it is of the utmost importance to interpret results 
cautiously . . . ’ (Johannesson 1993: 359).
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The ultimate test o f validity is to compare 
hypothetical WTP bids with actual money tran­
sactions after fees or insurance schemes are in­
troduced (Johannesson 1993), but this would be 
often impossible and, as stated earlier, is fraught 
with difficulties o f interpretation. Another test 
of validity is to see whether WTP bids are sys­
tematically related to socioeconomic variables. 
If they are, there is a greater chance that the 
WTP bids have not simply been pulled out 
o f the air, but are in fact related to household 
preferences.
If one assumes that these problems can be over­
come, there is still the question o f setting prices. 
WTP methods can help decision-makers set 
prices because they provide information about 
the demand for a service at a given price: a 
hypothetical demand curve can be constructed. 
But the prices set will depend on the priorities of 
decision-makers. Prices might be set at a level 
which the majority o f people are willing and able 
to pay so that utilization does not decrease, but 
these prices might be too low to cover costs. If 
the decision is taken to raise prices because the 
WTP survey showed that enough people would 
still use the service, this may be beneficial in 
terms of revenue and efficiency, but might 
discourage utilization by poorer sections of the 
community.
WTP is a method which can be considered for 
attaching a value and a price to health services. 
However, as it is still in an experimental stage, 
careful consideration needs to be given to the 
development and piloting o f questionnaires. 
Secondly, given the limited understanding of the 
factors affecting WTP statements, it is important 
to at least collect socioeconomic information to 
aid analysis o f valuation. Finally, there needs 
to be careful interpretation of any WTP values 
because the validity and reliability o f hypothetical 
statements is still not clear.
Endnotes
1 There is some debate over the terms willingness and 
ability to pay. In orthodox economic theory there is no con­
ceptual distinction between these two terms -  it is assumed 
that if individuals are willing to pay the price then they must, 
somehow, be able to do so. Ability to pay does, however, re­
quire further analysis, since payments for health care might, 
for example, be based on asset sales causing long-term 
declines in household welfare.
100 How to do {or not to do).
2 A number of studies using survey data have modelled the 
demand (willingness to pay) for social services and health 
care using this technique: see Gertler and van der Gaag (1988) 
and Lavy and Quigley (1993). They use data on illness and 
medical care utilization to construct a demand function, 
and predict the elasticity of demand for health care and the 
impact that user fees accompanied by quality/accessibility 
changes would have on utilization, revenue and welfare.
3 There is a large body of work on contingent valuation 
methods relevant to industrialized countries, particularly by 
environmental economists. See for example Brookshire, 
Ives and Schultze (1976), Brookshire and Crooker (1981),' 
Brookshire and Schultze (1986), Mitchell and Carson (1986).
4 These assumptions are based on paretian welfare 
economics which accept that the sum of all individuals’ WTP 
equals society’s maximum valuation for the good or service 
in question. It gives no recognition to who the recipients of 
benefits or welfare improvements are.
5 See for example Johannesson et al. (1991); Gafni (1991); 
Morrison and Gyldmark (1992); Johannesson (1993): Golan 
and Shechter (1993).
6 See for example Altaf et al. (1992); Altaf and Hughes 
(1991; 1992); Whittington et al. (1987; 1988; 1989; 1990; 
1992).
7 Respondents often give a range of prices that they would 
be willing and able to pay.
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Appendix 2: Questionnaires
CAM study 
Abota study
Willingness to pay study (Ghana)
PATIENT HEALTH INSURANCE UTILIZATION QUESTIONNAIRE MUYINGA PROVINCE, BURUNDI
Nous souhaitons vous poser quelques questions afin de nous aider h mieux comprendre pourquoi certaines families utilisent la 
Carte d'Assurance Maladie, alors quo d'autres no 1'utilisent pas. Vos r6ponses nous seront tr6s utiles pour savoir quelques 
changements sont peut-Stre n£cessaires pour ameliorer la CMA. Toutes vos r6ponses seront tenues confidentielles, et si vous 
le souhaitez, votre nom ne sera pas inscrit sur les dossiers. Nous vous prions surtout de nous donner des r6ponses correctes. 
Merci de votre bonne collaboration._______________________________________________________  .
DATE DE L1ENQUETE: JUIN 1992
NOM DE L1ENQUETEUR
1 NOM DU REPONDANT
2 NUMERO D'IDENTIFICATION DU REPONDANT
3 ADRESSE : Numdro de la Maison _____________
Zone ou quartier _____________
____________ Province Muyinga
4 Quelle est votre position dans le mdnage ?
 1
1 Homme chef de manage; 2 Femme chef de manage; 3 Femme Spouse du chef de manage; 4 Homme 4poux de femme 
chef de manage; 5 Fr6re ou soeur du chef de manage; 6 P6re ou M&re du chef de manage; 7 Autre:
5 Quelle est votre situation matrimoniale?
1 C^libataire 2 Mari£; 3 Veuf (veuve); 4 Divorc6/s£par£
6 Quelle est votre religion ?
1 Aucune; 2 Religion traditionnelle; 3 Islam; 4 Christianisme; 5 Autres
1
HOUSEHOLD HEALTH INSURANCE UTILIZATION QUESTIONNAIRE
"Nous vous demandons de nous indiquer les noms et £ges de toutes les personnes qui font partie de votre manage 
(famille). En outre, veuillez prdciser pour chacune de ces personnes, si durant les 4 derni&res semaines elles 
ont une quelconque maladie, m£me si c ’dtait une maladie banale pour laquelle aucun tratement n'dtait n£cessaire. 
Si quelqu'un dtait plusieurs fois malade durant ces 4 demieres semaines, indiquez la maladie la plus rdcente ainsi 
cue l'une quelconque des autres maladies.
Nom de la 
personne
Age Sexe Nombre d'dpisodes 
de maladies durant 
les dernieres 
semaines
Principal signe ou plainte du dernier 
Episode de maladie
10a
7a 8a 9a
10b
7b 8b 9b
10c
7c 8c 9c
lOd
7d 8d 9d
\
lOe
l e 8e 9e
lOf
2
PATIENT HEALTH INSURANCE UTILIZATION QUESTIONNAIRE
A present, nous allons vous poser des questions concernant les personnes qui £taient malades, ce 
qu'elles ont fait pour retrouver la santd, et les frais que cela a codt6 dans chaque cas. Pr^cisez 
dans ch&que-cas si-la carte- CAMma uti-l-is^e ■ ou-noni---------------- - ---------------------------
NOM DE LA 
PERSONNE
Quel type de soin 
a utilisd? 
lere / 2&me 
maladie
11a
lib
11c
(1 ) S o in  k  
d o m ic i le
(2) G u 4 r is se u r  * 
t r a d i t i o n n e l
(3) C e n tr e  de s a n t4  du 
G ouvernem ent
(4) H S p ita l de l a  
M iss io n
(5) M £decins  
priv£s
( 6) Autres________
Quel type de paiment a 
6t£ utilise? 
lere / 2&me 
maladie
12a
12b
12c
(1) Argent comptant
(2) CAM
(3) En nature
(4) Autre assurance
(5) Autre______
Combien ont coftt£ 
les d£penses de la 
plus r£cente 
maladie? (Fbn)
P
13a
M
14a
T
15a
13b 14b 15b
13c 14c 15c
P = Argent pay£ au 
service soignant 
M = codt des 
medicaments achet^s 
T = CoQt de 
transport et autres 
coQts____
Combien ont coClte 
les d^penses de la 
pr£c£dente 
(ancienne) maladie ?
P
13a
M
14a
T
15a
13b 14b 15b
13c 14c 15c
3
HOUSEHOLD HEALTH INSURANCE U T IL IZA T IO N  QUESTIONNAIRE 
MUYINGA PROVINCE/ BURUNDI_______________________________________
16 Actuellement, votre famille poss&de-t-elle une carte CAM valide ? oui=i
Non=2 I p
Combien de fois cette carte a-t-elle 6t6 utilis£e ?
17 Votre famille a-t-elle, dans le passd, achetd de carte CAM 
(diff^rente de l'actuelle carte ?)
Oui=l Non=2
18 Au moment ou vous achetiez cette carte CAM, est-ce que vous, ou une autre 
personne de votre famille, etait malade et allait l'utiliser pour se 
soigner ?
Oui=l Non=2
19 Selon vous, quels sont les principaux avantages (bdndfices) que vous 
pouvez tirer de la CAM ?
Ecrivez fid^lement les propres mots du r£pondant. Au besoin, demandez clarification et reportez
ensuite sans m o d i f i c a t o n . _ ______________________________________________________________________________________
4
PATIENT HEALTH INSURANCE UTILIZATION QUESTIONNAIRE
MUYINGA PROVINCE/ BURUNDI____________________________ _
20 Pour terminer, je Vais vous lire une liste de raisons pour lesquelles une famille peut decider
d'acheter ou de ne pas acheter une carte CAM. Pour chacune de ces raisons, indiquez si oui ou non si 
cela a pu 6tre une des raisons pour lesquelles votre famille a cessd d'acheter la carte CAM.
1) Ma famille n'a pas recu assez d'information sur la CAM OUI NON
2) Ma famille n'a pas assez d'argent (n'est pas assez riche) pour acheter la carte
3) Les membres de ma famille ne sont pas souvent malades. II n'y a done pas de raisons de 
s'inqui^ter au sujet des d4penses de sant6.
4) Si aucun membre de la famille ne tombe malade, la carte est inutile et 1'argent d6pens6
pour acheter la carte est alors une perte. Je tiens k 6viter une telle perte d'argent.
5) Les membres de ma famille ont droit aux soins gratuits grAce k une autre forme 
d'assurance.
6) Les membres de ma famille ont peu d'occasions d'utiliser les services de sant6 du 
Gouvernement.
7) Aucune des raisons cities n'est valable, puisque depuis le demarrage de la CAM, ma famille 
a toujours achet4 la carte.____________________________________________________________________________
OUI NON
OUI NON
OUI NON
OUI NON
OUI NON
OUI NON
OUI NON
21 Est-ce que vous, ou un autre personne de la famille est membre d'une 
forme locale ou traditionnelle de solidarite, telles association pour 
Caisse de funerailles, Marriage, Naissances et Bapt£mes ?.
Si oui, indiquer laquelle. Oui=l Non=2
22 Seriez-vous favorable pour payer 2 fois le prix actuel de la carte si 
cela permettait d'obtenir les medicaments n£cessaires pour les soins de 
sante?
Oui=l Non=2
23 Votre famille a-t-elle d£jci eu faire face h des d^penses de sant6 qu'elle 
ne pouvait pas payer par ses propres moyens ?
Oui=l Non=2
5
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MUYINGA PROVINCE, BURUNDI___________________________________
24 Indiquez parmi ces articles, lequel ou lesquels votre famille poss&de 
actuellement
1) Radio
2) Bicyclette (v£lo)
3) Voiture
4) Aucun de ces articles
25 Quelle est la principale occupatic
1) Cultivateur de riz
2) Cultivateur des c£r£ales de base
3) Commercant
4) Employer du Gouverment (Fonctionnair
5) Travailleur manuel
6) Petit commercant
7) Autre (pr£ciser)
on du 
e)
:hef de mdnage ?
26 Quelle est l'etendue de terre cultivde par le mdnage ?
27 Quelle est l'etendue de terre qui est la propriety prjLvde du manage ?
30 Le Chef de menage a-t-il regu une formation scolaire (frdquentd l'dcole)?
Quel niveau de formation a-t-il atteint ?
6
10 Para termfnar, vou passar a I6r as razOes pelas qua/s pode levS-to a decldlr'contrlbulr para ABOTA.
Por cada uma dessas razOes, Indicar S/M  ou NAO se  Isso tem  sldo uma das razOes qua /ha /avaram ou a sua famf/ia 
ABOTA.
1. Minha famf/ia nSo racebau InformaqOes sobra a ABOTA
2. A minha famf/ia nSo tarn possibi/idadas financairas fnSo 4 rica} para podar
contrlbu/r
3. Os mambros da minha famf/ia nSo estSo sampre doentes. Portanto nSo h i  nacess/dada  
da ma praocupar com gastos ra/aclonados com  a sua sauda
4. Sa nSo tanho nenhuma fam/fiar doanta, a contributqSo 4 Inutil a gastar dinhairo nala 4 uma parda. r .  j 
m otlvos para sofrar tal parda
5. Os mambros da minha famf/ia t4m diraitos a cuidados m 4 die os gratuitos graqas a uma outra
forma de assist4ncia
6. Quando um membro da minha famf/ia est4  doanta, a assist4ncia m4dica na Unldade da Sauda da base  ^  
ou nf/o corraspondam. as nacassidades
7. NSo ex/sta ABOTA na minha tabanca
8. Nenhuma destas razOes 4 vS/ida Isto porqua desde qua se  in/clou o sistem a ABOTA a minha famf/ia ~.~y 
ABOTA
a nSo contribuir para a
SIM Q iA o ^ ' 
S/M {/NAO
S/M ,N A p  
Portanto, nSo tanho^ — ■.
S/M ;NAoJ
SIM ( jA o )  
nSo t4m boa qua/idade
S/M
'Z fM ) NAO 
sampre contribuiu para a 
S/M (NAQ'
11 SerS qua voc4 ou um sau familiar 4 mombro de uma forma local ou tradic/ona! de solidariedade, ta/s como AsssociaqOes para a criaqSo de 
um fundo destinado a pagar funerals, casam entos, nasc/m entos ou baptlsm os ?
nao = 2
12 Em caso afirmativo, indicar o tipo de associapSo__________ (P
s^im “ J y
13 Tem experiSncia de ter ido a Unidade de Saude Base nos u/timos 12 m eses e nSo encontrar 
medicamentos ? fsim  = 1J  nao = 2
14 EstarA de acordo a pagar 2 vezes o prepo actual da ABOTA se eta permitisse obter os medicamentos sem 
fa/ha ? (sim = 7 N) nao = 2
Qua! 6 a contribuipSo que estaria disposto a pagar para comepar a ABOTA na sua ta b 'a r fc a __________
1000 = 1 2000 = 2 e mats de 2000  = 3 ou nSo estA disposto a pagar -  4
30 A sua familia j£  se confrontou com despesas relacionadas com a saude sem  que as pudesse sa/dar i
31 In dicar entre os artigos abaixo descriminados, o qua/ ou os quais a sua familia possui n e s p  momento
7. Nenhum desses artigos1. Radio 3.  Motor izada  5.  Cavalo
2.  Biclcleta 4 .  Bur ro/Chare t te  6.  Vaca
> i e^ e
Z
32 Tipo de casa
1. Materia is durdveis (zinco, tel ha, tijolo, bloco)
2. Material’s  semi-durdveis (adobe)
3. Cobertura de palha ou folha
33 Qua! a principal ocupagao do chefe do lar ou da familia 7
1. Agricultor (subsistdncia)
2. Pequeno comerciante
3. Artes§o
4. Grande comerciante
5. Assalariado do sector publico
6. Assalariado do sector privado
7. Operdrio do sector publico
8. Oper&rio do sector privado
9. Outras
y
34 H6 outras pessoas no seio do lar ou da famflia que exercem outras actividades ?
1. Agricultor (subsistGncia)
2. Pequeno comerciante
3. ArtesSo
4. Grande comerciante
5. Assalariado do sector publico
6. Assalariado do sector privado
7. Operand do sector publico
8. Oper&rio do sector privado
9. Nao
y
3 5  0  chefe do laf ou da familia tem alguma
formagSo esco/ar (frequentou alguma vez uma escola) 7
Sim = 1 Nao =
Que nfvel de formagao atingiu 7
4ABOTA fSeitim  de'ttoehcaf R k M o J f G a f d : «
Pedimos que nos indique os nomes e respectivas idades de todas as pessoas que fazem parte do seu lar (familia). Por 
outro lado, gostarfamos que nos esclarecesse se  cada uma dessas pessoas que nos indicou, tiveram qualquer problem a 
de saude nas 4  ultimas semanas, mesmo que seja uma doenga sem  importSncia e para a qua/nSo foi sequer necessdrio 
fazer qualquer tipo de tratamento. Se algudm esteve vdrlas vezes doente no decurso dessas 4  ultimas semanas, indicar 
por favor a doenga mais recente bem como um qualquer outro tipo de doenga.
Nome da pessoa Idade Sexo
..
Doente N° de 
eplsddios
N° de 
Consu/tas 
na USB
Principal sinai ou queixa da ultima doenga
Sim NSo
17a
;  ■ j
18a 19a
/ / X
21a
3
22a
X .
23a
17b
A
18b 19b
X X
21b
X
22b 23b
17c
A
18c
/r
19c
X X
21c
3
22c 23c
d & t  x / d i
17 d
A  x* •*
18d
/ Z
19d
Ji X
21 d
. 3
22d 23d
17e
' A
18e
/ O
19e
X
X
21 e
z
22e 23e
1
c & l  C&Z /x X l
\til fzz til f fii fLl
in !ZZ HZ m m HI
Hit HZZ HIZ
t
'161 mi mi ^ .^.-i
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fil
/
hi
Diuoop Diuijjn op DXidrib no joins jodpuvj
asn
sojjnsuoj 
*P oN
soippsids 
9p oN
OPN ui;s
oxds dpopi DOSSdd op dWOfiJdjvdOQ
9
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MOH & LSHTM HOUSEHOLD INTERVIEW SCHEDULE
1 LOCATION CODE
NAME OF HOUSEHOLD HEAD
2 DATE
3 CLUSTER NUMBER
4 INTERVIEWER
5 START TIME
6 BUILDING TYPE
7 ROOF MATERIAL
□
No. name
brick and title (1)
local materials (2) 
combination (3)
thatch
aluminium
zinc
asbestos
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
I would like to talk to you about the health of those living In your household and 
the health care they nave been receiving. I would also like lo find out yours view:
and interest In an association to help with clinic and hospital fees. The contents
of our talk will be used only to help the ministry of health to understand the health 
problems of the people of this community. All your answers will be comfidential.
Status In household of person interviewed
head = 1 spouse = 2 parent = 3 child =4 other
IDENTIFICATION
8 COMPOUND NO.
9 VILLAGE NAME
10 NAME OF. RESPONDENT
11 AGE OF RESPONDENT
Inspection date \ \
TIME COMPLETED Supervisor's signature
Jun e  1993 
D Arhin
OSlfDOKU HEALTH EXPENDITURE AND HEALTH INSURANCE DEMAND STUDY page 2
12 What is your marital status?
13 What is your religion?
single (1J 
married (2) 
widowed (3)
Divorced/s (4)
Christian (1) 
Islam (2) 
Traditiona (3)
others (sp« (4)
14 Is there an adult in your houshold 
who is unwell today ?
yes
no
(1)
(2)
15 how do you consider the health of the bettter than a  (1 )
adults in this household compared to the same as < (2)
other households you know worse than ot (3)
16 Is there a child (any person under 18 yes (1)
years )in your houshold
who is UNWELL* today ? no (2)
‘ (provide meaning as below)
‘Unwell = having a health problem for which » 
treatment was sought, or would have beeri sought, 
if care had been available and could have been afforded
17 how do you consider the health of the 
the children,( the under 18 years olds)
in this household compares to children 
of the same age in other household?
18 are members entitled to free health 
care at the point of use?
if so state source of benefit______
bettter than others (1) 
the same as others (2)
worse than others (3)
yes
No
(1)
(2)
What Is the source of drinking water 
19 for this household?
20 Is your houshold supplied with 
electricity?
21 Does your household possess
items from the following three groups?
(a) cattle/truck/ tractor
(b) car/milling machl/comme. property
(c) TV/bicycie/sewing mach
(d) Radio/fan________________ _
tap in compound (1)
public standard pipe (2) 
stream/well (3)
dugout (4)
others (specify)_______
yes
No
group A 
group B + or 
group c +or -d 
group d only 
none________
(1)
(2)
+ or - oth (1) 
C (2)
(3)
(4)
M
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We would like to know a little about those people who usually live In this household and whether or not they have been UNWELL recently. By unwell 
we mean he or she has had a health problem for which treatment/cure was sought, or would have been health care had been avlalable and affordable
22 <------------ information from household head
NO USUAL RESIDENTS & VISITORS
Please give me the names of 
persons who usually live 
in your household or are stay*
Ing with you starting with the 
head of household
(D (2)
*01
'02
03
'04
'05
'06
TICK HERE IF CONTINUATION 
SHEET USED
RELATIONSHIP 
TO HOUSEHOLD 
HEAD
How Is (name) 
related to the 
household head ?
sex
Is (name) 
female or 
male ?
(3) (4)
> »
> »
» >
» >
» >
» >
(1) HOUSEHOLD HEAD
(2) SPOUSE
(3) PARENT
(4) CHILD
(5) RELATIVE /FRIEND
(1) FEMALE
(2) MALE
<----
AGE
How 
old Is 
he/she?
■self reported by each household member or parent-
EDUCATION
LEVEL
(5) (6)
□
(1) profess, training
(2) vocational tm
(3) Secondary
(4) middle sch
(5) primary
(6) None
NO. UNWELL THIS YEAR
OCCUPATION
If you have several 
please state the 
three major 
(Important first)
(7)
(1) crop farmer
(2) life stock farmer
(3) fisherman
(4) store/Wosk trader
(5) table trader
NO. UNWELL 
LAST 2WKS
UNWELL UNWELL 
PAST SINCE
TWO WEEK BEGINING 
OF YEAR
NO NO
YES to A2 YES to A2
(8) (9)
(6) labourer
(7) craftman/tradesman
(8) non-degree proffesslonal
(9) degree holder professional
OSUDOKU HEALTH EXPENDITURE AND HEALTH INSURANCE DEMAND STUDY
23 Would you be willing to Join an association that requires you to make regular contributions 
that would entitle ALL PERSONS in your household to recieve health care free of charge?
Yes ■ 1 No* 2 (skip to children only) if 2 then skip to children only option
first set A (insert a) if prfo=1 repeat as set B(ie insert b) if prfi=1 repeat as set B(ie insert b)
24 What would be the most money you would be willinging
and able to contribute in a year so that all your household could 
attend all facilities ie (community clinic, health posts, government
and mission, hospitals. > (insert a, b, or c) (a) for free out and in patient care?
(b) for free outpatient only care?
(c) for free inpatient care only?
25 What would be the most money you would be willinging
and able to contribute in a year so that all your household could 
attend Bator catholic hospitals only .....>....> (insert a, b, or c)
(a) for free out and in patient care?
(b) for free outpatient only care?
(c) for free inpatient care only?
26 What would be the most money you would be willinging
and able to contribute in a year so that all your household could 
level B, Health Post such as Volu — > — > (insert a, b, or c)
(a) for free out and in patient care?
(b) for free outpatient only care?
(c) for free inpatient care only?
27 What would be the most money you would be willinging 
and able to contribute in a year so that all your household
could attend Akuse government hospital on!y-> insert a, b, or c)
(a) for free out and in patient care?
(b) for free outpatient only care?
(c) for free inpatient care only?
28 What would be the most money you would be willinging . 
and able to contribute in a year so that all your household 
could attend only the nearest community clinics->~ (insert a, b, or c)
29 Name of nearest cc Volivo * 1 Klebuse *2 
Atobinya*3 Duffo*4
(a) for free out and in patient care?
(b) for free outpatient only care?
page 4
a
all care
b
outpatient
cedis (1000s)
C
inpatient
a
all care outpatient
cedis (1000s)
C
inpatient
a
all care outpatient(1UUU3)
C
inpatient
a
all care
cedis
outpatient
(1UUU3)
C
inpatient
a
all care outpatient
cedis (1000s)
OSUDOKU HEALTH EXPENDITURE AND HEALTH INSURANCE DEMAND STUDY page 4b
INTERVIEWER INSTRUCTIONS
If answer to 29b Is NO-  go to question 29c and Indicate 
reason by writting 1 if respodent selects the reason,
and 0 if not. Respondent may select any 
numbers of reasons
29c
fill squares of column a, b, c, or d with zero 
if corresponding 29b answer is yes
Why would you be unwilling or unable to pay ?
29b
An association wishing to provide free care at specific facilities for its members, will need to 
collect adequate contributions/dues per household. Would you be able willing and able to pay 
the following yearly contributions for the stated benefits for all persons in your household?
yes = 1 No = 2
a) four thousandcedis (c4,000.00) for free care at Bator mission hospital 
would you be willing and able to pay this amount to be a member?
b) three thousand cedis(c 3000.00) for free care at Akuse government hospital
would you be willing and able to pay this amount to be a member?
c) two thousand five hundred cedis(c 2,500.00) for free care at the nearest health 
post/centre-would you be willing and able to pay this amount to be a member?
d) one thousand five hundred cedis (c 1,500.00) for free care at a community clinics
would you be willing and able to pay this amount to be a member?
mission hosp. gov, hosp. health post Comm, clinic
Unable to afford such an amount
the quality of care provided at mission facilties Is inadequate
do not understand the idea of an association to share the costs of health care
Not worried about health care costs because my fiousehold is always healthy
My household already does not pay for health care at the point of use
Not willing to 'lose' my contribution if none in my household requires health
care during the year
other reason(s) (specify...............................................................................
OSUDOKU HEALTH EXPENDITURE AND HEALTH INSURANCE DEMAND STUDY
30 (prfo)
Would you prefer to join an association that collected less 
money for contribution and entitled all your household to 
to free outpatient care only
page 5
(prfi)
YES =1 NO =2 If yes repeat set 
above inserting b
31 Would you prefer to join an association that collected less 
money for contribution and entitled all your household to 
free inpatient care only If yes repeat set
YES =1 NO =2 above inserting c
32 Would you be willing to join an association that required you to make less contributions on 
on a regular basis but would entitle only the CHILDREN in your household to recieve health 
care free of charge?
YES=1 NO = 2
33 Would you be willing to join an association that required you to make less contributions on 
on a regular basis but would entitle only the ADULTS in your household to recieve health
care free of charge?
YES=1 NO = 2
If answers to ALL PERSONS, CHILDREN & ADULTS = 2 skip to Ever purchased
34 Would you prefere to make contribution(s) to this association
once a year =(1)
twice a year = (2)
four times a year = (3) 
monthly = (4) skip to Ever purchased
others
35 Which months of the year would prefer to make contributions
Ever purchased 
36 Have you purchased an insurance policy in the past?
If yes please specify.
YES=1 NO = 2
37
If you were a member of an association that 
provided free health care for you and your 
household which type of illness would you 
most value having free health care
common, non-life threatening & cheap
examples Asra (fever) (1)
Setsou (backache)
common non -life threatening & expensive
examples Tsueheo (Tuberculosis) (2)
Misikorm ( L. A. Pains) 
common life threatening and cheap
examples Asraku (High Fever)
Gvgorbem (Nose bleeding) (3)
common life threatening and expensive 
examples Akoroley (Hernia)
Gbedemi (measles) (4)
rare life threatening and expensive
examples Illnesses requiring operation
Dzlkunc anl Hiwe (snake bite)
Nyaaml- (cholera) (5)
reasons
OSUDOKU HEALTH EXPENDITURE AND HEALTH INSURANCE DEMAND STUDY
Transfers since the begining of the year (1993)
TRANSFERS OUT OF HOUSEHOLD
38
recipients relationship parent 
to head of household child
brother /sister
inkind(specify type)
40
42 cash
other
food (1)
clothes (2)
accom'datlon (3) 
health care (4) 
education (5) 
other
Cedis (1000s)
TRANSFERS INTO HOUSEHOLD 
43 tranferee's relationshii parent 
to household head child
inkind(specify type)
44
46 Cash
47 Purpose of cash 
transfer
brother/sister
friend
other
food (1)
clothes (2)
accom'datlon (3) 
health care (4) 
education (5) 
other
cedis 1000s
39
j,12)
f t
41 cash equivalent
j'2)
45  ctsh equivalent
Subsistance (1)
school fees ('2)
trading capital (3)
investment capita (4)
_________________________________________________ page 6___________
48  Are you a member of any saving group or associations that provided financial 
assistance in times of unforseen need eg death andillnesS? yes=1 no=2 
specify____________________________________  ___
Which would you prefere if given the chioce of prize money today or a larger 
amount next year. Please consider the following prizes and the bigger 
in a years time
now =1 later= 2
49 Would you take 1,000 cedis today or wait to recieve 1,100 cedis in a years time?
50 Would you take3000cedis today or wait to recieve 3600 cedis in a years time? f
51 Would you take 4000cedis today or wait to recieve 5600 cedis in a years time? [
52 Would you take 5000cedis today or wait to recieve 7500 cedis in a years time?
53 Would you take 8000cedis today or wait to recieve 11600 cedis in a years time?
54 Is it better to purchase goods such as tv & fine cloths to use today or 
to save the money to be used at a later state?
YES = 1 NO = 2
55 How will prices of goods in the market and stores increase in the coming 
year?
will Increase by 25% «(1)
will Increase by 30% = (2)
win Increase by 50% *  (3)
Increase 100% or more a (4) ________________________
__________don't know_______ = (5)__________________________
OSUDOKU HEALTH EXPENDITURE AND HEALTH INSURANCE DEMAND STUDY page 7
HOUSEHOLD PRODUCTION Production activities during minor'Gbo" season (Aug. 1992-Jan 1993) dry No. wet No.
Farm input previous minor" Gbo" seasson August 92 to Januar Flshina for large eg. Ozo (1) quantity cought
type . codes quantity medium eg. Kpoku (2)
small eg. Agorkpo (3) processed
labour No. days
self (1)
family met (2) animals rearing(speclfy numbers sold
hired (3) i cows (1) sheep (2)
ohers goats (3) pigs (4) Itrs of milk
seeds borrowed (1) bags/tins retail trading (specify) beer(1) others drinks (2)
from past I (2) provisions (3) veg &frutt (4) quantity sold
purchased (3) cloths (5) others........
machinarv days\acreage Poultarv rearing(speclfy) hlcken/GuInea f (1) numbers sold
plouging (1) turkey (2)
harvesting (2) duck (3) No. of eggs
transpt (3) Sale of manual labour
days worked
Crop farmina output previous minor season" Gbo" persons mare aauit ( i;
female adult (2)
crop type measure 
bags rice (1)
units sold 
consummed Sale of skilled labour/ 
professional skills
bkets tomatoes (’2) months employed
bkets pepper (3) child (3)
bags casarva (4)
bkets okro (5) \ Other outputs from householc firewood collection (1) units of measure quanitity
bags corn (6) (please specify output type) charcoal burning (2)
others specify i i
respondents estimate of
households annual Income.
OSUSUKO AREA HEALTH EXPENDITURE AND HEALTH INSURANCE DEMAND STUDY
HOUSEHOLD LOCATION NO. I symptoms codes
A2
NAME OF MEMBERS 
MAIN SYMPTOMS
RECALL PERIOD
SEX
1 --------------------------------------------------
3 ——————
6 MONTHS=1 2 WEEKS =2
health record sheet
code
Action Action 
record type 
No.
(1) (2 )
days <------------- direct costs (1000s cedis) *-------------- >
admitted consultation drug others
not addmltteds NA
(3) (4) (5)
<—Indirect costs (1000s cedis— > level of
transport
(6)
others 
(Important first)
(7)
statisfaction
(8)
Outcome 
of action
(9)
•01
'02
03
'04
'05
» >
» >
» >
» >
» >
(6) LOCAL HEALTH CENTRE 
i! i) NOTHING /WAITED / SPIRITUAL HEALER (7) AKUSA GOVERN. HOSP. 
:2 ) TRADITIONAL MED SELF ADMIN. (8) ASUTURA MCH CUNtC
•■3' PHARMACUETICAL SELF MED (9) VOLU ?
IBATTOR (10) OTHER (SPECIFY),
»S! COMMUNITY CLINIC-------------------------------- ------ --------------------------
TICK HERE IF CONTINUATION 
SHEET USED _________
□
(10)
If yes specify
Has respondent had an operation as
a result of any of the above actions?___________
yes *  1 No *  2 I I action No.
(1) very high
(2) high
(3) low
(1) problem persisted
(2) minor Improvement
(3) complete recovery
NOTE ques. (9)
If answers are either 1 or 2
Inquire If another action was taken 
and complete another action record
OSUDOKU HEALTH EXPENDITURE AND HEALTH INSURANCE DEMAND STUDY (ROUND 2) page 1
HOUSEHOLD LOCATION INFORMATION 
LOCATION CODE
VILLAGE NAME
NAME OF HEAD..................................................... AGE
The purpose of our visit today Is to continue the work the Ministry of Health 
has been doing in this district. This work is trying to find out from people 
their views and interest in an association to help with clinic and hospital . 
fees
1 Did this household take part in the first round interviews?
Yes =1 NO = 2 Don't Know = 9 Q1
If" don't know inquire from other members
AGE OF RESPONDENT
VILLAGE NAME
NAME OF RESPONDENT
CONFIRMATION OF HOUSEHOLDS IDENTITY
COMPOUND NO.
Q5
Q4
Q3
Q2
PLEASE PROVIDE THE EXPLANATION BELOW BEFORE MOVING TO PAGE 2
Thank you for your answers during the first Interview. They were very helpful and have raised 
several specific questions about the willingness of people to contribute to an association 
that helps with clinic and hospital fees. In this interview I shall ask those questions. I would 
also like to talk to you about the health of those living in your household since our last visit 
and the health care they have been receiving. All your answers will be treated as private 
and confidential.
DATE
INTERVIEWER No.
INTERVIEWER’S NAME
START TIME
TIME COMPLETED
Inspection date \ \
Continue Interview with explanation If Identity corresponds to given location No, Supervisor’s signature 
otherwise terminate (Interview and Inform supervisor Immediately
OSUDOKU HEALTH EXPENDITURE AND HEALTH INSURANCE DEMAND STUDY (ROUND 2)
6 Do you think associations that help individuals with the costs of funerals and other such 
unxpected costs are needed in this communnity?
Yes = 1 No* 2 donl Know *  9
page 2 
Q6
7 In the past have you had any difficulties paying the costs involved in seeking clinic or hosptial 
care for yourself or a member of your household?
infrequently =3 Never = 4Many time =1 Some times =2
8 Have you exprienced such difficulties within the the last six months?
Yes =1 NO =2 can not remember = 9 If no or cannot remember Jump to question No. 10
TOTAL
Q7
Q8
CONSULTATION DRUGS
9 If you have had difficulties in the last six months what sums of money were involved? 
Please states separately that for transport consulatation drugs and others
(cedis 1000s)
10 What would be the main reason for immunizing your children (1) To reduce the likely hood that they will get childhood c
(2) To stop them getting ill
(3) Others
11 Please may we see the Road to Health Charts of the children in this household who are aged 2-5 years
iseases
Q10
1 = available for inspection
2 = not available Q11
12 Instructions for Interviewer & supervisor 
Interviwer to fill in Immunization status box
before answering Q7 child 1
child 2
tick for given immunization 
if not given "X"
13 Do you smoke or have ever smoked?
Yes currently =1 yes In the past =2 no,never =3
child 3 
child 4
DPT 3 or 
OPV 3 GIVEN REASON FOR NON-IMMUNIZATIONS
others
Q9
N/A =777
Q12
Q13
Has the claim that smoking damages your health and Increases your chances of 
illness Influenced your decision whether or not to smoke?
yes,stopped me from start!ng=1 Yes, was the reason for stopping =2
No, has not effected my smoking =3 I have not heard this claim =4 other =5
1=ALL/MOST IMMUNIZ.
2= LESS THAN HALF IMMUNIZ. 
7 = N/A
Q13b
OSUDOKU HEALTH EXPENDITURE AND HEALTH INSURANCE DEMAND STUD1 (ROUND 2) page
14 Of course one cannot tell what will happen tomorrow but it Is possible that you or some other adult In your household may become ill.
The person may then need to go to the clinic or hospital. If that person Is treated and allowed home 
what would you expect the costs involved to be?
consultation
Don't know = 99
Minimum amount 
Maximum amount
drugs
cedis (1000s) 
transport others
Q14
15 Again one cannot tell what will happen tomorrow but it is possible that a child in your household may become ill.
That child may then need to go to the clinic or hospital. If that child is treated and allowed home 
what would you expect the costs involved to be? consultation
Minimum amount 
Maximum amount
drugs
cedis (1000s) 
transport others
Q15
16 If it happens that the adult is admitted in the hospital for one week (seven days) for treatment and is allowed home
what would you expect the costs involved to be? cedis (1000s)
consultation drugs
Minimum amount 
Maximum amount
transport others
Q16
17 If it happens that the child is admitted In the hospital for one week (seven days) for treatment and Is allowed home
what would you expect the costs Involved to be? cedis (looos)
consultation drugs_______ transport others
Minimum amount 
Maximum amount Q17
18 From your past experience how often in a year do you expect that you or another adult In your 
household will visit a clinic or hpspital for treatment and return home the same day?
Q18
19 again from your past experience how often in a year do you expect that a child In your 
household will visit a clinic or hospital for treatment and return home the same day?
Q19
OSUDOKU HEALTH EXPENDITURE AND HEALTH INSURANCE DEMAND STUDV
20
What is the most amount of money that you would be willing 
and able to contribute each year to be a member of an associtation 
that allowed your household to have outpatient care free at a clinic?
This clinic would be within an hour of walking and be staffed 
by nurses. Equipement for physical and laboratory examinations 
would be available. Drugs would also be available at the clinic 
Members of the association would help manage the clinic
Don't know=99per childper adult
What is the most amount of money that you would be willing 
and able to contribute each year to be a member of an associtation 
that allowed your household to be admitted and treated at Battor 
Hospital free of charge and when it became necessary?
per childper adult
Don't know = 99
What is the most amount of money that you would be willing and able to
contribute each year to be a member of an associtation that allowed your 
household cloud be treated free of charge at this nearby clinic and also be 
admitted at Battor Hopsital free of charge if and when it became necessary*?
Don't know = 99
per childper adult
(ROUND 2) page 4
23 From the work done In this area last year it was found that,
on the average, an adult attends clinics about once and a child about twice
per year. It has also been found that the average expense per outpatient attendence is
about C 4,200 per adult and about C 3,600 per child. This covered consultation fee anc
drugs.
Given this information would you change the amount you are willing and able to pay 
as a member to allow your household to have free outpatient care.
Not revised = 888per adult per child
24 Similarly from the work done in this area last year it was found that,
on the average, about six out of every 100 young to middle aged adults will be admittec
in hospital. In the case of children, it was eight out of every 100 
will be admitted. It was also calculated that the average expense per inpatient admission 
is C 15,000 per adult and C9.800 per child, This covered consultation fee and drugs.
Given this Information would you change the amount you are willing and able to pay 
as a member to allow your household to be admitted and treated at Battor Hospital 
free of charge
Not revised = 888
per adult per child
25 Given this information would you change the amount you are willing and able to pay 
as a member to allow your household to receive free treatment at the clinic and to be Ba 
admitted free of charge to Battor Hospital should they become unwell
Not revised = 888
per child
OSUDOKU HEALTH EXPENDITURE AND HEALTH INSURANCE DEMAND STUDY (ROUND 2) page 5
We would like to know whether since our last visit to this household some people have moved In or out and whether anyone has been UNWELL. By unwell 
we mean he or she has had a health problem for which treatment/cure was sought, or would have been health care had been avialable and affordable
No USUAL RESIDENTS & VISITORS
'01
'02
03
'04
'05
'06
Please confirm the names of 
persons who usually live 
in your household or are stay­
ing with you starting with the 
head of household
(1) (2)
ICK HERE IF CONTINUATION 
SHEET USED
■Information from household head_- 
sex
Is (name) 
female or 
male?
(3)
(1) FEMALE
(2) MALE
□
CURRENT STATUS
-self reported or by parent of a child- 
AGE
(4)
please . 
confirm his 
or her age
(5)
UNWELL
PAST
TWO WEEK
UNWELL 
SINCE 
BEGINING 
OF YEAR
(1) still living In household
(2) Moved out of household
(3) Has died
(4)arrlved since round 1
No. unwell 
since round 1
TICK IF 
details same 
as recode sheet
NO
YES. _toA2
NO
YES. .to A2
(6) (7) (8)
NO. UNWELL 
LAST 2 WKS
OSUOOKU HEALTH EXPENDITURE AND HEALTH INSURANCE DEMAND STUDY (ROUND 2) Page 6
Transfers since mid 1993 (ie since our first interview)
TRANSFERS OUT OF HOUSEHOLD
38
recipients relationship parent 
to head of household child
brother/sister 
other
inkind(specify type)
40
42 cash
food (T
clothes (2)
accom'datlon (3) 
health care (4) 
education (5) 
other
Cedis (1000s)
TRANSFERS INTO HOUSEHOLD 
43 tranferee's relationshii parent 
to household head child
inkind(specify type)
44
•is Cash
47 Purpose of cash 
transfer
39
j'2)
f t
41 cash equivalent
j'2)
H
brother /sister 
friend 
other
food (1)
clothes (2)
accom'datlon (3) 
health care (4) 
education (5) 
other
cedis 1000s
Subsistance 
school fees 
trading capital 
investment capita (4)
45  cash equivalent
j'2)
(3)
4 8  Are you or have you ever been a member of any saving group or associations that 
provides financial assistance in times of unforseen need eg death and illness ?
yes= 1 no=2 year of membership
In which situations do members benefit from the association eg death of relative illness 
specify____________________________________
How much money is /was contributed annually per member ?
cedis
it better to purchase goods such as tv & fine cloths to use today or 
to save the money to be used at a later state?
YES = 1 NO = 2
How will prices of goods in the market and stores increase in the coming 
year?
= (1) 
a (2)
*(3)
will Increase by 25% 
win Increase by 30% 
will Increase by 50%
Increase 100% or more = (4)
don't know = (5)
OSUDOKU HEALTH EXPENDITURE AND HEALTH INSURANCE DEMAND STUDY (ROUND 2) page 7
HOUSEHOLD PRODUCTION
Farm input previous major " Gbie" seasson Mid -erid 1993
type codes quantity
labour No.
self (1)
days
family mei (2)
hired (3)
ohers
seeds borrowed (1) bags/tins
from past I (2)
purchased (3)
machinary days\acreage
plouging (1)
harvesting (2)
transpt (3)
Crop farming output previous minor seasc>n ■ Gbo"
crop type measure 
bags rice (1)
units sold 
consummed
bkets tomatoes (•2)
bkets pepper (3)
bags casarva (4)
bkets okro (5) \
bags corn (6)
others specify
Production activities during major "Gbie" season 1993
Fishing for
animals rearfngfspecifv
retail trading (spec fy)
Poultarv rearlng(specifv)
Sale of manual labour
Sale of skilled labour/
large eg. Dzo (1) 
medium eg. Kpoku (2)
small eg. Agorkpo (3)
cows (1) sheep (2) 
goats (3) pigs (4)
beer(1) others drinks (2) 
provisions (3) veg &fmlt (4) 
cloths (5) others____
hlcken/Gulnea f  (1) 
turkey (2)
duck (3)
persons 
maie aauit ( i;
professional sk I is female adult (2)
months employed
child (3)
quantity cought 
processed
numbers sold 
Itrs of milk
quantity sold
numbers sold
No. of eggs 
days worked
dry No. wet No.
Other outputs from householc 
(please specify output type)
firewood collection (1) 
charcoal burning (2)
units of measure quanitity
respondents estimate of 
households annual income.
OSUSUKO AREA HEALTH EXPENDITUR
HOUSEHOLD LOCATION NO.
E AND HEALTH INSURANCE DEMAND STUDY
symptoms codes
A2
NAME OF MEMBERS 
MAIN SYMPTOMS
RECALL PERIOD
— AGE
SEX
6 MONTHS=1 2 WEEKS =2
health record sheet
code
Action Action
record type days <------------- direct costs (1000s cedis)------ ------
No. admitted consultation drug others
not addmltteds NA
( 1)
'01
'02
03
'04
*05
(2) (3) (4) (5)
<—Indirect costs (1000s cedis— > level of 
transport others statisfaction
(Important first)
(6) (7) (8)
Outcome 
of action
(9)
» >
» >
» >
» >
» >
(6) LOCAL HEALTH CENTRE 
i) NOTHING /WAITED / SPIRITUAL HEALER (7) AKUSA GOVERN. HOSP. 
:2 ) TRADITIONAL MED SELF ADMIN. (0) ASUTURA MCH CLINIC »
■J. PHARMACUETICAL SELF MED (9)VOLU?
BATTOR (10) OTHER (SPECIFY).
'5! COMMUNITY CLINIC — — — — ------ . . . . . . .
TICK HERE IF CONTINUATION 
SHEET USED
□
(10)
If yes specify
Has respondent had an operation as
a result of any of the above actions?___________
yes *  1 No a 2 I I action No.
(1) very high 
2 high 
(3) low
(1) problem persisted
(2) minor Improvement
(3) complete recovery
NOTE ques. (9)
If answers are either 1 or 2
Inquire If another action was taken 
and complete another action record
Appendix 3: Osudoku sub-district census
1APPENDIX 2A 
Osudoku Sub-district census
The sub-district is divided into 29 units. These divisions are based on population, and are used by 
the CDRs and district council Each unit has a unit CDR chairman. We used these units as the basis 
for enumeration; and the unit chairmen as the enumerators. Each unit is made up of several small 
villages with anything from 1 to 40 or 50 houses. Before the census each unit chairman was asked 
to list the villages making up his unit This was to act as a check to make sure no village was 
overlooked in the enumeration. This list is provided below.
•  Dormelian Unit DM
Mormortsonya
Amaganya
Djemam
Kenekope
New Town
Ablorkope
Akordum
Lomen
•  Kasunya Unit KS
Kasunya
Kisseh-Kopey
Setse-Kopey
Kwaosi-Kopey
Fulani-Kopey
•  VolivoUnitVO
Volivo Gbesedom 
Volivo Tekoursi 
Volivo Lanor 
Mafi-KorpeNo.l 
Mafi-Korpe No.2 
Chief-Korpe
•  Agortor Unit AG
Teye Kwesi Korpey 
Ayertey Obodai Korpey 
Teye Kwao Korpey 
Kwesi Gaga Korpey 
Korsie Korpey 
Narh Sadodji Korpey
Akomo Kwao Korpey 
Narteh Djikuteh Korpey 
Mauna Okeletse Korpey 
Ahuma Akotia Korpey 
Sadjo Korpey 
Asanatse Korpey 
Korleteytse Korpey
•  Gozah-Korpe Unit GO
Gozah-Kope 
Akokokorpey 
Mihadah-kope 
Borkimataso 
Zongo line
•  Duffor Unit DU
Atabui 
Duffor 
Takpe-Korpe 
37 village
•  Congo Unit CO
Congo village 
Congo Sikanti 
Bawa Korpe 
Asutuare Military Camp 
Zanidor 
Awudu Korpe 
Sowah farm
•  Osuwem Unit 1 OS
Dakarkusi Part 1
Korle-Bu
Dormekope
Wuronu
Ween
Weto
•  Natriku Unit NA
Natiku
Amatekope
Kwadzo-Kope
•  Kortorkor Unit KO
Kormorekpo
Tetsosi
Kokotey Korpe 
Kortorkor 
Kortorkor 
Asimeh Korpe 
Tankporm 
Issa Korpe 
Kortorkor Salem
•  Ada Korpe Unit AD
Takpomya
Dorse
Amefarfor
Adakope
Saine
•  Kasunya-Adidome Unit KA
Kasunya-Adidome 
Edzorwu Kope 
Agbodzalu Kope 
Brother Kope 
Dafolenyame 
Dadematse kope 
Dzovor Kope 
Odomieabra
•  Nyapienya Unit NY
Maakpo
Dadematsekope
Nankpo
Fulani Kope 
Nyakumakope 
Ogbeteyohe 
Gblorkpokope
•  Abuviekpong Unit AU
Abider Kope 
Gatsiku Korpey 
Torbokor Korpey 
Daledzime Korpey 
Waleku Korpey 
Doku Korpey 
Edevi Korpey
•  Kadjanya Unit KD
Akukpong
Tenya
Atsavanya
Gortsom
Kadjanya
No Smoking
James Town
•  Asutuare Unit 1 AA
Agave 
Bokorkpey 
Saletsokpo 
Asutuare New Town 
Local Council
•  Asutuare Unit 2 AS
Tsangmer
Tankpom
Swarpo
Zongo
Namibia
•  Asutuare Unit 3 AD
Dorm 
Kopoanya 
Father Korpe 
Sikamawu 
Tamatey Korpe
Appendix 4: Evaluation of regression models
Scatterplot of predicted and observed log WTP
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Scatterplot of predicted and observed log WTP values
Model 1 for child cover
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Scatterplot of predicted and observed log WTP values
Model 2 for child cover
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Residuals versus predicted log WTP
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Residuals versus predicted log WTP values
Model 1 for child cover
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Residuals versus predicted log WTP values
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